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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis posed the question whether foreign arbitral awards are enforced in accordance with the 
demands of the New York Convention in the UAE and Bahrain and moreover whether the conditions 
for enforcement compel the conclusion that these two nations are enforcement-friendly in the same 
manner as leading arbitral nations such as the UK, France, Hong-Kong and NYC. On the basis of 
legislative and judicial practice in the UAE and Bahrain it was found that Bahrain and all UAE 
emirates, with the exception of Dubai, are enforcement friendly and more importantly place few 
constraints on the enforcement of foreign awards. Dubai is also enforcement-friendly but a small 
number of decisions, particularly Bechtel, leave significant latitude to foreign investors to consider 
Dubai courts, and particularly its court of Cassation, as dubious when it comes to enforcement.  
  
It was also found that Islamic law per se is not an obstacle in the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards and very few constraints were found from the perspective of public policy and arbitrability in 
particular. In fact, the courts of Bahrain and the UAE have applied a rather liberal interpretation of 
Islamic law in order to accommodate arbitral practices that have been sustained in other jurisdictions 
and under the lex mercatoria with a view to assisting the commercial vision of the two nations. 
Hence, it was found that Islamic law is an enabling vehicle in the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in the UAE and Bahrain, rather than an obstacle. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The Hypothesis 
 
There is an absence of analytical bibliography on the law and practice relating to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the UAE and Bahrain. The reason for this is that 
both countries, in response to the Saudi rejection of arbitration in the 1950s and 1960s, 
followed the same path and it was not until recently that they realised that alternative dispute 
resolution was a crucial factor in international investment and globalised trade. It was not 
enough for a country to provide investment incentives or be trade-friendly; rather, it 
transpires that a country becomes commercially attractive primarily if it provides legal 
certainty and adheres to the rule of law. The choice to submit business disputes to arbitration 
and have awards enforced in a country no doubt contribute to a rule of law image. The utility 
of arbitration was only rather recently realised in the UAE and Bahrain, particularly in the 
early 1990s, when other industrialised nations had already taken a significant lead.
1
 
 The absence of significant arbitral initiatives in the two nations under examination 
necessarily meant that the field was not discussed at government level, or indeed at university 
level and among local lawyers. It is instructive that alternative dispute resolution chairs and 
lectureships are a recent phenomenon in both the UAE and Bahrain. It is not therefore strange 
that there is very little commentary on arbitral law and practice, even in Arabic, which as I 
will explain later on has not been relied to any great degree in the thesis. Rather, the focus has 
been on English-speaking material, save for primary sources. Equally, however, the relevant 
works in English are sparse and the few English-language books take the form of 
commentaries with little devotion to analysis because they are intended as practitioners’ 
guides and are written with this audience in mind.
2
 Alongside this, one finds short comments 
by lawyers, both Arab and non-Arab, working in the region, but such materials are 
                                                          
1
 This in no way means that one of the aims of the thesis was to decipher whether or not the law had made an 
impact on business or other social aspects of life. This is a matter that befalls the law and social change literature 
which is beyond the purview of this thesis. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, it may be possible to discern, 
although indirectly, some impacts on the social and business climate in the UAE and Bahrain as a result of 
legislative and judicial initiatives. See SL Roach-Anleu, Law and Social Change (Sage Publications, 2009). 
2
 See, for example, the excellent work by AH El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (Kluwer, 3
rd
 
edition, 2011), which is an exhaustive guide on the arbitral laws and practices of all Arab nations. However, its 
nature is principally that of a commentary. See also E Al-Tamimi, Practical Guide to Litigation and Arbitration 
in the United Arab Emirates (Brill, 2003). 
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necessarily short, less analytic than one would have hoped for and are intended equally for 
professional audiences. 
 Hence, the result of these considerations is that there is little understanding as to the 
driving forces, the dynamics, the interplay between policy and law and a direction in respect 
of the enforcement practice of courts and tribunals in the UAE and Bahrain. There is a 
widespread assumption that the two countries are not averse to arbitration and are in fact as 
arbitration-friendly as most Western nations and yet we know very little about the reasons 
behind the attitudes of their courts. 
 The hypothesis underlying this thesis is that there are various strands in the 
enforcement practice of the courts of the UAE and Bahrain. The first strand is coloured by 
the dictates encompassed in the Qur’an and the sunnah and from an outward perspective 
these seem to play a significant role in the drafting of legislation. Yet, unlike Saudi Arabia, 
direct religious sources play only a minor restraining role in the legal systems of UAE and 
Bahrain and at best their significance relates to public policy and certain matters of 
arbitrability. The second strand is of a secular nature. The courts and the authorities in the 
two nations have gone far beyond the strict injunctions in the Qur’an, as have other countries 
in the region and the Arab world, including Oman, Kuwait and North African nations, and 
have effectively given rise to a new secular commercial environment, which in turn has had a 
significant impact on the law of arbitration and especially their enforcement laws and 
practices. A poignant illustration concerns the charging of commercial interest, which 
although prohibited under the Qur’an, the UAE and Bahrain have designated ceiling limits to 
financial institutions. The hypothesis thus assumes that the courts in the two countries adhere 
to the secular strand and only employ the Qur’anic strand in exceptional circumstances and 
then again without much consistency or predictability. The Bechtel case,
3
 which will be 
explored extensively in the course of this thesis, will demonstrate that religious injunctions – 
which have passed into statute law – are applied by some courts in isolated instances in order 
to protect particular interests; in the case at hand, to avoid enforcing an arbitral award that 
awarded significant damages against a government entity. Nonetheless, the underlying 
assumption throughout the thesis is that such exceptions to liberal enforcement constitute 
isolated incidents and by no means the norm. 
 
                                                          
3
 International Bechtel Co Ltd v Department of Civil Aviation of the Government of Dubai, Dubai Court of 
Cassation, case No 503/2003, judgment (15 May 2004). This same result was later reaffirmed by the Court in 
case No 322/2004, judgment (11 April 2005). 
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Methodology 
 
As already stated, this author was aware from the outset that there existed a very limited 
Arab-language bibliography on the subject matter of this thesis. In fact, although there is a 
strong legal culture in both the UAE and Bahrain, legal training there does not have a 
tradition of extensive and analytical legal writing, as is the case in the UK and USA. Equally, 
the idea of precedent is rather novel, despite the fact, and unlike Saudi Arabia, that it is 
employed by the courts and the practitioners. Moreover, given that the primary audience of 
the thesis is the new generation of Bahraini and UAE lawyers, as well as foreign 
practitioners, law students and researchers, it was felt that the Arab-language bibliography 
had little to add to the analysis of the subject matter. Finally, an outstanding consideration 
was also the fact that it would have been impossible for non-Arab speaking supervisors and 
external examiners to determine the veracity of statements, quotes and references in Arabic 
introduced into the text by the author. For all these reasons, it was decided in advance with 
my supervisor that I would employ English-speaking material in respect of primary and 
secondary literature, mainly textbooks, monographs and articles.
4
 
 However, it was also acknowledged that there were inherent limitations to this 
methodological approach. The primary limitation was that the thesis would fail to achieve 
originality if it did not examine cases and materials from the case law of the courts of Bahrain 
and UAE. Given that these judgments and orders are produced in Arabic it would have made 
little sense to try and retrieve them in English. The International Journal of Arab Arbitration 
contains an extensive list of national court judgments devoted to matters of arbitration, but it 
only publishes summaries of said judgments, which are clearly inadequate for research at 
doctoral level. Hence, it was decided between my supervisor and I that I should retrieve and 
examine all cases determined in the last 20-25 years in the courts of the UAE and Bahrain 
with a view to assessing which of these constitute an effective precedent and to use these as a 
skeleton for my thesis. In fact, one of the original elements of the thesis is the research 
conducted with respect to these cases. The first year of my studies was spent on retrieving, 
reading and making brief comments on all of these cases. 
                                                          
4
 This was made easier by the fact that certain institutions in both nations operate officially under the English 
language. A typical example is the Dubai Financial Investment Centre (DFIC) whose working language is 
English and the judgments of its courts are also in English, courtesy of the fact that the judges appointed are 
from English-speaking nations. 
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 It was also decided early on with my supervisor that I should not make a significant 
effort to retrieve arbitral awards relating to the UAE and Bahrain that were otherwise 
unavailable to the general public by reason of confidentiality agreements. This proved to be a 
good strategy because in a short quest to find some arbitral awards I was driven to a dead-end 
and in any event there is no evidence that any meaningful outcome would have been derived 
by having access to them. Given that the principal aim of the thesis is to assess how foreign 
arbitral awards are enforced in the UAE and Bahrain, it is only the role and attitudes of the 
enforcing courts that matter and not the intentions of the parties and the deliberations of the 
arbitrators. 
 My supervisor moreover advised me not to enter into quantitative analyses or 
undertake any interviews with officials in the two nations because they would offer no visible 
benefits to the thesis.
5
 It would have been ideal had we had the benefit of statements by the 
judges, but it was known to this author from the outset that judges were instructed not to 
provide any interviews on matters related to their work and hence no attempt was made to go 
down this path. However, this author, in the course of his ordinary research in the past three 
years, has been in contact with numerous practitioners working in the region and who have 
made their views known. Although the author did not record these views and did not as a 
result try to incorporate them in the current thesis, many of his ideas and assumptions have 
necessarily been painted, to a larger or lesser degree, by these conversations. In fact, these 
discussions helped the author to understand some of the underlying politics behind particular 
judgments, as well as the politics of practitioners, whether local or international law firms and 
their perceptions of the legal systems of the UAE and Bahrain. 
 As a result, the primary basis of this thesis is library-based and lacks any empirical 
research or the use of questionnaires.
6
 It has relied on original materials published in the 
                                                          
5
 An original idea that was put on the table was to interview junior and senior ministers as well as policy –
makers in the field of commerce and international investment and contrast their views and aspirations with the 
reality on the ground. This was later, however, viewed as unproductive and significantly time-consuming with 
no visible results in the horizon. For example, it is not clear, or indeed certain, that said ministers would offer 
any new insights, such that would make a substantial outcome to any of the points raised in the thesis. 
Moreover, given that there was no aim from the outset to measure the effects and impact of the law and policies 
on social change, such an empirical strand to the thesis would have been superfluous. 
6
 By library-based I should make the disclaimer that a number of materials collected for the purposes of this 
thesis were not found in libraries and many of the Arab-language material that was read and not used was found 
through personal contacts in the UAE and Bahrain. In addition, some of the recent court judgments by the Dubai 
Court of Cassation were retrieved by this author from their original source given that at the time of writing the 
chapters in which they are contained they were not publicly available. 
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Arabic language, namely court judgments and documents, as well as available secondary 
literature in English.
7
 
 It should be noted that, in agreement with the instructions of my supervisor, it was 
decided that the decisive issue was the quality of the final outcome and not its size. As a 
result, given the acknowledged scarcity of available material it was decided that the thesis 
should make up for the shortfall by examining – essentially reiterating – the judgments of 
other courts around the world from a comparative perspective. Rather, this author felt that it 
was best that he concentrate exclusively on material from the UAE and Bahrain even if this 
meant that the total size of the thesis was shorter than usual. Nonetheless, it is natural that 
precedential and significant judicial determinations offered by courts around the world were 
important aspects of this author’s analysis because arbitration is above all global and the 
decision of one court does, and should, play a part in the decisions of other courts around the 
globe. 
 
Originality of the Thesis 
 
In the course of the last decade there have been a number of doctoral theses, especially in the 
UK, dealing with matters of arbitration in the Gulf, and some of these have dealt with the 
particular issue of enforcement. However, to the best of this author’s knowledge no thesis has 
been written dealing with the enforcement of arbitral awards in the UAE and Bahrain.
8
 This 
as of itself is a significant element of originality and as already stated the general works on 
arbitration in the Gulf do not possess the academic and analytical rigour associated with a 
doctoral thesis. 
 Secondly, many of the judgments analysed in the course of this thesis are not 
accessible to non-Arab speakers. Although some of these have appeared in English-language 
periodicals this has been achieved in the form of summaries and excerpts. No rigorous 
analysis has ever been attempted in respect of these cases nor have they been linked to wider 
                                                          
7
 It should be noted that a good source of information has been the websites of local and international law firms 
working within the jurisdiction of the UAE and Bahrain. Most of these law firms proceed to post new judgments 
and other developments and their lawyers provide timely analyses thereof. Although such analyses are meant to 
be descriptive and thus do not possess significant academic rigour because their primary audience are 
prospective clients, nonetheless they do provide professional insights that are otherwise unavailable and 
inaccessible in textbooks and monographs. 
8
 This disclaimer is made in respect of English-language theses that were submitted in countries around the 
world for which there exists a register of successful doctoral theses. Theses with little or significant references 
to arbitration in the UAE and Bahrain do however exist. 
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policy imperatives nor  has there been an assessment as to their conformity to Islamic legal 
principles. Moreover, some of the cases analysed are of recent import, some handed down as 
recently as 2011 and 2012 and hence this is the first time that they are being introduced to a 
wider audience.
9
 
 Finally, as will become evident, most of the analyses on the laws of Gulf nations have 
fleeting references to Islamic law and its compatibility with said legislation. In light of the 
quasi-secular nature of Gulf legal practice it is widely assumed that Islamic law has little 
relevance to arbitration. However, no in-depth research on this matter has taken place and the 
assumption is merely fed by speculation. This author has devoted significant sections to 
Islamic law in each chapter and demonstrates how and where contemporary legislation seeks 
to meet or deviate from the prescriptions of the Qur’an and the sunnah. This is yet another 
original element of this thesis, which it is hoped will shed some light on the juxtaposition 
between the two and demonstrate that they exist in significant harmony with Islam not being 
irrelevant at all. The final outcome clearly demonstrates that even where an express 
injunction in the Qur’an is violated by particular arbitral legislation, the legislator is at pains 
to justify the deviation on the basis of Islamic law and philosophy. 
 
The Structure of the Work 
 
The thesis is devoted to exploring the modalities, challenges and obstacles in the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards in the UAE and Bahrain.
10
 It was assumed from the outset that the 
two nations had similar legal systems, similar economic capacity and similar aspirations in 
relation to becoming international arbitration centres for parties to solve their disputes. 
Hence, this was not meant to be a comparison between two dissimilar laws. An introduction 
to each chapter is as follows: 
 
 
                                                          
9
 In fact, the only English-language monograph on the legal system of any of the two countries under 
consideration in this thesis is by H Al-Radhi, Judiciary and Arbitration in Bahrain: Historical and Analytical 
Study (Brill, 2003). 
10
 The original title of the thesis encompassed also an analysis of the relevant laws of Qatar, this being a small 
and rich Arab nation, with a legal system similar to that of the UAE and Bahrain and with a jurisprudence that 
was to a large degree compatible with that of the other two nations. However, ultimately, a decision was taken 
to exclude Qatar from this work on the basis that the thesis would become less focused and look more like a 
comparative analysis. A significant part of the decision to exclude Qatar was also the fact that very little 
English-language bibliography exists on its arbitral laws and practices and this would have made any 
contribution by this author futile. 
 7 
 
Chapter 1a 
 
This chapter aims to provide a sociological perspective to the UAE and Bahrain’s legal 
landscape. It explores the causes for current judicial attitudes, the role, function and outlook 
of legal education in the two nations and distinguishes the roles of the various stakeholders in 
the legal profession. It goes on to demonstrate that the boundaries of arbitration, including the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, are not pushed by local lawyers, who are simply 
content to litigate before local courts. Rather, these boundaries are pushed by foreign law 
firms and given the imbalance in education, experience etc there exists an evident asymmetry 
between foreign lawyers on the one hand and local enforcement judges on the other. The 
chapter demonstrates through this analysis that the few isolated exceptions to liberal 
enforcement can be explained by reference to these sociological parameters. 
 
Chapter 1 
 
This was meant as an introductory chapter to thesis. The intention was to draft an 
introductory chapter that would introduce the research and the reader to the general 
framework of the subject matter of the thesis. The subject matter being enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in the two selected jurisdictions there was a dilemma as to whether the 
introductory chapter should focus on the modalities of enforcement more generally or on 
enforcement practices in the region more specifically. Given this author’s stated commitment 
to producing a thesis that was original from start to end and without simply reiterating 
existing, old and new, cases decided by the courts of Western nations, it was decided that the 
introductory chapter should focus on the enforcement of awards in classical and modern 
Islamic law as well as the rationale of the UAE and Bahrain in enforcing foreign arbitral 
awards there. 
 To achieve this result, and in order to maintain a degree of originality despite the 
inherent difficulty of doing so in an introductory chapter, it was thought that a structured and 
concise analysis of the relevant parts of the legal system of the two nations was important – 
but only as far as this is related to enforcement of arbitral awards. The place of Islamic law in 
the creation of legal rules on arbitration and specifically on enforcement was equally crucial 
and to this end a number of alternative theories are explained. Moreover, this author goes on 
to provide a detailed overview of the sources of enforcement in the two nations with an 
 8 
 
emphasis on the provisions of the two respective international arbitration acts – the Bahraini 
was adopted as far as back as 1994, whereas the UAE one was finalised in 2010 and replaced 
by the Code of Civil Procedure as regards international arbitration. An important dimension 
of these sources is the degree to which the international conventional obligations of the two 
nations play a part in their enforcement practices and to this end the author analyses the 
various regional and global multilateral treaties as well as certain bilateral treaties. 
An analysis on the enforcement patterns and practices of the courts of the two nations 
would have been incomplete without a concrete discussion of the special zones established in 
both, particularly the Dubai International Finance Centre (DIFC) which has its own laws, 
courts and facilitates the role and function of arbitration, not to mention its status as a host for 
international arbitrations. The chapter goes on to analyse important jurisprudence coming out 
of the DIFC court in relation to jurisdiction – although admittedly little on enforcement, but 
this is done in order to show the mentality of the DIFC court and the way, therefore, by which 
it is going to operate in the future in respect of enforcement requests in Dubai and other Gulf 
nations. 
One of the original facets of this chapter is its examination of money laundering in the 
UAE and Bahrain through the process of enforcement of foreign awards. This is an issue that 
has been debated fiercely recently by western law-makers and practitioners and this author 
was of the opinion that its consideration at the Gulf level was much needed. Finally, the 
chapter discusses, albeit rather briefly, whether the arbitral legislation of the UAE and 
Bahrain may validly constitute a legal transplant or whether in fact it is the result of an 
autonomous development. Although this is not a crucial question to the thesis itself, it does 
tell us whether the two legal systems are followers or independent in their legal thinking. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
It is in this chapter that the author starts to explore those impediments that are mentioned in 
the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model laws and the respective arbitration laws of 
the UAE and Bahrain that may preclude the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The list 
in all of these instruments is more or less identical given that the two local laws have been 
drafted on the basis of the UNCITRAL Model Law and hence some degree of legal certainly 
and homogeneity is retained. One of the principal issues in the chapter is that of incapacity of 
one of the parties to the arbitration or the agreement preceding it. Although this is not 
 9 
 
generally a problem in traditional arbitrations because the parties are corporate entities, 
certain issues have arisen in the Arab world and the senior courts of the UAE and Bahrain 
have on occasion dealt with such matters. The matter becomes slightly more complicated by 
reason of the fact that private international law dictates that in personal matters the applicable 
is the person’s personal law, which for Muslims means Islamic law or the law of their seat or 
residence. Thus, in many cases, non-Muslim parties may be surprised to learn subsequently 
that their Muslim counter-party did not have the capacity to enter into an arbitration 
agreement because of an issue that could not have been foreseen. 
 The second impediment that is discussed in this chapter is that of improper legal 
notice. Again, this seems like a minor procedural issue but it is of great importance in the 
Arab world, where its courts, such as those of the UAE and Bahrain, have devised a standard 
of notice that is required from the parties to arbitral proceedings. Much of this of course is 
based on standards adapted from proceedings before the regular courts. One of the particular 
issues that arise in situations of improper notice is the inability of one of the parties to present 
his or her case, which constitutes a direct prejudice to the rights of that party.
11
 This matter is 
also explored in the course of this analysis. 
 The third impediment relates to excess of jurisdiction by the arbitral tribunal itself, 
which again prejudices the rights of a party to the dispute and culminates in a faulty award. 
This author’s analysis on jurisdictional excess goes through three stages, namely: a general 
discussion of the issue under international practice in order to get a sense of where the 
problems and solutions lie; an examination of the scope of the arbitration agreement in order 
to properly assess jurisdiction assess, which is accomplished by an examination of the 
jurisprudence of the courts of the UAE and Bahrain and their respective laws; this is then 
followed by an assessment of the relationship between the arbitration clause and contract 
annulment in Islamic law and the UAE and Bahraini laws in particular. Finally, we look to 
                                                          
11
 One of the issues that arise here and is slightly touched upon is the fact that any prejudice to one of the rights 
to a party in arbitral proceedings gives rise to human rights questions, particularly that of access to justice, 
equality of arms and others. The European Court of Human Rights, as explained in chapter 2, has related these 
matters to the application of Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The lower and senior 
courts of Bahrain and the UAE, on the other hand, have not made any references to “rights” in respect of such 
violations to the parties’ entitlements as these arise from arbitral proceedings. This is no doubt attributable to the 
fact that there exists no regional human rights convention that makes such an inference and local laws tend to 
disassociate rights language from commercial dealings, although in case No 351/2005, judgment (1 July 2006), 
the Dubai Court of Cassation held that depriving a litigant from his right to review and reply timely to 
documents distorts the parties’ right to equal treatment and constitutes a violation of due process rules. The 
matter, however, needs to be discussed more fully and some prominence must be given to it in the jurisprudence 
of the courts and the law-makers. See generally, A Jaksic, Arbitration and Human Rights (Peter Lang, 2002). 
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the foundations of separability in the laws of the two nations, arguing that this is crucial in 
understanding and explaining jurisdictional excess. 
 The final impediment that is analysed in this chapter relates to inappropriate 
composition of arbitral tribunals. This has given cause to some concern in the Arab world and 
is closely linked with bias questions, which are also explored. Overall, the grounds for refusal 
analysed in this chapter and their application by the local courts do not depart in any 
significant way, if at all, from their Western counterparts. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Here, this author examines yet another obstacle to the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, namely that of arbitrability. It is explained that traditional arbitrability served 
to limit the extent to which particular disputes could be submitted by the parties to binding 
arbitration and was an encroachment of the State on personal autonomy. The fundamental 
principle, as is the case in Muslim countries, is that a dispute can only be referred to 
arbitration if it is susceptible to a process of conciliation. This, of course, is rather a broad 
formulation but is no doubt the basis for the arbitrability test under the Qur’an and the sunnah 
and to a large degree it is followed in the Gulf. However, the traditional dichotomy between 
that which is allowed and that which is not under classical Islamic law has not strictly been 
adhered in the UAE and Bahrain. More specifically, illegal contracts under Islam, such as 
those that contain in themselves a large degree of speculation and uncertainty (gharar) have 
been found to be incompatible with the Sharia in countries like Saudi Arabia. An application 
of the gharar prohibition encompasses commercial activities such as Western-type insurance, 
futures trading, the charging of interest (i.e. Western-type banking) and in some cases the 
introduction of an arbitration clause in a contract; the latter is considered speculative because 
of the parties’ future thinking about their contractual relationship. While most of the 
commentaries have in the past held such contracts to offend Islam, this is no longer the case, 
nor indeed the interpretation preferred by the laws and practices in the UAE and Bahrain. 
 It is explained that while arbitrability does not in theory have to align with public 
policy, in practice this is exactly the case. The laws and the courts in the UAE and Bahrain 
have taken a very pragmatic view of the global commercial reality and in the opinion of this 
author have distinguished and extrapolated the root of the evil in those commercial activities 
that were prohibited under classical Islam. The root of the evil is usually the greed that drives 
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most people to trespass against ethical and religious prescriptions and it is exactly this 
element of greed that is vanquished in respect of legislation that allows the charging of 
commercial interest in a well-regulated manner, alongside Islamic financing models which 
are available for everyone to use. In the case of the UAE and Bahrain, such regulation 
consists of placing mandatory ceilings on the amount of interest that can be charged. Hence, 
weight is given throughout the chapter to the links between Islamic thought and jurisprudence 
and the underlying policies and rationale behind the arbitrability dimension of the laws of the 
two nations. Finally, the chapter seeks to pinpoint the principal issues of arbitrability as these 
are found in the statute law of UAE and Bahrain. This is not always a simple exercise, not 
least because there is no precise formulation in the legislation as to when particular forms of 
conduct or relationships are not considered arbitrable. Rather, this is either presumed by 
inference or by the normal operation of the law itself. 
 Once again, neither the UAE nor Bahrain pose any arbitrability constraints to the 
enforcement of foreign awards in a manner that is inconsistent with the practices of Western 
nations. In fact, the UAE and Bahrain are content to bypass fundamental tenets of the Quran 
in order to avoid posing Islamic arbitrability obstacles. 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Having examined several other impediments to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
other chapters, particularly incapacity, improper notice, jurisdictional excess, improper 
composition of the arbitral tribunal, arbitrability and public policy, this chapter traces the 
remaining impediments as these are enumerated in the UNCITRAL Model Law and the 
respective arbitration laws of the two nations under consideration. These include those 
circumstances where an award is deemed to be null and those where the tribunal applied 
improper substantive law to the merits of the dispute. It is assumed that along with all the 
other chapters in this thesis the impediments analysed are those that are referred to in the 
relevant instruments and it those that frequent before local and international courts and 
tribunals. As a result, this author assumes that he has exhausted the reasons for which an 
award may or may not be enforced in the UAE and Bahrain. 
 As regards the first of these, it will be noted that whether or not an award is null is not 
sufficiently explained in the UNCITRAL Model Law or the New York Convention and the 
matter remains rather contentious at international level. This means that national courts can at 
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their own initiative, following in most cases a request by the losing party, determine that a 
particular award has been rendered null by the operation of national law. This possibility 
renders the process rather risky and with little legal certainty. Thus, the chapter goes on to 
assess the standard practice in international commercial arbitration and to trace how the 
concept may be subject to abuse and what considerations are available in order to avoid 
breaches of legal certainty. It then goes on to explain the relevant jurisprudence from the 
lower and senior courts of the UAE and Bahrain in order to assess whether this practice is 
consistent with international developments. 
 With respect to the application of improper substantive law by the arbitral tribunals, 
one is aware that this matter has been the original issue of contention by Arab nations 
following the famous ad hoc arbitrations of the 1950s and 1960s, where the arbitrators 
decided that despite the express reference to Islamic law as the applicable law of the contract, 
international law was in fact the appropriate substantive law. Such scenaria are improbable 
today but it is evident that significant sensitivity exists as regards the improper application of 
law, especially if this is a foreign law that prejudiced the rights of one of the parties to the 
proceedings.   
For good reason, therefore, the courts of the UAE and Bahrain have taken a rather 
strict approach to this impediment and their judgments reflect this historic reality. It should 
be noted, however, that there is no abundance of cases on this matter and that much of the 
research lies on the existing case law of the two courts, coupled with an analysis of 
international developments. It is clear that all these issues fall within the rubric of public 
policy and the courts in the two nations have often referred to public policy in respect of such 
matters. However, the specific matter of public policy is left to the final chapter of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
This chapter seeks to illuminate one of the most vague and little-understood areas of Islamic 
law and practice, namely public policy. It is, not without reason, assumed by Western 
scholars and practitioners working in the Gulf that Gulf nations and many Arab nations, in 
fact, apply the principle of public policy arbitrarily and without solid legal reasons in order to 
divest winning parties of their right to have their awards recognised and enforced in the 
country of enforcement. This is indeed a serious accusation and it is the reason why this 
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author decided that it was pertinent that a chapter be devoted to the examination of public 
policy in the legal spheres of the UAE and Bahrain. 
 The chapter starts off by examining the meaning of public policy and public order, as 
well as the meaning of transnational and international public policy. This is then contrasted 
with the prevailing perceptions as to “whose” public policy one is referring to. The outcome 
is that public policy under the New York Convention is local and not transnational in nature. 
The author then turns to elaborate on the meaning of public policy in Islamic jurisprudence 
with a view to assessing whether this is compatible with the model projected by the courts of 
the UAE and Bahrain. There is an absence of a precise definition of public policy in the two 
nations under investigation and it principally as a result of this that the courts are inclined to 
protect certain interests and project a picture to the outside world according to which foreign 
clients must be careful when submitting awards to UAE and Bahrain because they may come 
under serious surprises if they assume to know what local public policy is. In fact, following 
the Bechtel decision it has been noted that failure to acquire sworn statements from witnesses 
to arbitral proceedings in accordance with the strict requirements of UAE law rendered an 
award null for the purposes of enforcement.
12
   
Moving beyond the narrow dictates of classical Islamic law, where the author 
identifies permissible contracts, we are then driven to explore the public policy of the UAE 
and Bahrain from the point of view of their statutory injunctions. There, one finds some 
interesting case law of recent vintage, as well as a devotion to formalities in the law that 
would not otherwise be sufficient to convince a judge that a particular award should not be 
recognised and enforced. What is critical about public policy is the fact that so much is left to 
the discretion of the local judges and this in itself breeds legal uncertainty and harms the 
parties’ sense of legitimate expectations. The author does not wish to enter into an appraisal 
as to whether the rationale behind the Bechtel decision will remain in the future jurisprudence 
of the Dubai Court of Cassation, but he does point out that this has been a shock to the system 
itself and it is doubtful whether it will be replicated. The chapter goes on to point out that 
much more research and better drafting is required if the UAE and Bahrain are to eliminate 
all suspicions from Western businessmen and lawyers that public policy is an erratic and 
unfathomable aspect of their legal system. It has been advised throughout that the 
formalisation of precedent will help dispel the perceptions of arbitrariness. 
 
                                                          
12
 Above note 3. 
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The Concluding Chapter 
 
The concluding chapter at the very end of the thesis will not simply reiterate what has been 
mentioned in the course of the thesis itself. If this were the case it might as well have been 
called a summary of the thesis’s proceedings. Although this in itself would not have been 
faulty or unwise, this author is of the opinion that an original work should, besides 
summarising the law and its deficiencies, point the way forward and the mistakes of the past. 
This is especially the case given that the present author will be appointed to an academic post 
in the Gulf with specialisation in arbitration and therefore this work is meant to some limited 
degree to provide insights to law-makers and nurture future arbitrators and litigators in the 
country and the region more generally. Therefore, the primary focus of the concluding 
chapter is on identifying the problems in the system and suggesting solutions that would 
enhance it. Some of the conclusions will be of a much broader nature and may not necessarily 
take stock of some of the research in this thesis. However, it is hoped that the 
recommendations set out here will provide some kind of benchmark for future developments 
in both the UAE and Bahrain and will assist in consolidating the excellent work that has been 
undertaken by the courts and law-makers of these countries over the course of the last years. 
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CHAPTER 1A 
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES TO JUDICIAL AND ARBITRAL ATTITUDES 
IN THE UAE AND BAHRAIN 
 
1. A1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present a sociological account of the legal profession and legal 
education in the UAE and Bahrain with a view to understanding  judicial behaviour in the 
two nations and in order to conceptualise whether the attitude in both nations is arbitration-
friendly or not. The latter outcome is not evident in the first sections of the chapter and one 
has to reach the end of the chapter, as well as read the black-letter analysis of all other 
chapters, to reach any conclusion. However, although this author is of the opinion that the 
overall philosophy of both the UAE and Bahrain is by no means hostile to arbitration, 
including in respect of enforcement of foreign awards, the principal purpose of this chapter is 
not to substantiate or give credence to this belief. Rather, the various sections are structured 
in such a way as to demonstrate the distinct but inter-related phases in the evolution of law 
and the legal profession in the two nations in order to understand why the arbitration system 
is flexible or inflexible and trace the responsible actors within the system.
13
  
It will be shown that the legal profession is split into two camps, that is, local Arab 
lawyers who are competent to practice before local courts and foreign law firms who provide 
consultancy services to foreign clients and moreover undertake the vast bulk of arbitration 
work in the region. The legal education of the judiciary and the availing political climate in 
the two nations, although extremely trade-friendly, is generally inadequate to cater for the 
complexity of transnational arbitration. Hence, when a foreign law firm presents a complex 
award to a GCC judge for enforcement therein, the lower court judge may possess little 
understanding of the relevant issues and procedures. The judge’s biases may also determine 
the final outcome, but in practice aberrations are rare and the system generally operates 
                                                          
13
 My starting point, therefore, has been the application of systems theory, and in particular the understanding 
of the enforcement process as part of a larger system that encompasses legal education, the legal profession, 
judges, attitudes, politics etc. Systems theory recognises that organisations are complex legal systems, from 
which one cannot redact the parts from the whole without reducing the overall effectiveness of the 
organisation itself. See N Luhmann, Law as a Social System (Oxford University Press, 2004), who applied 
systems theory to legal systems. 
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without major distortions.
14
 This is not to say that Bahrain and the UAE are among the most 
attractive forums for conducting arbitrations; on the contrary, the rise of Singapore as a rival 
to London, Paris, New York and Stockholm should act as an example to lawmakers in the 
two countries. 
I make no claim in this chapter to demonstrate, empirically or otherwise, whether 
Bahrain and the UAE are enforcement-friendly. Instead, my aim is to map some of the 
underlying reasons behind judicial attitudes and the actors that push the boundaries of 
arbitration law and practice. At the end of the chapter I set out some methodological remarks 
the principal aim of which is to emphasise that the chief objective of the thesis is to explain 
and analyse the law and practice of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the UAE and 
Bahrain. This is accomplished through a meticulous and critical study of relevant 
enforcement judgments, the law as it stands and commentaries on the two. Whether or not 
this discussion leads to the conclusion that the UAE and Bahrain are pro-arbitration is of 
secondary importance and my expectation is that any outcome will be a reflection of the 
overall discussion. The fact that I point to inconsistencies in enforcement practices while at 
the same time I give the impression that the system is indeed arbitration-friendly should not 
be viewed as confusion on my part or as structuring my arguments on an incoherent 
methodology. Rather, I take it for granted that even a perfect system may produce isolated, 
inconsistent, or irrational outcomes which it then proceeds to remedy.
15
 A situation of this 
nature by no means renders the system itself inconsistent or in any way reduces its efficiency. 
 
1. A2 The Sociological Dimension of Gulf commerce 
 
Unlike the West where social sciences have a long and entrenched history and a significant 
empirical background, Muslim societies have not generally generated a sufficient body of 
empirical research. As a result, the vast majority of sociological and anthropological research 
on Muslim societies and of the Gulf in particular has originated from Western scholars. It 
would be pointless to talk about a unifying sociological paradigm encompassing the whole of 
the Muslim world, given that such an approach negates the very essence of society and 
                                                          
14
 Indeed, this is one of the major traits of “systems”, i.e. that they are self-regulating, meaning that they are 
capable of self-correction through feedback. If the system is moreover self-referential, that is, it receives no 
influences from external factors (so-called operational closure) then we are talking about an autopoietic 
system. Luhmann, id, at 6-8. Clearly, the enforcement/arbitration system of the UAE and Bahrain is not subject 
to operational closure. 
15
 This “remedy” corresponds to the “feedback” inherent in self-regulating systems. Luhmann, id, at 8. 
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societies.
16
 The starting point for this discussion should be the distinction between the Gulf’s 
pre-oil and post-oil era. The former was characterised by a primitive lifestyle and inward 
localised commerce with few, if any, external influences. Tribalism played a central role 
during this period save for legislation derived from colonial powers (originating from either 
British or Ottoman rule), with strict Islamic law being the only law known to the local 
populations. Several of these characteristics were brought forward in the post-oil era. Chief 
among these were tribalism (or family rule), the application of Islamic law – this time as 
supreme law – and almost complete reliance on foreign services and goods. Several scholars 
attribute Islam’s “cultural stasis” to the nature of the sacred with which it is infused and 
which penetrates every aspect of life in the Muslim world. Hertog takes the view that this 
sacred in Islam suspends the acceleration of social time, hinders change and circumvents 
secularisation and modernity.
17
 
 It is emblematic of resource-rich nations – otherwise known as rentiers on account of 
the fact that they rent their subsoil to others – to share a number of negative traits. These 
principally concern acute democratic deficits,
18
 the quality of public institutions and the 
services delivered to their people
19
 and finally economic growth itself. The latter has been 
exemplified by the concept of Dutch disease or resource-curse which has arisen where 
resource-rich nations expanded their public sector and spending when prices were high, 
rendering themselves volatile to subsequent international price fluctuations, thus being unable 
to sustain their excesses.
20
 As a result, instead of having what would otherwise be a surplus, 
they find themselves saddled with unbearable debts. Although Gulf nations have not been 
beset by such issues, the very fact that they can command strong economies and rely on their 
natural resource in order to perpetuate and sustain their wealthy living has caused a number 
of social phenomena that will be explored in the course of this section. 
                                                          
16
 See T Keskin (ed.), The Sociology of Islam: Secularism, Economy and Politics (Ithaca Press, 2012), which 
represents one of the few contemporary efforts by an Arab scholar to examine the diffusion of Muslim 
societies in light of modernity, rather than from a religious and historical lens, which has traditionally been the 
case. 
17
 D Diner, Lost in the Sacred: Why the Muslim World Stood Still (Princeton University Press, 2009), particularly 
the conclusion. 
18
 M Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy? (2001) 53 World Politics 325 who takes this position in respect of all 
Gulf nations, as well as all other developing nations that are resource-rich. The principal exception is Norway. 
19
 J Isham et al, The Varieties of Resource Experience (2005) 19 World Bank Economic Review 141. 
20
 J Sachs, A Warmer, The Curse of Natural Resources (2001) 45 European Economic Review 827. 
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 Social scientists argue that the above identified negative impacts in rentier nations 
arise because of the vast disparity in the ratio under which the resources are possessed by the 
State to the ratio that these are made available to society. Hertog convincingly argues that: 
State services will be relatively less valuable and sought after if society has enough 
productive capacity to satisfy individual needs through private provision. Less individual 
effort will be put into accessing State services and resources. Conversely, less private wealth 
and lower productive capacities in society relative to the State will reinforce the reorientation 
of individuals towards goods provided by the State. The ratio of state to societal resources, 
however, is specifically skewed in rentier States.
21
 
He goes on to demonstrate on the basis of available data that despite the public provision of 
free or subsidised health, education and utilities, the share of wealth in the GCC between 
government and people is highly disproportionate.
22
 As a direct result of this imbalance Gulf 
societies have given rise to the social phenomenon of intermediaries, that is, people with 
influence or in positions of some authority who are able to affect government relations in 
favour of third persons, both locals and foreigners. This is true notwithstanding the fact that 
with the exception of Bahrain, the biggest part of the local population is employed in the 
public sector in one form or another. Whereas the percentage for Bahrain is 30 percent, which 
is still high compared to Western nations, the same figure for UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and Qatar is between 60 and 80 percent.
23
 
 This state of affairs has created a number of social anomalies. For one thing, it has 
inhibited the growth of a universal educated class as indeed the growth of local research in 
both the technical and the social sciences. The secondary and tertiary education that does 
exist is uncritical and very little emphasis has traditionally been placed upon the social 
sciences and the humanities, other than classical Islamic studies. This is equally true for the 
state of legal education, which will be analysed more fully in another section. This absence of 
critical education in addition to the granting of privileges to nationals, particularly through 
their employment in the public sector or the requirement for all companies to have a 
                                                          
21
 S Hertog, The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems: Societies of Intermediaries (2010) 52 Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 282, at 285.  
22
 Id, at 285-86. 
23
 Id, at 286-87. 
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minimum amount of local employees,
24
 has given birth to successive generations lacking 
incentives to be productive, entrepreneurial or innovative. 
 As a result, despite a massive transnational trade, commerce and investment in the 
Gulf and the existence of a significant expatriate community from all corners of the globe, the 
majority of the local population clearly distinguishes between “us” and “them”.25 Given the 
abundance of privileges afforded to the local population, private trade and commerce is 
largely controlled and dominated by foreign elements and entities.
26
 This has necessarily 
augmented the social divide between these two classes and has made communication much 
more difficult, despite the progressive cultural adaption of Bahrain and the UAE and the 
adoption of laws that at times contradict even specific injunctions of the Quran.
27
 
 In the opinion of this author this failure to enhance communication and cultural 
understanding – inevitable given the creation of two distinct classes within the same State, ie 
local civil servants and foreign private entrepreneurs – has ultimately created a chasm and 
suspicion on the part of the local elite that the foreign elements are distinct from “us” and that 
they are after our resources and wealth.
28
 This suspicion is not wholly unjustified and is to a 
large part attributed to the fact that the institutions of trade, commerce and investment have 
been derived from the West, as is also the case with the mechanisms by which to resolve 
disputes. The oil arbitrations that went the way of Western companies from the 1950s until 
the 1980s have ignited this suspicion,
29
 but in my opinion this is largely fuelled in the present 
day by the absence of a common language spoken equally well by all actors (few Arabs speak 
                                                          
24
 See H Atiyyah, The Sponsorship System and Infringements of the Rights of Foreign Workers (1990) 3 
Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal 267. 
25
 Keskin, above note 4, at 155-56. 
26
 It is for this reason that all Arab nations have traditionally required that agents of foreign franchises be locals 
rather than foreigners, in order to control that part of the market. The UAE Commercial Agencies Law No 18 of 
1981 (as amended by Federal Law No 14 of 1988 and by Federal Law 13 of 17 June 2006) provides that only 
UAE courts have jurisdiction over commercial agency disputes. See C Montagu, The Private Sector of Saudi 
Arabia (Committee for Middle East Trade, 1994), one of the first studies on the involvement of post-oil local 
Arab populations in the private sector, which was always dominated by foreigners. 
27
 I am here referring to the legality of the imposition of interest by financial institutions and the legality of 
contracts otherwise described as gharar under classical Islamic law, particularly clauses looking to the future, 
such as arbitration clauses. For a detailed analysis of these developments, see chapter 3.3. 
28
 Social attitudes in the GCC adversely affect potential migration flows thereto. A recent study by Gallup 
demonstrates that almost 98 per cent of potential migrants to the GCC are from Asia and Africa, their majority 
being Muslim, with less than 2 per cent from North America and Europe seeing a permanent future for 
themselves in the GCC. More worryingly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE attract relatively less educated potential 
migrants. See <http://www.gallup.com/poll/157058/potential-migration-gcc.aspx?ref=more>. 
29
 Particularly Petroleum Development (Trucial Coasts) Ltd v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144; Ruler of 
Qatar v. Int’l Marine Oil Co. Ltd (1953) 20 ILR 534 and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia v. ARAMCO (1963) 27 ILR 117. 
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English fluently and even fewer Westerners speak Arabic),
30
 the absence of a common legal 
language until recently (Islamic law versus Western legal systems) and Arab complacency 
due to the abundance of resources and wealth.   
In the context of this social climate it is not surprising that the older generation of 
Bahraini and UAE judges are disinclined towards those operating the transnational rules of 
arbitration.
31
 This is particularly true in respect of those judges that have not received any 
legal education abroad, the vast majority of which will have gained a knowledge of 
arbitration on the job and not as a matter of training.
32
 These judges will not have divested 
themselves of the general Arab hostility towards arbitration. At the same time, however, they 
will be acutely aware of the local political climate which strongly favours foreign investment 
and the flexible reading of classical Islamic rules but will no doubt entertain an underlying 
bias in favour of local public companies, if for no other reason because they are 
quintessentially “theirs”. This attitude has been on a course for change since the last decade 
and major changes include the internationalisation of legal studies programs in the region, 
exposure to Western legal thinking through postgraduate studies and the gradual introduction 
of female judges.
33
 
 This does not necessarily mean that judges in Bahrain and the UAE are hostile to 
international arbitration or that they demonstrate malicious bias in favour of local companies 
or public policy. Rather, the social construction of Gulf societies in the manner described, in 
which judges constitute an integral part, views entrenched “foreign” practices such as 
arbitration as a vehicle for investment but at the same time as an unknown entity. This 
explains why despite the otherwise liberal and arbitration-friendly approach of Bahraini and 
                                                          
30
 A contrario, the existence of English as a common language in the Dubai International Financial Centre 
(DIFC), for example, has effectively delocalised it from a cultural and language perspective. Diner, above note 
5, at 99, points to the “time suspending impact of Arabic as a sacred language” as yet another cause of the 
cultural stasis of Muslim societies. 
31
 See JM Lew, The Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards in the Middle East 
(1985) 1 Arbitration International 161 who cautioned against enforcing awards in the GCC because of the 
relevant uncertainty in judicial attitudes at the time. 
32
 This is reflected in the judgments themselves. These rarely refer to the NY Convention when dealing with 
enforcement or other related arbitral proceedings and are moreover cursory in their analysis and approach. 
There is no in-depth analysis and never any reference to key international or transnational judgments before 
domestic courts. Besides capacity, the other reason no doubt is that since precedent is not permitted locally it 
would make sense that transnational precedent should also be treated in the same manner. There is a 
rationale hue to this argument even if its fundamental premise is erred. 
33
 In fact, although Article 18 of the UAE Federal Judicial Authority Law of 1983 stipulates that judges must be 
male, this requirement applies only in respect of federal courts. Thus, there is a good representation of female 
judges in local courts. See A Mustafa, More Women Judges Needed in UAE Courts: Panel Says (24 November 
2011), available at: <http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/courts/more-women-judges-needed-in-uae-
courts-panel-says>. 
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UAE courts and public institutions there are instances, such as Bechtel,
34
 where the 
underlying bias surfaces as an exception rather than the rule. It is in order to avoid these 
aberrations, which arise particularly in Dubai it should be mentioned, that the need for 
binding precedent becomes pressing. While it is true that countries lacking formal precedent, 
such as France, Sweden and Switzerland, maintain powerful arbitration forums, it is also true 
that these countries do not distinguish between “us” and “them”. More importantly, the 
judgments of their courts are detailed, well-referenced and cognisant of international 
developments and as a result they possess significant precedential value. The introduction of 
precedent in the UAE and Bahrain will help render the transnational far more national and 
allow local courts to think more fully about justifying and elaborating their judgments. Local 
courts will also make the effort to distinguish foreign judgments where necessary and thus 
foster a legal dialogue which in the long run will render arbitration much more harmonised 
with other major arbitration-friendly nations.  
These observations tie in with research on the reasons behind the independence of the 
judiciary in the Gulf. It is has been vociferously contended that while this independence may 
be attributed to imperialism or liberal ideology, the primary purpose of the system is to 
provide support for the officially sanctioned order.
35
 Hence, the system’s independence from 
the executive could at least better be served by an institution, such as precedent, that is not 
susceptible to overt manipulation and which ensures consistency and the rule of law.  
 
 
 
 
1. A3 Legal Education in Bahrain and the UAE 
 
The typical medium for becoming a legal professional in the Gulf has always been an 
excellent knowledge of Islamic law, a good reputation and certainly a good level of literacy. 
Professional lawyers’ bars are a recent phenomenon. Given that the regulation of all matters 
falling within the subject matter and ratione loci jurisdiction of GCC courts in the pre-oil era 
were resolved on the basis of Islamic law it was only natural that judges (kadis) were not 
                                                          
34
 International Bechtel v Department of Civil Aviation of Dubai, Case No 503/2003, judgment (15 May 2005). 
35
 See the empirical work of N Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), who takes the view that this system of “judicial independence” in the Gulf 
was copied from Egypt, which itself made use of it for similar ends. 
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required to be acquainted with any other branch of law. However, the infusion of external 
influences, mostly in the form of legal transplants from French and particularly Egyptian laws 
meant that the legal system was gradually becoming mixed and bifurcated. This eventuality 
was particularly highlighted by the introduction of statutes covering almost all areas of 
activity, often times overlapping with Islamic law itself. Hence, the new generation of kadis 
and advocates enhanced their legal education by delving into civil law theories and 
jurisprudence. However, before the advent of globalisation (for the purposes of this thesis this 
date is 1990) these influences did not render the legal systems of Bahrain and the UAE 
cosmopolitan nor did they engage the application of transnational law – mainly best practices 
from other advanced legal systems – by the local courts. It should be stressed that prior to the 
era of globalisation the use of arbitration in the UAE and Bahrain was minimal. 
 Both prior and after globalisation judges were asked to determine complex cases 
involving a plethora of transnational elements brought by experienced litigators working as 
partners in top international law firms.
36
 They were largely unfamiliar with the issues at hand 
and given that US courts, for example, had considered matters as complex as the arbitrability 
of anti-trust issues from the late 1950s, it is obvious that the legal arguments brought forward 
by said foreign litigators was something alien to local judges. Quite clearly, their legal 
education and their everyday case load could not match the pace and expertise of 
international law firms who by the late 1980s had firmly established themselves in the GCC. 
 The implications of this observation have never been studied in the Gulf, but in my 
opinion help to explain many of the system’s deficiencies. For one thing, there may well be 
unrecorded cases where the courts failed to understand counsel’s arguments and hence tended 
to agree out of embarrassment. Equally, the opposite is also likely; i.e. cases where the court 
disagreed with sound arguments it did not itself understand out of resentment. Although such 
occurrences may be rare for the federal courts of the UAE where judgments are recorded, this 
assumption is not necessarily true with respect to lower courts. Secondly, the lack of 
familiarity with transnational rules and cases may explain the development of cursory 
judgments in transnational cases and the reluctance of the courts to elaborate further. The fact 
that UAE and Bahraini laws do not follow precedent is a poor excuse, particularly since 
important judgments in civil law systems tend to be elaborate and make reference to foreign 
                                                          
36
 In the UAE and Bahrain, foreign lawyers cannot represent the parties before the courts as this is only 
available to local lawyers. As a result, local lawyers typically act as barristers in complex cases before local 
courts whereas international law firms undertake all the substantive work in the background. This is further 
explained below. 
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cases. One would have thought that Bahrain and the UAE would have welcomed any attempt 
to demonstrate legal certainty and the rule of law in their territory by establishing some sort 
of precedent rule. Finally, as is usually the case with legal transplants, the life of the 
transplant in its original home is not static and takes on a different life than that of the country 
where it has been transplanted. Thus, whereas Egyptian laws were themselves clearly 
influenced by France, the surge of Egyptian lawyers throughout the world from the 1970s 
onwards gave rise to a current of new influences, many of which originated in transnational 
practices (i.e. arbitration, lex mercatoria, judgments with transnational impact etc) and legal 
developments from common law jurisdictions. Thus, whilst Egypt viewed its laws antiquated, 
the UAE and Bahrain found Egyptian laws as a suitable paradigm, even if compelled to some 
degree to follow the new Egyptian trends, which would be difficult because the majority of 
Egyptian case law is unreported. 
 This state of affairs was necessarily filtered into the region’s legal education. No 
research has ever been carried out by Gulf States on their legal education. Serious questions 
have never really been asked and only recently has there appeared a rudimentary scholarship 
on higher education in general. The overall conclusion is that there is no particular aim to 
higher education in the Gulf and despite the import of a “baroque arsenal” of sophisticated 
and costly educational programs Gulf nations simply consume other countries’ knowledge 
and products, all of which are of declining utility and sustainability.
37
 This of course does not 
mean that the sudden influx of Western universities in the region and the establishment of 
publicly-funded colleges and universities has not provided a stimulating environment for the 
local populations or that this has not enhanced democratic governance, rights, status of 
women in society etc. All this is very well documented
38
 and I am not arguing otherwise. 
 What is problematic is the direction, or the lack thereof, of legal education in Bahrain 
and the UAE. For one thing, whereas these nations are international hubs for trade and 
commerce, the existing legal curriculum is to a large degree of local character and outlook. 
As has already been stated, there exists much complacency in the fact that foreign lawyers 
cannot appear as counsel before local courts
39
 and hence local lawyers are content with their 
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 The situation differs from one emirate to the next but the result is the same throughout. In Dubai, for 
example, lawyers operate at the discretion of the Ruler's court. In addition, law firms must obtain a 
professional licence from the Dubai Department of Economic Development. Only Dubai nationals can practice 
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foreign counterparts’ domination of the arbitration scene. This has given rise to a conscious 
self-admission of inferiority in the sense that Arab lawyers could not possibly carry through 
complex arbitral proceedings whether because they lack the vast resources of their Western 
counterparts or simply because foreign (and perhaps local) corporations generally prefer 
Western-style legal services even if they cost more. This attitude is necessarily reflected in 
the curriculum, with arbitration and private international law not featuring at all until recently 
in the legal curricula of law schools in the region. Secondly, Gulf law and practice lacks a 
clear international outlook. Although certain laws, such as those on interest, favour 
international trade, their outlook is domestic and this is reflected in the teaching of the laws in 
local law schools. As a result, succeeding generations of lawyers and judges view local law 
from a domestic lens and this explains to a very large degree our aforementioned remark 
regarding the absence of references to transnational law in the judgments of the courts of the 
UAE and Bahrain, unless absolutely necessary.   
Finally, the scholarly output of law academics in the region in international 
periodicals, or in the form of scholarly monographs, is relatively poor. Although universities 
encourage academics to write and publish there is no clear vision as to why this is beneficial 
for the university or its students. The situation is further compounded by the fact that the 
teaching schedule in local law schools is exceptionally heavy and students are burdened with 
a large number of modules which leaves little room for critical thinking
40
 or depth in any 
particular field. This heavy teaching load does not allow Gulf academics any time to 
undertake quality research and thus to expand the horizons of legal thinking in the region. As 
a result, there is very little scholarly output from local law academics,
41
 with the majority 
being authored in Arabic and published in local legal periodicals whose peer-review 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
before local courts, whereas other GCC nationals may exceptionally do so if they are entitled to practice in 
other GCC jurisdictions. Overall, the regulation of the legal profession in the UAE is achieved by reference to 
Federal Law No 23 (1991), which limits the practice of law to UAE nationals, albeit licensing is exclusively 
dependent on each ruler’s office. The latitude for discretion is therefore significant. 
40
 In fact, critical thinking is among the pinnacles of Islam, reflected not only in secondary sources, but in the 
Koran itself. Verse 8:22 stipulates quite clearly that: “Most certainly the worst of animals in Allah’s sight are 
the deaf, the dumb who do not use their brains”. Moreover, Imran ibn Khalid has been quoted as saying that a 
person’s religion is not completed until his intellect is perfected [Al-Aql wa Fadlih/17]. 
41
 Of course, I am not underestimating the absence of critical scholarship in Gulf academia generally, which 
would make it very difficult for Gulf academics to publish in foreign periodicals despite the fact that they are  
otherwise extremely well qualified with excellent studies abroad. The reason is that Western-style periodicals 
are weary of non-critical, dry, pieces of research. There is an emphasis on socio-legal output, even in fields 
such as commercial law, which is alien to Gulf academics who are not accustomed to thinking and writing in 
this manner. 
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processes are nowhere as scrupulous as those in Western periodicals.
42
 It is of no surprise, 
therefore, that the majority of scholarly analysis on Gulf laws and progressive Islamic legal 
thinking has largely been derived from Western legal scholars publishing abroad
43
 or from 
Gulf students undertaking postgraduate degrees in the USA and the UK. Equally, it has been 
from the ranks of the legal profession in the Arab world that the most significant 
commentaries have been derived, whether in the form of comprehensive commentaries by 
distinguished Arab lawyers,
44
 or in the form of short, succinct analyses provided by foreign 
law firms working in the Gulf. 
 
1. A4 Pushing the Boundaries of Law and Arbitration in Bahrain and the UAE 
 
The previous sections of this chapter should also be read as a prelude and a starting point to 
the discussion in this section. One would be astonished to learn that individual lawyers in 
Dubai were not required to register with the government until the passing of a Decree that 
took effect on 24 August 2011. Until then, anyone claiming to be a lawyer – save for law 
firms which were required to register – could provide legal services even if that person did 
not possess any relevant qualifications. As a result, there were no hard standards to which 
lawyers could adhere, such as a binding code of conduct or the threat of disciplinary action.
45
 
This is particularly striking given that Dubai courts are the most vociferous among the courts 
in the region and as will be explained throughout the course of this thesis the Dubai Court of 
Cassation has adopted several landmark judgments that have baffled international 
commentators as to the sincerity of the UAE, and Dubai in particular, as regards their claims 
of being arbitration friendly. Of course, there are exceptions to the rule posited above and 
which largely confirm the argument by Brown on the GCC judiciary.
46
 In one of these, 
Scottish law firm HBJ Gateley Wareing was granted a legal advocates license by the ruler of 
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Dubai, effectively allowing a foreign law firm for the first time to hire local advocates and 
thus represent the firm before local courts.
47
 For all intents and purposes the Scottish law firm 
was given the status of a local law firm. Despite the obvious BIT implications relating to the 
varying standards of treatment afforded to foreign investors
48
 there is a question mark here 
about the system’s consistency overall. 
 Foreign law firms operate what Flood and Lederer call global lawyering or 
cosmopolitan lawyering.
49
 Transnational law firms, as well as global auditing firms, have a 
twofold aim when venturing to expand their operations in a new country: namely, the 
protection of the interests of existing clients therein, and the desire of breaking into new 
markets and new clients. Where the regulation of the legal profession operates under a 
protectionist umbrella, as is the case with the UAE and Bahrain, the choices are limited. 
Either one teams-up and refers the litigation dimension of cases to local partner firms, or, 
where possible, establishes a branch and hires local lawyers in addition to expatriates. 
Foreign companies in the UAE and Bahrain (whether legal, financial or auditing), as indeed 
in all other GCC nations, have applied significant peer and political pressure in one way or 
another to local governments and rulers to push the boundaries of existing laws that were 
viewed as hostile to trade and commerce. The adoption of the NY Convention, the relative 
trend towards a much friendlier approach to arbitration, the adoption of the Model Law and 
others are examples of the impact of peer pressure
50
 – although by no means the only cause. 
Moreover, it would have made no sense for the UAE and Bahrain to facilitate the entry of 
foreign law firms on their territory if they were not prepared to accept change themselves; an 
archaic, inflexible and anachronistic legal system, no matter how wealthy the country is, 
cannot generate sufficient legal business to attract a multitude of law firms of the size of 
those in Bahrain and the UAE. The influx of top-flight law firms and the creation of 
thousands of legal openings in the two nations necessarily mean that they not only generate 
enough revenues internally but that they are also appropriate forums for conducting business 
or settling disputes externally.  
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 It is no accident that many law firms include a so-called “political law” section, which deal with much more 
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 As has already been indicated, foreign law firms have concentrated on consultancies 
and arbitration, given that litigation is preserved exclusively for local lawyers. Yet, it is true 
that a very select, yet very small, number of local firms have been able to take a share, albeit 
small, of the available arbitration market. Foreign law firms are capable of dominating this 
market for a number of reasons, namely reputation, long-standing expertise, long-standing 
client relationships, immediate access to financial mechanisms such as third party funding
51
 
and their excellent government relations with Western industrialised nations. Although rare, 
local firms such as Al-Tamimi are an exception to this mould and are successful in attracting 
arbitration business because they resemble their Western counterparts in their outlook and 
structure.
52
   
Having reached the conclusion that foreign law firms dominate the local arbitration 
market through their non-Arab lawyers, it is pertinent to question to what degree they push 
the boundaries of arbitral practice in the UAE and Bahrain. By arbitral practice I mean both 
in terms of contract law as well as the actual dispute resolution stage, which may include 
mediation in addition to arbitration proceedings. Empirical research suggests that in Latin 
America, at least, law firms, among others, played a leading role in the structuring of power 
and the constitution of nations.
53
 This is also true to some degree in certain parts of the GCC. 
Despite the confidentiality involved in arbitration we are able to have a rather clear picture as 
to the companies that dominate the market at the global scale. ALB published its 2012 
Arbitration Rankings which makes use of a solid questionnaire to discern the leading 
arbitration firms in terms of both volume and quality of service.
54
 Although the Rankings are 
not confined to a particular area and hence we do not have accurate information about 
Bahrain and the UAE, given that they are both international hubs, it is unlikely that the global 
result will be unreflective of the situation there. Not surprisingly, no Bahraini or UAE law 
firm is included in the top fifty, despite the fact that some of the international firms in the list 
have undertaken significant arbitration work there.
55
 Presumably, other arbitration work 
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outside of the UAE and Bahrain, the awards from which are intended to be enforced in the 
UAE and Bahrain, will also have been handled by international law firms. 
 What this effectively means is that both at the stage of enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award but also in terms of contract formation and arbitral proceedings in the UAE 
and Bahrain foreign law firms dictate the rules of the game and push – not always succeeding 
– to alter legislative boundaries and remedy what they see as impediments to an arbitration-
friendly business environment. Throughout the course of this thesis the analysis makes no 
reference to the “invisible actors” behind the enforcement of foreign awards, these being the 
law firms representing the interests of their clients; the analysis largely focuses on the 
applicable law and the challenges posed by the courts in the enforcement of foreign awards. 
Yet, even when an award is not enforced on technical grounds, as in the case of Bechtel, the 
law firm has communicated to the local court and the government itself the position of the 
international arbitration community and its objections to an arbitration-hostile stance.
56
 This 
communication should not lightly be dismissed by the courts or the government at hand, 
because of its undoubted effect on existing and future business and trade relations. Indeed, 
Bechtel was followed by a number of judgments that clearly departed from its enforcement-
hostile reasoning, thus demonstrating that the shock waves were not only felt but that also the 
warning signs were heeded to.
57
 It also reinforces the argument that all active participants in 
the legal process, i.e. lawyers, law firms, courts, activists and others, are legitimate 
stakeholders, each shaping and challenging the system in his or her own distinct way.
58
   
Thus, at present there is tug-of-war between those few elements in the courts and 
perhaps also the executive that are reluctant to harmonise arbitral practices with those in the 
developed arbitration centres across the globe and those who attempt to remedy such policies 
by taking a much more liberal approach. This tug-of-war is not always evident in the main 
analysis of the thesis, but is no doubt a poignant aspect of the politics of arbitration in the 
UAE and Bahrain, although it is particularly acute in Dubai as compared to the other UAE 
emirates and Bahrain. Overall, it is not the claim of this author that all, or any, of these 
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jurisdictions clearly pursues an arbitration-hostile policy or approach; this could not be 
further from the truth. Rather, a combination of conservatism, protectionism (especially in 
respect of government entities), outdated legal education, legal language gap and the fact that 
the boundaries are pushed by foreign law firms have contributed to isolated incidents of 
hostility. The fact that foreign law firms continue to augment their presence in the region and 
more and more awards are enforced there confirms the view that said isolated instances have 
not inhibited the international arbitration community. 
 
1. A5 the Methodology Pertinent to Ascertaining Enforcement Practices 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the law the practice relating to enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in the UAE and Bahrain. Moreover, although I have not set out to 
demonstrate whether the UAE and Bahrain are enforcement-friendly jurisdictions, it is 
expected that this will flow from the overall discussion. The inherent limitations have already 
been emphasised in the introductory chapter and concern particularly the absence of a 
database containing all relevant judgments. Hence, our understanding of the prevailing 
situation is necessarily fragmented but it is doubtful that the available case law contradicts 
that which is not publicly available, especially given that the judgments of superior courts are 
well publicised and included in the scope of this research. Therefore, what is missing from 
the overall puzzle are decisions on matters not covered in other judgments and in respect of 
which we I have employed a comparative approach by relying on jurisprudence from the 
courts of other nations. The extent of this gap in the jurisprudence of Bahraini and UAE 
courts is a matter of some speculation and cannot be fathomed with any degree of certainty. 
My assumption is that because on all other matters the jurisprudence of Bahraini and UAE 
courts is similar to that of their Western counterparts – save for obvious public or other 
grounds – that the comparative method is sound and reflective of similar trends and 
approaches in the GCC. 
 Because the empirical dimension of the thesis is extremely limited – I have spoken 
with lawyers, judges and government officials on a confidential basis but have not made any 
direct references to these discussions in the thesis – it is evident that I do not intend to 
provide an empirically-based conclusion as to the arbitration-friendly stance of the two 
nations under consideration. My expectation is that any conclusion will be derived from the 
exposition of the law and practice itself. Therefore, I generally avoid making acute 
 30 
 
characterisations one way or another, albeit from the outset my leading hypothesis has been 
that save for isolated instances both countries are indeed arbitration-friendly. This result is 
further confirmed by the number of award enforcements, at least those that are recorded and 
are known. Again, one can only speculate as to those awards that were not enforced by lower 
courts. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that their number is significant otherwise the two nations 
would not be viewed as attractive arbitration forums by foreign law firms. Another 
methodological limitation concerns the enforcement choices of law firms and this is clearly 
not the case.   
If a law firm can enforce against the losing party in more than one jurisdiction, with 
the available assets in just one sufficing, then the fact that the UAE and Bahrain were not on 
the top of the list obscures our understanding of law firms’ conception of arbitration-friendly 
as regards the phase of enforcement. The issue becomes more complicated where a law firm 
takes into consideration in reaching its decision other factors, such as the likelihood of 
securing the assets, their size, cost, etc. Thus, in order to fully locate and conceptualise 
whether foreign law firms consider Bahrain and the UAE as arbitration friendly we need 
direct access to raw data, particularly interviews, something which is beyond the purview of 
this thesis.
59
 We possess no record of such perceptions and what we do have is fragmented. 
By way of illustration, the 2010 Queen Mary International Arbitration Study showed that the 
Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) is poorly regarded and perceived by 
arbitration lawyers.
60
 Of course, DIAC is simply an arbitral institution and the reasons behind 
lawyers’ choices may not be relevant to Dubai as such. This is particularly true, given that 
lawyers did not profess the same feelings against other GCC arbitral forums. Nonetheless, 
this should be a worrying sign for the developers of DIAC and Dubai itself who invested 
heavily in this institution and some thought should certainly go into understanding how 
relevant perceptions can be improved. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE SOURCES OF ARBITRATION IN BAHRAIN AND UAE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the various sources that apply to arbitral proceedings in 
Bahrain and UAE, with an emphasis on the subject matter of the thesis, namely enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards. In order to construct the ladder of sources it is important to clarify 
certain differences from western legal thinking. Although both the UAE and Bahraini legal 
systems may be viewed as either civil law-based or mixed because of the Shari’a courts and 
legislation (as this relates to personal matters and Islamic financing among others), this is a 
rather neat categorisation that does not aptly reflect their respective realities. As will be 
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demonstrated in the course of the chapter in the duration of their existence these two dynamic 
legal systems have been plagued by various paradoxes and conflicts which they have 
reconciled without much doctrinal justification. By way of illustration, the superior status of 
the Shari’a overall other legislation has not curtailed the promulgation of legislation that is 
clearly contrary to it.  Although such practices are undertaken in order to advance 
commercial imperatives and as a result can be accommodated within the flexible nature of the 
Shari’a, they are discussed outside the context of Islamic law. This has been severely 
criticised by a number of authors.  Moreover, although western legal audiences usually have 
access to judgments by the various courts in the two nations, Islamic law has not traditionally 
condoned the use of judicial precedent on account, so it is claimed, of man’s inherent 
fallibility. As a result, precedent runs the risk of reproducing faulty human judgment over and 
over. Although one can see the benefits of this line of thinking, one is also privy to its 
underlying disadvantages. Human conditions and interactions are so complex that statute 
alone is unable to cover all possible deviations. Judicial precedent, even in civil law nations, 
has become the only way of legal certainty, especially in relation to antiquated or inadequate 
statutes. Although the UAE and Bahrain refuse to formally recognise the authority of 
precedent, nonetheless their courts and those who have recourse to their courts observe local 
precedent religiously. In practice, the judgments of local courts have been excellent and are 
respected by the international community, particularly the foreign jurists who practice law in 
the Gulf as consultants and arbitrators. 
 An emphasis was placed on the primary sources that have a direct bearing on the 
practice of arbitration and on its enforcement in the two nations. Moreover, an extensive 
discussion on their international obligations has been undertaken with a view to ascertaining 
the exact boundaries of such obligations. Moreover, we have analysed the Shari’a factor from 
the point of view of enforcement, given that Shari’a will be discussed in other chapters, 
particularly that dealing with public policy. At the end of the chapter we have given a 
thorough overview of two distinct arbitration zones that exist in the UAE and Bahrain 
because of their impact on the enforcement of arbitral awards in the region and globally. 
 
1.2       The Bahraini Code of Civil Procedure 
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Codes of civil procedure in respect of arbitral proceedings typically serve to regulate the 
conduct and operation of domestic arbitration. Moreover, although certainly in conjunction 
with other domestic laws, they also serve as the necessary lex arbitri in respect of 
transnational or international arbitral proceedings taking place in the territory of that State. 
The Bahraini Code of Commercial and Civil Procedure were adopted in 1971 and were later 
modified in 1990. Articles 233ff regulate matters regarding arbitration, albeit only in respect 
of domestic arbitration.  This provision stipulates that: 
Contracting parties may make general provisions for arbitration in respect of disputes arising 
between them over the performance of a certain contract, or agreement may be reached on 
arbitration in respect of a particular dispute by means of a special arbitration agreement. 
Nonetheless, there is disagreement as to whether the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) applies 
only to domestic arbitrations, given that Article 1 of the Decree promulgating the Code 
expressly provided that it was meant to repeal any provisions contrary to it. No doubt, 
although no conflicts have arisen to date, it is unlikely that the CCP can override Bahrain’s 
international arbitration act, which is examined in the following section. This follows from 
the maxim that lex posterior derogat lex priori, as well as implicitly from the maxim lex 
posterior generalis non derogat legi priori speciali. Quite clearly, the 1994 International 
Arbitration Act, unlike the CCP, is not a general law but a very specific one, applicable to 
international arbitrations. These two maxims, which constitute general principles of law, are 
not only confined to statutory interpretation but more fundamentally they provide legal 
certainty and protect legitimate expectations. It is rather unlikely for the Bahraini superior 
courts to construe these two pieces of legislation as being in conflict with each other. The 
only problematic situation that may be envisaged is the possible fragmentation of the two 
regimes (ie domestic and international arbitrations), with the courts issuing diverse judgments 
based on the nature of the arbitration under consideration. Such diversity would not generally 
be problematic were the two regimes to remain permanently fragmented. However, if they 
ever became wholly or partly unified, conflicts would certainly arise.  For example, imagine a 
situation whereby the regime of international arbitration tolerated the resolution of 
international disputes concerning gambling, especially if Bahrain were to become an 
attractive forum for the settlement of disputes. The country’s domestic regime banning such 
activities should in theory be compatible with their resolution on Bahraini territory, 
particularly when the parties to a dispute are international actors who do not intend to enforce 
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their award in Bahrain, because Bahrain only serves as a forum for resolution. Nonetheless, 
the government may well take the view, following public opinion, that Bahraini laws and its 
courts serve to validate the effects of gambling, thus violating its public policy. In this case, 
the CCP and the relevant judgments by which it has been interpreted would have to become 
applicable against the International Arbitration Act. 
 It should also be stated that Bahraini courts have used the CCP to enforce foreign civil 
judgments and arbitral awards in cases where there was an absence of a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement with the country whose courts issued the judgment.  In Merrill Lynch 
v Abdul Jalil Behbehani a judgment against the respondent was issued by an English court 
pursuant to an arbitral award and plaintiffs sought to enforce against his assets in Bahrain, 
among other jurisdictions. The problem was that at the time no reciprocal agreement existed 
between the two nations whereby civil judgments and arbitral awards could be mutually 
enforced. On the basis of Articles 252 and 253 of the CPC the Bahraini Civil High Court, 
reversing the decision of a lower court, held that it was authorised to examine the merits of 
the case and assess whether it had been issued under conditions of possible reciprocity. It 
ruled that the tribunal had complied with all relevant rules, such as would have been applied 
by Bahrain had the case been lodged there, and hence found the judgment to be in good order 
and in conformity with public morals and order. More specifically, it held that: 
[t]here is agreement between English law and Bahraini law in terms of the manner of 
enforcing foreign judgments. A legal action seeking the issue of an order for enforcing a 
judgment in Bahraini law is equalled by a legal action for recognition of the right represented 
by the foreign judgment according to English law. The conditions contained in the Article 
252 of the Bahraini Law of Civil and Commercial Procedures applicable to the admissibility 
of adopting an order for enforcing a foreign judgment are the same as conditions required by 
English law for recognising a foreign judgment.  
Reference to the CCP and the aforementioned judgment was meant to highlight the 
importance of the CCP in respect of international arbitration, and in particular enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. It should be noted that application of the CCP under such 
circumstances raises issues of reciprocity that are beyond the purview of this thesis.  
However, if one were to assess the application of reciprocity on the basis of statutory 
provisions in the Gulf region, one would come to the conclusion that although said practice 
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does indeed exist, local courts, especially lower ones, have been conspicuously conservative.  
Given the sociological analysis in chapter 1a, it is not at all surprising that judges in superior 
courts are far more flexible and less prone to technicalities as compared to their colleagues in 
lower courts. 
 
1.3 The Bahraini International Arbitration Act 
 
It has already been explained that Bahraini civil law has been influenced by Egyptian law, 
which in turn heavily relied on French civil law and legal theory. It was only natural therefore 
for the country to decide the implementation of rules relating to international arbitration not 
in a spirit of isolation, as was the case with Saudi Arabia, but in a manner that rendered 
Bahrain an attractive investment destination. This has certainly been achieved to a significant 
degree by the adoption of the 1994 International Arbitration Act.  The Act is quintessentially 
an almost verbatim implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration. It will be recalled that the primary objective of the Model Law was 
to serve as a benchmark, if not wholesale as a model law that would be implemented by as 
many countries in the world as possible with a view to harmonising arbitral processes.  Given 
that enforcement of arbitral awards had already achieved some uniformity with the adoption 
of the 1958 New York Convention, it was rightly felt that the puzzle was still incomplete 
from the point of view of the pre-enforcement stages of arbitration, from the validity of the 
agreement wherein the arbitration clause is contained to the recognition of the award once 
rendered. No doubt, the objective of Bahrain was to become a major player in international 
commerce as well as establish itself as an arbitration-friendly location. The adoption of the 
Act on the basis of the UNCITRAL Model Law certainly worked towards fulfilling this goal. 
 We shall limit ourselves in this section only to those parts of the Act which the 
Bahraini legislator adapted to the particular exigencies of the Kingdom. The scope of 
application of the Act  has been taken verbatim from Article 1 of the Model Law and what is 
more it has also incorporated within the meaning of “commercial activities” all those 
activities stipulated in footnote 1 to UNCITRAL’s 2006 revision of the Law.  
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 In terms of the provision of assistance and supervision over arbitral proceedings the 
Act has designated as competent the Supreme Civil Court of Appeals.  The designation of 
such a senior court, as opposed to the Diwan in Saudi Arabia, is evidence of the significance 
afforded to arbitration and dispute resolution in Bahrain. Unlike Saudi law, which imposes 
numerous restrictions on personal autonomy as is the case with the religion of arbitrators, the 
1994 Act poses no obstacles to parties wishing to conduct their arbitration in Bahrain. The 
only limitations placed by the Act are those which all countries would necessarily have to 
impose even if they were to copy the Model Law verbatim. For one thing, recognition of 
foreign awards rendered in a language other than Arabic requires a duly authenticated 
translation.  Secondly, an award may be refused recognition if the subject-matter of the 
dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of Bahrain, or where the 
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of Bahrain.  
The issue of arbitrability is further reinforced by Article 1(3) which stipulates that the Act 
“shall not affect any other law of the State of Bahrain by virtue of which certain disputes may 
not be submitted to arbitration or may be submitted to arbitration only according to 
provisions other than those of this Law”. We shall not expand on the concept of arbitrability 
at this stage as it will become of the focus of analysis in other sections of this thesis, 
particularly chapter 3. 
 It should be stressed at the close of this section that as important as the 1994 Act is, it 
should not be read in isolation, but should be examined in conjunction with Bahrain’s other 
international commitments in the field, principally the New York convention, regional 
arbitration agreements and foreign investment law. The latter is important because under 
ordinary circumstances it would have no place in the scope of the Act. However, the 
aforementioned footnote in the explanatory notes to the UNCITRAL Model Law stipulated 
that “investments” are subject to the ordinary law of arbitration. Although it is beyond the 
purview of this thesis to discuss in any detail the concept of investment and investment 
arbitration, it is clear that the Bahraini legislator, perhaps rather inadvertently, thought it wise 
to give investors the choice of whether they would rather have recourse to commercial, as 
opposed to investment, arbitration. The repercussions of this provision are not entirely clear 
in practice, particularly whether the investor who has opted for commercial arbitration, can 
take advantage of the BIT between his country and the host State in order to initiate 
investment arbitration. In all probability, “investment” disputes within the meaning of the 
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1994 Act correspond to private disputes, not disputes between a foreign investor and a 
Bahraini public entity.  
 
1.3 The Role of Islamic Law in Bahraini and UAE Arbitration 
 
We have chosen to assess the position of Islamic law in relation to the Bahraini position on 
arbitration not because it is less important than the official laws analysed in previous sections, 
but because its place in the Bahraini legal system is contingent. Moreover, its place against 
other legal systems is at times confusing.  Indeed, Article 2 of the Constitution clearly states 
that the “Islamic Shari’a is a principal source of legislation”. This is further coupled with 
express injunctions in the large preamble to the 2002 amended version of the Constitution, 
wherein the role of Islamic law is rendered paramount. This is further reinforced by the 
dominance of Shari’a in the political, business and cultural life of the kingdom. A former 
Bahraini justice and Islamic affairs Minister, in responding to a question on arbitration in the 
Gulf States, was quoted as saying: 
The Arab is conscious of the fact that a case in a court is actually a dispute between two 
adversaries, whereas in the case of arbitration it is a dispute between brothers. This clear 
distinction makes arbitration harmonise with an Arab’s psychological make-up, which is 
imbued with sentimentalism and which is more at home with a spirit of peace, good will and 
conciliatory brotherhood. This makes arbitration as a method of settling disputes more 
effective on Arab soil, which provides an appropriate environment for the acceptance, 
strengthening and popularising of this model and infusing a spirit of respect for it.  
This statement, although implicitly referring to Shari’a as an element of the Muslim’s life, 
nonetheless focuses on the nature of the Arab. It is instructive for the purposes of the 
regulation of arbitration for it suggests that unlike other areas of law where Shari’a is 
compulsory on the parties; commercial arbitration may not necessarily fall within this strict 
category. This line of thinking is reflected in the Kingdom’s court structure. The judiciary is 
organized into two branches: the civil law courts and the Shari’a law courts. The civil law 
courts are typically entitled to discuss and settle all commercial, civil, and criminal cases, and 
all cases involving disputes related to the personal status of non-Muslims. These courts are 
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structured in a three-tier system, starting with the courts of minor causes, also called the 
lower courts and the court of execution, which have jurisdiction over civil and commercial 
matters. The middle courts have jurisdiction over criminal matters. At the second level is the 
High Court of Appeal, or the Senior Civil Court. Cases at these levels are presided over by a 
minimum of two judges. 
The Shari’a law courts have jurisdiction over all issues related to the personal status of 
Muslims, both Bahraini and non-Bahraini. The Judiciary Act  stipulates that they are 
competent to hear all matters relating to inheritance, gifts, wills and charitable donations 
(waqf). There are at present two levels of Shari’a courts, namely: the Senior Shari’a Court 
and the High Shari’a Court of Appeal. At each level there exists a Sunni Shari’a Court with 
jurisdiction over all personal status cases brought by Sunni Muslims, and a Jaafari Shari’a 
Court with jurisdiction over cases brought by Shi’a Muslims. The High Shari’a Court of 
Appeal must be composed by a minimum of two judges. In the event of a disagreement, the 
Ministry of Justice shall provide a third judge and the decision will be based on a majority 
vote.  
Law No 8 of 1989 established the Supreme Court of Appeal or Court of Cassation. This 
institution serves as the final court of appeal for all civil, commercial, and criminal matters. 
In addition, cases dealing with the personal status of non-Muslims may be appealed to this 
body. The Court of Cassation is composed of a chairman and three other judges who are 
appointed by decree. As a practical matter, the civil courts do not invoke Shari’a law except 
when the issue is concerned with inheritance. 
It is clear from this structure and the substantive laws that grant the parties access to civil 
courts rather than the Shari’a courts that Bahrain operates a mixed system, wherein secular 
law plays a dominant role. This rationale has even permeated fields that would otherwise be 
viewed as sacrosanct to Islamic legal and theological thinking, as is the case with interest 
(riba) whose prohibition is clearly prohibited under the Shari’a.  Bahrain, as well as other 
Gulf States with similar adherence to Islamic law as their primary basis for legislation tend to 
circumvent, or indeed bypass, on certain occasions the express dictates of this body of law by 
reason of statute in order to accommodate commercial or other social imperatives.  Whether 
or not such legislative practices are strictly in conformity with the constitution and hence 
Islamic law is something that is beyond the ambit of this thesis, but it is suggested that it is 
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probably wise of the legislature to adopt laws that respect the spirit of Islam rather than focus 
stubbornly on the letter.  In any event, it is evident from the analysis in this section that 
Islamic law does not operate in Bahrain, as indeed in all other Gulf States,  as an impediment 
to the introduction of progressive commercial legislation and the courts of these nations 
construe commercial relationships rather liberally. This attitude has a direct impact on the 
practice of arbitration taking place on said territories (essentially giving rise to a liberal and 
arbitration-friendly lex arbitri) as well as on the enforcement practices thereof.  
 
1.5 The Sources of Arbitral Law in the UAE Legal System 
Unlike Bahrain, the UAE is a federation of emirates, seven in number, welded together under 
the terms of a provisional or temporary constitution that was adopted in 1971 and 
subsequently amended in 1996.  A brief overview of the UAE’s law-making authorities is 
crucial in order to fully understand the rationale of the legislative process. According to 
Article 45 of the UAE Constitution the federal authorities consist of the Supreme Council of 
the Union (SC), the President of the Union and his deputy, the Council of Ministers, the 
Federal National Council (FNC) and the federal judiciary. The FNC is the closest thing to a 
representative body and in theory it is supposed to discuss and/or suggest amendments to 
laws submitted by the SC. In practice, however, it is neither democratic nor does it live up to 
its purported role. Only half of its members are elected, the other being appointed by the 
respective emirs. Even so, the elected members are chosen by an appointed electoral college, 
thus depriving the FNC of the democratic credentials available to western-style parliamentary 
bodies. While in theory the FNC may reject a bill, the UAE Constitution establishes a process 
whereby ultimately the SC can bypass it.  
 The Supreme Council is vested with full legislative power. It consists of the rulers of 
the emirates, which although are of different sizes, each is entitled to a single and equal vote 
in the Council. Article 47 of the UAE Constitution enumerates a non-exhaustive list of 
competencies conferred upon the Council, encompassing, inter alia, the adoption of federal 
laws, including the national budget, the endorsement of certain decrees of the Council of 
Ministers and the ratification of international treaties. The Council is moreover vested with 
authority to approve the appointment of the Prime Minister and the members of the federal 
Supreme Court. Finally, as a general proposition, the Council enjoys the “[s]upreme control 
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over the affairs of the Union generally’ and is competent to consider ‘all matters … to 
achieve the aims of the Union and the common interests of the member Emirates.”  
 Despite the fact that the various emirates have authority to adopt local (i.e. non-
federal) legislation, this has only sparsely been undertaken to date.  Legislation is typically of 
a federal nature, although this may change in the near future given that the various emirates 
are now actively competing among themselves for investment and commercial opportunities 
in the region, thus giving rise to the need for tailor-made non-federal laws. A typical example 
is offered by the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) which consists of a financial 
free zone with autonomous jurisdiction where the ordinary commercial legislation of the 
UAE finds no application.  As will be discussed in other parts of this thesis, such 
developments will have a significant impact on the practice of arbitration in the region, which 
is evolving into a profitable commercial activity for emirates like Dubai. It will probably 
produce repercussions in terms of enforcement in other nations that do not accept free zones 
such as DFIC, especially where they produce an abundance of awards. 
 The court structure of the UAE consists of local courts in each emirate with 
jurisdiction over matters that are not encompassed in the jurisdiction of federal courts.  There 
are two federal courts, namely the Federal Courts of First Instance and the Federal Supreme 
Court. The first instance courts enjoy jurisdiction over civil, commercial and administrative 
disputes arising between an individual and any of the emirates, as well as over civil, 
commercial and personal status disputes (Shari’a-related cases) between persons normally 
resident in the UAE capital.  The Supreme Court enjoys jurisdiction over any dispute 
amongst the emirates or between any emirate and the UAE concerning the construction of the 
Constitution. Its jurisdiction also extends to the resolution of conflicts between the emirates’ 
judicial bodies, among others.  There is also a range of other specialist chambers operating at 
the federal or emirate level.  Reference to some of these will be made in the course of this 
thesis. 
 From the point of view of arbitration, a federal arbitration act was promulgated in 
1992 within the framework of the then-newly formed federal code of Civil Procedure.  
Arbitration was included in chapter III thereof. Chapter III was effectively repealed in 2009 
with the passage of the UAE Federal Arbitration Act, which much like the 1994 Bahraini 
International Arbitration Act is predicated on the UNCITRAL Model Law. However, it is 
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different in a number of ways from its Bahraini counterpart. For one thing, it is not a 
verbatim adaptation of the Model Law. An excellent illustration is provided by Article 3 
which concerns the scope of application and which, although containing many of the 
activities listed in the Model Law, excludes a fair number and enumerates several new ones, 
such as “exploration and extraction of natural wealth, energy supply, the laying of gas or oil 
pipelines, the building of roads and tunnels, the reclamation of agricultural land, the 
protection of the environment and the establishment of nuclear reactors”. Secondly, the 2009 
is sufficiently linked to the Egyptian Arbitration Act,  from which it has been influenced. For 
the purposes of this thesis although the analysis will focus on the 2009 UAE Act, it is 
important to have recourse to federal judgments based on the Civil Procedure Code, 
especially where these are not in conflict with the new Act. This is natural given that many of 
the provisions contained in chapter III generally reflect principles of arbitration law that are 
common to all nations or to the various UAE emirates and which have not been abrogated by 
the passing of the new Act. 
 Besides the 2009 Act, there are several other pieces of legislation that have a bearing 
on arbitration. In order to avoid providing a brief overview of all of these, given that many, 
such as the federal Commercial Agency Act, give rise to arbitral proceedings, we will simply 
mention one Act that relates to enforcement of arbitral awards. The Act on the Organisation 
of Judicial Relations between the Emirates of the Federation obliges all UAE entities to 
render awards made in other emirates enforceable within the space of a year.  This Act is 
particularly important given the dispersal of assets of both UAE and foreign companies in all 
of the emirates in one form of another and the increasing use of arbitration throughout the 
UAE, not to mention its potential utilisation by DFIC. It should be noted that Article 13 of 
the Act does not subject UAE arbitral awards to further judicial scrutiny in order to give 
effect to their enforcement. The rationale is no doubt that matters of public policy and 
arbitrability are identical throughout the UAE, but the potential asymmetric financial 
situation of the various entities in the future may push some to contest this legislation, 
especially where it causes, or is perceived to cause, financial harm. 
 
1.6. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards on the Basis of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: 
The Riyadh and New York Conventions 
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Bahrain and the UAE are parties to five multilateral treaties dealing with enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards and foreign civil judgments. These are: the 1995 Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC)  Agreement on the Execution of Rulings, Requests of Legal Assistance and 
Judicial Notices (Oman GCC Convention), the 1995 GCC Protocol on the Enforcement of 
Judgments, Letters Rogatory and Judicial Notices (GCC Protocol); the 1983 Riyadh 
Convention on Judicial Cooperation between members States of the Arab League; the 1952 
Inter-Arab Convention on the Enforcement of Judgments and Awards (which was superseded 
by the Riyadh convention), and; the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Of these the most important for the purposes of this 
thesis are the New York and the Riyadh conventions because they serve as a basis for the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, whereas the other two were formulated with a view to 
facilitating the enforcement of civil and commercial judgments.  
 Unlike the New York Convention, its Riyadh counterpart only briefly deals with 
arbitration. Article 37, which deals with the recognition and enforcement of civil, commercial 
and administrative judgments, stipulates that arbitral awards shall be recognised and enforced 
in each Member State under the same conditions envisaged in respect of court judgments. It 
is for this reason that the Riyadh Convention is considered the regional equivalent of its New 
York counterpart.  Certain key features of the convention will be highlighted as they will 
illuminate our discussion on the enforcement obligations of Bahrain and the UAE. Under 
Article 32 the court of enforcement cannot assess the merits of the award. It is restricted 
solely to the examination of two conditions, namely: the form and nature of the award,  as 
well as its procedure and content.  The former includes: a) decisions made against the 
government of the contracting State where recognition or enforcement is sought, or against 
any of its employees for acts only undertaken during the fulfilment of duty or at the occasion 
thereof; b) decisions whose recognition and enforcement would be contrary to international 
agreements applicable in the country of enforcement, and; c) provisional and conservatory 
measures rendered in cases relating to bankruptcy, taxes and fees. The conditions imposed 
under Article 30, on the other hand, concern: a) situations where the merits of the dispute 
violate public policy  and morals, particularly violations of the Shari’a; b) restrictions on 
form generally require the existence of a valid notice, the provision of adequate 
representation rights to both parties, especially those lacking capacity (although rather 
improbable in arbitral awards) and the refusal to enforce an arbitral award whose subject 
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matter has already been litigated before regular courts. Additional reasons whereby the 
enforcement court may refuse recognition include, under Article 37, the absence of 
arbitrability in respect of particular types of dispute, the existence of a void arbitration 
agreement or compromis, the absence of arbitral jurisdiction and the absence of proper 
notification.  
 Recent practice suggests that both UAE and Bahrain judicial institutions are at pains 
to emphasise that they are enforcement-friendly and that they respect their obligations under 
the New York Convention. In Hedley International Emirates Contracting LLC v Nakheel 
PJSC, the parties had inserted a binding arbitration clause in their contract which stipulated 
that future disputes would be referred to arbitration in Dubai under the DIAC rules. Hedley 
International commenced a claim before a special tribunal established by Dubai to hear cases 
relating to the restructuring of the Dubai World group.  The Decree vested the special tribunal 
with authority to hear “any demand or claim submitted against Dubai World” [and its 
subsidiaries]. Nakheel challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction as a result of a Tribunal Practice 
Direction which provides that the tribunal will respect and enforce arbitration agreements 
made between Dubai World and its creditors and that, where disputes have already arisen, the 
tribunal expects the parties to continue with their arbitral proceedings. Hedley, however, 
argued, that the Practice Direction applied only to proceedings in process and not to those 
which had not yet been initiated. The special tribunal in the case held that the Tribunal 
Practice Direction applied to all arbitration agreements, regardless of whether proceedings 
had already been commenced. It also held that it applied to both international and domestic 
arbitrations. One observation of the tribunal was that to rule otherwise would put the UAE in 
breach of its obligations as a signatory to the New York Convention because the Convention 
requires the courts of signatory states to refer the parties to arbitration where the parties have 
entered into an arbitration agreement, unless the agreement is void, inoperative or incapable 
of being performed. 
 Given the proliferation of UAE and Bahraini companies throughout the world, they 
can expect a degree of reciprocity even when enforcement of judgments or awards are not 
issued by UAE or Bahraini judicial or arbitral institutions. This is true in respect of judgments 
rendered in the world’s large financial centers, particularly New York and London, which 
judgments said companies are seeking to enforce elsewhere.  
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1.6.1 Enforcement through Bilateral Investment Treaties 
BITs are not typically perceived as vehicles through which foreign arbitral awards can be 
enforced. The principal reason is that their primary purpose is to protect the interests of 
investors through the adoption of investor guarantees between homes and host States. 
Moreover, it is also envisaged therein that any future disputes between the parties will 
culminate in investor arbitration claims, rather than commercial arbitration claims.  Indeed, 
private parties generally find investment arbitration less time-consuming because there is no 
lex arbitri (and attendant delay tactics) to speak of and more importantly the award does not 
require enforcement in the same manner as regular commercial arbitration awards.  Despite 
these observations, several BITs do in fact deal with commercial arbitration and enforcement 
of awards. This is generally because they are of an older generation and furthermore because 
prior to the 2000s many investors did not even envisage recourse to investment arbitration as 
a realistic option. 
 The 1999 USA-Bahrain BIT is a typical example of a BIT that makes extensive 
reference to commercial arbitration and enforcement. Article 9(4)(b) emphasizes that all 
agreements referring to commercial arbitration will not be precluded from being considered 
by arbitral tribunals, noting further under paragraph 5 that any arbitration shall be held in a 
State that is a party to the New York convention. More importantly, under paragraph 6, “any 
arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Article shall be final and binding on the parties to the 
dispute. Each Party shall carry out without delay the provisions of any such award and 
provide in its territory for the enforcement of such award.” Although there is no empirical 
evidence available, the author’s personal experience suggests that given the rise of arbitral 
centres and the arbitration-friendly environment in the Gulf, more and more investors 
consider the prospect of commercial arbitration a better, and certainly cheaper, prospect than 
investment arbitration. 
 
1.7 Jurisdiction of the Dubai International Financial Centre and Enforcement of 
Awards 
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The DIFC is an exceptional measure under international law.  It is unclear whether it 
constitutes a self-limitation of sovereignty that does not require the consent of other States, or 
whether States otherwise enjoy the prerogative, regardless of the consent of others, to 
establish free zones if by doing so they do not violate existing international obligations. The 
creation of the DIFC was primarily undertaken in order to attract business to Dubai through a 
fast-track process that bypasses many of the bureaucratic hurdles imposed by existing UAE 
laws. Its creation in fact necessitated an amendment to the UAE Constitution. The Law 
setting up DIFC provides powers of law-making and supervision to its appointed authority 
and although it does not discuss its latent arbitral jurisdiction, it does contain important 
features in respect of arbitration and enforcement of awards. Article 65(1) of the Regulatory 
DIFC Law states that: “a person who makes an agreement in the course of carrying on a 
financial service in breach of the financial services prohibition or the collective investment 
prohibitions shall not be entitled to enforce such agreement against any party to the 
agreement”. In combination with the Law’s strict money laundering, regulatory and auditing 
requirements, it is evident that although Dubai laws do not generally apply within DIFC the 
overall public policy and, to a large degree, arbitrability requirements that apply in the UAE 
are fully in force in DIFC.  It is important to emphasize that the UAE’s international 
obligations (treaties and customary law) apply without exception to DIFC as it does not enjoy 
statehood, only a distinct legal personality in terms of contractual capacity and liabilities. 
This means that DIFC courts and authorities are obliged to enforce Dubai’s treaty obligations.  
 The 2008 DIFC Arbitration Law establishes a semi-delocalised system of arbitration, 
whose jurisdiction is circumscribed on the basis of an agreement between the parties, whether 
in written, electronic, or other format.  We choose to call it delocalized because the lex arbitri 
is at its infancy and the parties rely on the DIFC Court for assistance, which itself is a new 
institution. The idea is that arbitrations are to take place with as little lex arbitri as possible 
and that awards made there or abroad, will find a venue of fast and effective enforcement.  
The DIFC Arbitration Law has been predicated on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Two types 
of laws apply in respect of awards whose claimants seek enforcement. On the one hand, 
Article 42(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law stipulates that all awards, irrespective of where 
they were rendered, shall be recognized within DIFC and enforced subject to the usual 
caveats under the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. The second 
situation concerns the status of awards recognized by DIFC. According to Article 42(4) of the 
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2008 Arbitration Law, any awards recognized by the DIFC Court “may be enforced outside 
the DIFC in accordance with the Judicial Authority Law and recognition under this Law 
includes ratification for the purposes of Article 7 of the Judicial Authority Law”.  What this 
means in practice is that DIFC-recognized awards are ipso facto recognized and enforced in 
the UAE and by implication also in all other nations with whom the UAE has entered into 
multilateral or bilateral treaties to that effect.  Thus, the New York and the Riyadh 
conventions apply in full with respect to DIFC awards. More importantly, all DIFC-
recognized awards automatically become Dubai-recognized awards.  
 In practice, it has become evident that the DIFC Court is itself a strong contender of 
jurisdictional supremacy and parties are not averse to conferring jurisdictional authority upon 
it. In Injazat Capital Ltd and Injazat Technology Fund BSC v Denton Wilde Sapte & Co, the 
parties entered into a contract which allowed for disputes to be referred to LCIA arbitration in 
London. Injazat sued Denton Wilde Sapte (WDS) before the DIFC Court and DWS applied 
to dismiss or stay the court action on the ground that the claim was to be heard in arbitration.  
The DIFC Court refused to entertain this claim, arguing that where the DIFC courts 
possessed the jurisdiction to hear a case, they had no power to dismiss it, or to stay it for 
arbitration, unless the arbitration had its seat in the DIFC. Had the parties agreed to submit 
their dispute to arbitration elsewhere it would not have enjoyed jurisdiction.  This decision 
highlights the position of the DIFC Court against its “competitors” and the fact that it will not 
deny itself a broad exercise of jurisdiction.  However, when there is a potential conflict 
between itself and DIFC arbitration it will happily relinquish its own authority. This of course 
makes ample business sense, not only in order to reinforce the credibility of DIFC arbitration, 
but also because DIFC awards, as already explained, are easily recognized and enforced 
everywhere. 
 
1.7.1 The Bahrain Centre for Dispute Resolution and Challenges against Recognition 
It was not the original intention of this author to assess the status of the BCDR because its 
existence does not pose any jurisdictional challenges nor does it give rise to particular 
enforcement concerns. The reason is rather simple. The BCDR is not a free zone as is the 
case with DIFC, nor does it possess a distinct legal personality from that of the kingdom of 
Bahrain, given that its budget and management entail a significant input from the central 
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government.  As a result, the BCDR is yet another arbitral institution, albeit with significant 
government backing, its purpose being to attract arbitral business to Bahrain. It is mentioned 
in this context because often in the literature it is compared to DIFC. This notion should 
certainly be dispelled. Awards emanating from the BCDR should be treated just like any 
other arbitral awards issued in Bahrain or elsewhere. Nonetheless, what is original about the 
BCDR is that parties to a dispute that would ordinarily be heard by the regular courts of 
Bahrain may choose to submit their dispute by agreement to arbitration under the BCDR. 
This entitlement only applies in respect of commercial claims the value of which exceed 
BHD 500.000 (close to $US 1.3 million). This includes:  
a) Disputes among financial institutions licensed according to the provisions of the Law of 
the Central Bank of Bahrain or between these institutions and other institutions, companies, 
and individuals;  
b) International Commercial Disputes. The dispute shall be deemed international if the 
location of one of the disputant parties or the place where a substantial part of the obligations 
of the commercial relationship is to be performed, or the location most closely connected 
with the dispute is outside the Kingdom.  
Moreover, in accordance with Article 25 of Decree No 30, once an award has been issued the 
parties cannot challenge it before the courts of Bahrain if the intention of the parties is to seek 
enforcement abroad and provided that the parties have agreed in writing that: a foreign law is 
the governing law; that they will not challenge the award before Bahraini courts and; any 
challenge will be made before a competent foreign court or entity. This has led several 
commentators to proclaim the BCDR is an “arbitration free zone”.  
Parties may naturally choose the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in such cases, particularly 
if they feel that an award has a higher likelihood of being enforced in more countries abroad 
as a result of the New York and the Riyadh conventions, as opposed to a local court 
judgment. Furthermore, the added attraction of minimal local court interference may render 
BCDR awards attractive for those who fear that disputes with local parties may give rise to 
bias on the part of local courts, particularly if the local party would have made attempts to 
circumvent proceedings in order to allow as much court intervention as possible. 
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Some degree of criticism has been levelled against the BCDR’s lack of Shari’a rules within 
its various instruments. Levi-Tawil argues that the absence of an Islamic character augments 
the perceived discrepancy between an Islamic legal order and the international arbitration 
legal order. She is of the opinion that Islamic law is flexible and adaptive enough to 
accommodate international arbitration, in which case arbitration can then try to align itself 
with Islam’s immutable principles. As things stand, and the BCDR is evidence of this, 
Muslims and non-Muslims try artificially to keep Islam outside the realm of arbitration.  
 
1.8 The Gulf as a Place of Enforcement of Awards Predicated on the Proceeds of 
Money Laundering 
It has recently come to the attention of regulators and other government officials that those 
involved in organised crime are using the devices of international commercial arbitration in 
order to launder their illicit proceeds.  Money laundering is a composite crime that requires a 
predicate criminal conduct, such as drug trafficking, the proceeds of which are then layered 
into the regular economy without the authorities being able to trace their origin. There exists 
a significant international effort to avert money laundering and among the many entities 
involved in setting out a pragmatic and legal framework is the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), which is situated within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The typical activities through which organised crime achieves the 
laundering of illicit proceeds has been through the purchase of real estate, investment in 
shares and bonds and the funding of political parties and other entities.  However, since the 
early 2000s, following the terrorist events of 9/11, money laundering has come to the 
forefront because of the manner in which terrorists are able to secure funds to finance their 
operation. As a result, it became necessary to formulate rules and policies that would prevent 
terrorist organisations from transferring money to their cells around the world. The absence 
of a regulatory system dedicated specifically to terrorist financing necessarily meant that 
domestic and international authorities relied on the much more elaborate money laundering 
regulations. 
 Criminal enterprises, however, are generally one step ahead of the authorities and as a 
result in the last decade it has been reported that instead of focusing on the aforementioned 
purchases to launder money, there has been a turn to arbitration. The New York Convention 
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is an ideal tool for criminal syndicates because it allows them to go to arbitration over a non-
existent dispute and obtain an award which is equivalent to a regular court judgment without 
the intervention of the local courts and then have that award enforced throughout the globe. 
The award itself serves to legitimise the money awarded to the winning party in the form of 
an official document that is not susceptible to significant challenges, particularly since the 
losing party will not lodge any of the usual challenges that are meant to prevent an award 
from being enforced. The only way, therefore, that such an award risks being rejected is if the 
courts of enforcement at their own initiative challenge it on grounds of public policy or lack 
of arbitrability. However, this eventuality is unlikely because the parties would have 
fabricated the subject matter of the dispute in such a way as to avoid risking a possible 
proprio motu challenge by the courts of the enforcing State. 
 There are several ways by which this operation may be set up. One possible scenario 
is for the parties to write a contract over a non-existent relationship in respect of which they 
trigger the arbitration clause and appoint an arbitrator that is aware of the fraud and the 
purpose of the arbitration. Of course, the parties are less likely to be quizzed over the award 
if, instead of choosing a random or unknown person as an arbitrator, they opt for an 
established name to whom they have no intention of revealing their illicit aims. Such an 
award is unlikely to be contested and the dispute will typically involve a subject matter for 
which no onsite visits are necessary by the arbitrators. Another possible avenue concerning 
the use of arbitration as a means of money laundering is by soliciting the services of a third 
party arbitration funder, whether legitimate or otherwise, the payment for which will then be 
filtered in the award. Finally, it is well known that in countries where the outcome of a 
mediation agreement only possesses a contractual character, as opposed to that of a judicial 
judgment, the parties may well achieve the status of a judgment by appointing an arbitrator to 
transpose the mediation agreement into an arbitral award. This practice is also pursued in 
sensitive cases involving State entities who find it embarrassing to pass a mediation 
agreement before parliament and their people, choosing instead to present an arbitral award 
over which they can say that they had no choice.  
 It is certainly hard, if not impossible, to quantify the scale of the problem worldwide. 
What is certain, however, is that fraudulent arbitral awards are sought to be enforced in 
jurisdictions with sound banking and financial systems with the Gulf nations being principal 
targets. From the point of view of this section and the thesis more generally it is pertinent to 
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assess the modalities in place in Bahrain and the UAE through which these nations can claim 
to prevent arbitral award-based money laundering. Unlike Europe’s gate-keeping system 
whereby the legal profession is responsible for averting the entry into the legitimate economy 
of illicit proceeds, few such safeguards exist in the legal systems of the Gulf. 
 The UAE has adopted a significant amount of legal instruments to tackle money 
laundering and the illicit proceeds of crime from entering its legitimate economy. More 
specifically, the UAE Criminal Code has been reinforced and supplemented by the adoption 
of anti-money laundering directives of the UAE Central Bank, as well as by the promulgation 
of the UAE Anti-Money Laundering law (AML) which was issued on 22 January 2002.  The 
AML contains relatively similar provisions to the UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 with five 
offences, namely concealment, arrangements and acquisition, use and possession,  failure to 
disclose  and tipping off.  Unlike the gate-keeping requirements established under the UK 
Proceeds of Crime Act, the UAE instrument does not set out an objective test whereby on the 
ground of a reasonable suspicion the legal or other profession could tip off the authorities. 
Article 20 of the AML simply serves to absolve of any responsibility, criminal or otherwise, 
all legal entities and their employees arising from any confidentiality obligations in the event 
that they furnish the authorities with relevant information of money laundering offences. This 
is no doubt a weak system that allows not only the legal and financial professions but also 
arbitrators to be complacent about their clients or duties. It is true however that several 
circulars have been issued in recent years to the professions in the front lines, particularly 
lawyers and notaries.  
There is, however, no guidance given to lawyers or notaries public, allowing them to conduct 
the “objective test” mentioned above and instead resolution No.1 of 2009 issued by the 
Insurance Authority contains reference to the three stages of money laundering and provides 
for an objective test approach. Resolution No. 1 of 2009 defines the three stages of money 
laundering and provides in Articles 12 and 13 for an objective test approach with examples of 
when there should be increased suspicion on behalf of insurance companies, such as a life 
insurance policy with a high premium fully paid in advance, cancelling a life insurance policy 
shortly after its execution, insuring goods by opening an account through immediate 
payment, large insurance premiums, or other.  The Emirates Securities and Commodities 
Authority (ESCA), has issued resolution No 17/r of 2010 which also refers to an objective 
test approach. Article 9 of this resolution gives examples of objective test scenarios such as 
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where there is a substantial increase in cash deposits without a clear reason in a short span of 
time, numerous cash deposits that are below the suspicion threshold (AED 40,000), and large 
telegraphic transfers of funds to be paid in cash in a foreign country.  
Nonetheless, these regulations do not address the problem of enforcement of awards with a 
view to laundering illicit proceeds. What is at the heart of the problem – and this is perhaps 
the institutional difference between Gulf States and traditional Western financial centres – is 
the establishment of mechanisms directed exclusively at arbitral mechanisms and against 
those involved in said mechanisms. This involves lawyers, arbitrators, the courts and 
government authorities against which realistic standards and tests should be set, appropriate 
to arbitral proceedings.  A serious problem which Bahrain and the UAE are still to fully 
appreciate is the degree to which an arbitrator is under a duty to disclose irregularities he 
detects in the course of arbitral proceedings. Given the confidential nature of arbitration, the 
confidentiality extends not only to the parties but also to the arbitrator. Under the current 
legal regime of Bahrain and the UAE it would seem that anti-money laundering legislation 
would prevail over the requirement for confidentiality, albeit this is not wholly clear in 
practice. This would certainly be the case in England and the USA because there the 
legislation is unambiguous and direct. The Gulf nations have a long way to go before they 
can oblige arbitrators, under threat of criminal sanctions, to disclose any irregularities they 
come across in the ordinary course of their judicial function. 
If the UAE and Bahrain are unable to enforce strict standards against arbitral awards seeking 
to further illicit gains, corporate clients will inevitably choose those jurisdictions that are 
serious about money laundering. It may perhaps seem profitable in the short run to tolerate 
such activities, particularly given how difficult it is to trace them, not to mention the high law 
enforcement cost, albeit in the long run it will tarnish a nation’s business reputation. 
1.9 Is the Arbitral Legislation of the UAE and Bahrain a Legal Transplant or the 
Result of Autonomous Development? 
In the course of this chapter it has become evident that both the UAE and Bahrain have 
borrowed a large corpus of their arbitration legislation from foreign, and particularly non-
Arab, sources. However, this hardly constitutes wholesale legal transplant in the same 
manner that new States incorporate into their legal systems verbatim the laws of other 
developed nations without consideration of the law’s original context and modalities of 
 52 
 
operation.  This type of legal transplant is irresponsible and is certainly resisted in 
contemporary legislative drafting. This does not mean that good laws cannot serve as a 
benchmark for other nations. Rather, even good laws need to be contextualized, adapted to 
local exigencies, tailored to local finances (especially in terms of implementation) and be 
made compatible with existing laws and institutions. The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law is usually cited as an example of an innocuous legal transplant because States are free to 
adapt it and in any event is purpose is to harmonize arbitral proceedings and enforcement of 
awards worldwide. Be this as it may, the wholesale adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
by a developing country without judicial or governmental experience in arbitration and 
without a strong economy risks putting its people in harm. Foreign investors may try to 
manipulate this inexperience in order to gain undue advantages. In the case of the UAE and 
Bahrain the cautious adoption of domestic legislation predicated on the Model Law and the 
various global and regional enforcement conventions has been at a pace that has allowed 
them to control the process of arbitration. 
 Moreover, it has given them the opportunity of participating in the global arbitral 
system while at the same time building up legal systems that are as able to attract profit from 
arbitration in the same manner as their western counterparts. Indeed, few western nations are 
inclined to set up arbitration free zones – as opposed to tax heavens – because this would 
upset their financial centers and their law firms operating there. Hence, the fact that Dubai 
and Bahrain have been able to compete with their western rivals for the prize of arbitrations 
as well as the enforcement of arbitral awards is a testament to the adaptability and the 
effectiveness of their laws. As regards the enforcement branch in the two nations, it is 
significant to note that enforcement of arbitral awards is not necessarily a profitable exercise, 
particularly if the claimants seek to enforce against persons with assets in the country of 
enforcement. Indeed, one of the most significant problems in international arbitration is the 
frustration of enforcement by the courts of developing nations on grounds that are wholly 
outside the New York Convention. The fact, therefore, that the legal systems of the UAE and 
Bahrain have turned this into a profitable exercise is perhaps evidence of the fact that the 
national authorities believed that their reliability as international financial and arbitration 
centers would only come about if they were seen to meticulously enforce foreign arbitral 
awards. Again, although there is no empirical evidence to back up this assertion, there is no 
doubt that their strong enforcement practices brought an abundance of legal service providers 
 53 
 
to the region. In the following chapters it will be demonstrated that the arbitration law and 
practice of Bahrain and the UAE is consistent, predictable and arbitration-friendly, despite 
certain complexities and particularities. Yet, the overall conclusion that we would like to 
convey through this section is that the arbitral regimes of the two nations, while part of a 
global system of rules, are circumscribed by ideas, notions and practices that are wholly 
local. In short, they have been adapted to suit local needs and it is hoped that in the near 
future the emergence of the Gulf States as powerful financial actors will give rise to an Arab, 
or at least a Gulf, position on international commercial arbitration. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
GROUNDS FOR NON-ENFORCEMENT: INCAPACITY, LACK OF NOTICE, 
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND INAPPROPRIATE COMPOSITION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
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The first chapter dealt with some of the more general and fundamental issues of arbitration 
and the enforcement of foreign awards in the UAE and Bahrain. It also touched upon the 
significance of Islamic law and its tradition in the formation of an enforcement culture. This 
discussion is carried through in the present chapter but is by necessity rather limited. This 
chapter will begin to explore and assess the modalities under which the UAE and Bahrain 
discharge their obligation under the New York Convention to recognise and enforce foreign 
arbitral awards. Although the focus of the chapter is on the practice of these two nations, 
which includes their laws and jurisprudence, given the scarcity of other material and the 
proclamations made by both the UAE and Bahrain according to which they aspire to become 
leading enforcement jurisdictions, we have made some necessary references to jurisprudence 
emanating from the courts of other nations. As already mentioned in chapter 1a, one of the 
principal methodological assumptions of the thesis is that where a particular issue is not 
specifically dealt by the courts or laws of the UAE and Bahrain, it is assumed that it is 
governed by the relevant transnational jurisprudence to which neither nation has raised any 
objections.   
The chapter tries to draw together the common and differentiated features between the 
UAE and Bahrain, albeit as will be seen in the course of the chapter, there are very few, if 
any, differences between the two legal systems as regards their approach to the particular 
themes of enforcement discussed herein. The reason for this should mainly be attributed to 
the fact that both have adapted in their domestic law the UNCITRAL Model Law and as a 
result it would create an oddity were their courts to produce diverse rulings on the same 
subject matter. Moreover, there is a clear trend in both nations in favour of becoming as 
arbitration-friendly as possible, despite the fact that some isolated judgments can hardly be 
reconciled with this objective. It should be stressed that it is difficult to find an underlying 
Islamic-based policy as the root of the attitude of Bahrain and UAE institutions to 
enforcement, save perhaps for public policy constraints, which are not however explored in 
this chapter. 
 This chapter discusses only some of the reasons offered under the Model Law and the 
New York Convention according to which the parties may challenge the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. These include claims of incapacity, whether by a legal person or a 
natural person to take part in arbitral proceedings or to enter into an arbitration clause or 
submission agreement; the standards relating to due process guarantees in the course of 
arbitration with particular reference to proper standards of notification that are required for 
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the attendance of parties or in order to submit or receive evidence or other material; excesses 
in the tribunal’s jurisdictional power, especially as regards its examination of issues that go 
beyond what was agreed in the arbitration clause, as well as precluding the parties from fully 
presenting their claims before it, and; claims connected to the inappropriate composition of 
arbitral tribunals, with an emphasis on the procedures required to appoint arbitrators when the 
parties have failed to agree. A special subsection is also devoted to the issue of arbitrator bias 
and the possible challenges thereto. Other chapters will deal with certain other claims relating 
to non-enforcement, such as arbitrability and public policy. 
 It should be stated from the outset that although the starting point for this discussion 
should be the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law, we have chosen to 
focus on the domestic legislation of the two countries under consideration in this thesis, as 
well as, more importantly, on their respective jurisprudence. In this respect, it was thought as 
wholly artificial to discuss the aforementioned challenges in isolation of some fundamental 
themes underlying arbitration in the UAE and Bahrain. Among these, particularly, is the issue 
of the validity of the arbitration clause and the submission agreement in the Arab world and 
the Gulf more specifically. As a result, some theoretical and jurisprudential issues relating to 
the arbitration clause and contracts in the two nations are explored in order to paint a more 
wholesome picture of the challenges themselves. 
 
2.2 Traditional Enforcement Obstacles in the Arab World and Islamic 
Jurisprudence 
 
Despite the fact that arbitration has been the major vehicle for investment and the boom in 
international commerce since the early 1960s, its application has been problematic in certain 
parts of the world. This has necessarily curtailed the degree to which foreign arbitral awards 
are enforced from one country to another. The dominant criticism in the literature concerning 
the investment and commercial relations of developing nations, even industrialised ones such 
as Egypt, is that arbitration, at least in its contemporary form, is the product of post-colonial 
rule and is designed in such a way as to cater for the commercial interests of the wealthy 
West over its poorer counterparts.
61
 There is certainly some truth to this criticism, particularly 
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since the very practice of arbitration and its attendant processes (i.e. the drafting and insertion 
of arbitration clauses in contracts, the establishment of arbitral forums such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce etc) is largely the product of Western corporate law 
firms. These have been responsible for pushing the boundaries of dispute settlement and in 
the case at hand they saw arbitration as a product they could sell to their large corporate 
clients after identifying an attractive gap in the market. This gap related to the risks 
associated with investments and commercial undertakings with private entities or sovereign 
actors from nations whose legal systems were viewed as archaic, inadequate, corrupt or 
simply biased in favour of domestic actors. 
 The Arab world was among the first to condemn arbitral proceedings to which it had 
originally succumbed to, as far back as the 1950s, and as a result was a vocal advocate 
against the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Its negative experiences in this respect 
should not be underestimated. In a string of arbitral awards the arbitrators chose to 
completely disregard the express wishes of the parties as regards their choice of law clause, 
which was a mix of Islamic law and general public international law. For whatever reasons, 
the arbitrators in these cases held that the appropriate governing law was international law or 
general principles of law on the ground that Islamic law was at times in conflict with it and 
that in any event it was rather indeterminate and did not adequately suit business interests.
62
 
Such awards today would no doubt provide serious grounds for annulment or at the very least 
the winning party would find it very hard to enforce them in Muslim jurisdictions because 
they offend Muslim public policy. Thus, Arab nations largely dismissed arbitration as a 
whole and did not concern themselves too much with the question of enforcement given that 
this was necessarily the last part of a much larger process.
63
 
 Of course, the issue of Islamic law as a governing law, whether in the context of the 
normal jurisdiction of ordinary courts or as the governing law in arbitral proceedings 
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continues to be a vexed one. In the Beximco case the English Court of Appeals dismissed the 
propriety of Islamic law as the governing law of the contract, arguing that the concept of 
governing law – especially for the purposes of the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations - refers to legal systems, as would be the case with the 
legal system of England, Egypt or Bahrain. Islamic law, it was opined, did not constitute a 
legal system despite its entrenchment in the Quran and its place as the supreme and validating 
law in most Muslim nations.
64
 Although Islamic law is grossly misunderstood,
65
 not to 
mention misapplied,
66
 by western courts and thus a degree of bias is evident, by-and-large the 
indeterminate character of Islamic law is hardly an odd statement.
67
 I will dwell on this point 
because it is relevant to our discussion on enforcement.  
Islamic law is as diverse as the schools that purport to offer its most definitive 
interpretation. Each of these schools lays claim to authenticity and thus when a choice of law 
clause refers to Islamic law in general terms, the courts are unable to distinguish the precise 
ambit of the law (i.e. essentially which school is to prevail over another). Moreover, Islamic 
law is construed and applied differently even among nations that espouse its superior 
character over and above all other legislation. By way of illustration, there is a discrepancy as 
to whether commercial agency agreements are indeed arbitrable in Arab nations of equal 
jurisprudential leanings. The UAE Federal Supreme Court has ruled that parties are incapable 
of enforcing a clause in commercial agency agreements that expressly provides for foreign 
arbitration.
68
 To be sure, there are cogent reasons for preventing arbitration in the context of 
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commercial agencies, particularly since it is deemed that the local distributor is at a 
significant disadvantage as compared to the mother company that may well turn out to be a 
large multinational corporation. As a result, the UAE Commercial Agencies Law No 18 of 
1981 (as amended by Federal Law No 14 of 1988 and by Federal Law 13 of 17 June 2006) 
provides that only UAE courts have jurisdiction over commercial agency disputes.
69
  
The situation is rather different in another neighbouring Gulf nation, Bahrain, where a 
1998 amendment to the kingdom’s Commercial Agency Law abolished the requirement that 
local agents be subject to the jurisdiction of local courts. Additionally, whereas western legal 
systems, whether of the civil or common law persuasion, tend towards some continuity or 
precedent, such a precedent is wholly absent in traditional Islam on the ground that man’s 
fallibility necessarily excludes any consideration of rendering infallible judgments in respect 
of all future disputes.
70
 This line of thinking certainly pervades jurisdictions such as Saudi 
Arabia, this being evident in the work of the Diwan Almazalim.
71
 
 The mistrust towards foreign arbitral awards is rather a vicious cycle. The more a 
nation closes its doors to its nationals opting out of the local judiciary and the more it refuses 
to recognise and enforce foreign arbitral awards, the more it restricts its commercial activities 
with other nations and commercial actors. The UAE and Bahrain have certainly shown the 
way forward by choosing to openly enforce all foreign arbitral awards – subject to logical 
public policy rules - despite the short term reputational and financial loss this entailed.
72
 It 
was rightly shared that in the long run the two kingdoms had much to benefit from this 
openness. Openness in enforcement of foreign awards has naturally been coupled with a 
liberal construction of Islamic principles in respect of issues that are considered non-
negotiable in other nations, such as the prohibition in the imposition of interest (riba). 
Whereas Bahrain recognises the imposition of commercial interest and therefore allows the 
enforcement of awards the subject matter of which was principally concerned with interest, 
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the Saudi authorities take a much stricter view of the matter.
73
 As a result, it is not uncommon 
for Saudi nationals or aliens conducting their commercial affairs in that country to make 
every possible effort to circumvent its restrictive laws. One largely efficient way of doing so 
has proven the practice of formulating appropriate arbitration clauses that exclude Saudi law 
from the lex arbitri and the governing law of the contract.
74
 Of course, there are no 
guarantees that the country of enforcement, in this instance Saudi Arabia, will necessarily be 
inclined to enforce such an award on grounds of public policy, albeit the parties may just as 
well be content with enforcing it in other jurisdictions.  
 By-and-large the kingdoms (or emirates) under consideration in this dissertation now 
seem to be significant partners in the business of international arbitration, including as 
systems adhering fully to the rule of law, particularly as regards enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.
75
 I argue that this is hardly a radical departure from their Quranic traditions. 
On the contrary, this is a return to such traditions, where arbitration finds direct expression. 
For one thing, Prophet Mohamed personally encouraged the use of arbitration in several types 
of frequent disputes, including in family and commercial matters.
76
 Secondly, it is a 
fundamental building block of Islamic jurisprudence that agreements and promises 
undertaken must be fulfilled. This is equivalent to the principle of pacta sunt servanda in 
western legal thinking, which is considered an ab initio rule of domestic and international 
law.
77
 Given that a foreign arbitral award is based on the assumption of a contractual 
obligation it is only natural to assume, and this is in fact the case, that the losing party is 
under a religious obligation to enforce the award from the point of view of Islamic law. This 
means that the losing party must not artificially hinder enforcement by claiming procedural or 
other grounds that seek to frustrate the recognition of the award. Thus, I argue that the spirit 
of the Prophet’s injunction on Muslims to observe contractual sanctity is not discharged by 
merely agreeing to comply with the terms of an award that has already been enforced. Rather, 
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this obligation is effectively discharged by not frustrating the other party’s effort to go 
through the various enforcement stages in the country of enforcement. 
 
2.3 Exceptions to Liberal Enforcement in the UAE and Bahrain 
 
As will be observed in the following sections of this chapter, the practice of Bahrain and 
UAE is to construe their obligations under the 1958 New York Convention rather liberally 
and certainly in light of a pro-commerce policy. This is true not only with regard to the 
judgments of the local courts but also in respect of the recent laws that were adopted therein. 
However, there are some notable exceptions to this rule, which seem to rely on formalism 
rather than substance. The most notorious among these is certainly International Bechtel v 
Department of Civil Aviation of Dubai,
78
 in which the Dubai Court of Cassation famously 
ruled that the failure by an arbitrator to elicit an oath was a violation of Dubai’s public policy 
and constituted a serious procedural infringement that prevented enforcement of an arbitral 
award. This decision does not conform to the spirit of the New York Convention and is 
clearly an excessive intervention by the courts in the autonomy of private parties to resolve 
their dispute through arbitration. It was rightly criticised by international commentators who 
saw it as a blot on the status of Dubai as a centre of international trade and commerce.
79
 
 The rationale of the Bechtel judgment was certainly reversed by the Fujairah Federal 
Court of First Instance in a judgment enforcing two awards, one on the merits and the other 
on costs, issued by a sole arbitrator in London under the Rules of the London Maritime 
Arbitration Association following an application for enforcement by the award creditor under 
the New York Convention.
80
 The Court refused to review the merits of an award issued 
pursuant to English law in the UK out of respect for the New York Convention. It refused to 
attach any significance to the claim that the award had been rendered in absentia of the losing 
party, thereby demonstrating an implicit disinclination against formalism. 
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 In a similar judgment, in Maxtel International FZE v Airmec Dubai LLC, the Court of 
First Instance of Dubai enforced two awards (one on the merits and the other on costs) issued 
by a sole arbitrator in London under the DIFC Rules and involving two Dubai-based 
companies, following an application for enforcement under the New York Convention. 
Unlike previous decisions it discarded Articles 235 and 236 of the UAE Code of Civil 
Procedure in respect of formalistic claims such as oath-taking, holding that: 
the court’s supervisory role when looking to recognise and enforce a foreign arbitral award is 
strictly to ensure that it does not conflict with the Federal Decree under which the UAE 
acceded to the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards and satisfied the requirements of Articles IV and V of the Decree in terms of being 
duly authenticated.
81
 
Although these judgments were issued by lower courts they are no doubt indicative of a trend 
that is not wholly unknown elsewhere; that is, of national courts refusing to enforce awards 
against local private or public corporations on the basis of formalistic grounds. The higher 
courts of the UAE, especially, have tried to mitigate this trend as much as possible, but 
foreign lawyers working in the region express a degree of uncertainty in the light of 
judgments that seem to obstruct the letter and spirit of the New York Convention.
82
 In the 
expressed opinion of this author these exceptional judgements are isolated and have no 
precedential value and in any event the reasoning behind them is usually reversed in 
subsequent cases. 
2.4 Grounds for Refusal to Enforce under the UAE and Bahraini Legal Regimes 
 
Given the modelling of the relevant arbitral laws around the UNCITRAL Model Law it 
comes as no surprise that they closely reflect the provisions of the Model Law. Article 36 of 
the Bahraini International Arbitration Act specifies that recognition or enforcement of an 
arbitral award may be refused only on the basis of the following grounds: 
 
1.1 At the request of the party against whom it was invoked, if that party furnishes to the 
competent court where recognition or enforcement is sought proof as follows: 
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a) A party to the arbitration agreement referred to in Article 7 was under some 
incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have 
subjected it, or failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the 
award was made; or 
b) The party against whom the award was invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to 
present his case; or 
c) The award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of 
the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of 
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decision on matters submitted to 
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which 
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognised and 
enforced; or 
d) The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or 
e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or 
suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award 
was made; or 
 
2. If the court finds the following: 
 
a) The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the 
law of the State of Bahrain; or 
b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of 
the State of Bahrain. 
 
3. If an application for setting aside or suspension of an award has been made to a court 
... the court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it considers it proper, adjourn 
its decision and may also, on the application of the party claiming recognition or enforcement 
of the award, order the other party to provide appropriate security. 
A first reading of the relevant provision in the 2009 UAE Arbitration Law suggests that the 
grounds for refusal to recognise and enforce are far narrower than those enumerated in the 
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Bahraini Act. Although this issue has not been satisfactorily addressed in the sparse literature 
or in any case law, it is the contention of this author that this suggestion is erroneous. Article 
58 of the UAE Arbitration Law reads as follows: 
 
1. The enforcement application of an arbitral award may only be accepted if the time 
period for requesting setting aside has expired. 
 
2. The enforcement of the arbitral award pursuant to this law may only be ordered after 
verifying the following: 
 
a) The enforcement of the award is not contrary to the public policy of the State. 
b) It was properly notified to the party against whom the award was rendered. 
 
It is improbable that the UAE legislator failed to take into consideration other grounds, 
particularly the validity of the award or the nature of the arbitral process. It may be that these 
issues are to be dealt with in respect of applications for setting aside, as stipulated in Article 
53 of the Law. Alternatively, it may just as well be the case that the grounds for setting aside 
an award are the same as those relating to public policy.
83
 Either way, the grounds for setting 
aside in Article 53 should be considered as being inherent in any considerations of 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the UAE. Hence, such awards may be refused 
recognition or be set aside as follows: 
 
1. If the arbitration agreement is inexistent or void or if it is possible that it is null or 
extinguished due to the expiry of its term; 
 
2. If a party to the arbitration agreement was, at the time of its conclusion, under some 
incapacity or lack of capacity pursuant to the law governing its capacity; 
 
                                                          
83
 The leading arbitration jurisdictions interpret the grounds for setting aside of awards in conformity with the 
corresponding New York Convention grounds for refusal of enforcement. It is therefore unnecessary to draw 
any distinction between the concept of public policy under the setting aside and enforcement regimes, as the 
extent of the court’s scrutiny of international arbitration awards is the same regardless where the award is made. 
See AJU v AJT [2011] SGCA 41, decided by the Singapore Court of Appeal. GB Born, International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 2009), pp 2552. 
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3. If any party to arbitration was unable to present its defence as it was not given proper 
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings, or due to any other 
reason beyond its control; 
 
4. If the award failed to apply the law agreed upon by the parties to govern the subject-matter 
of the dispute; 
 
5. If the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or the appointment of the arbitrators was in 
conflict with the law or the agreement of the parties; 
 
6. If the award settled matters not subject to, or falling beyond the scope of the arbitration 
agreement. However, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated 
from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters 
not submitted to arbitration may be annulled; 
 
7. If the award is null or the arbitral proceedings’ nullity affected the award; 
 
8. If the award was set aside in the country of origin; 
 
b) The court may upon its own initiative set aside the arbitral award if the latter is in conflict 
with the public policy of the State. 
 
It is obvious that the list of reasons through which an award may be said aside under Article 
53 of the UAE Law are similar to those for non-recognition and non-enforcement of arbitral 
awards under Article 36 of the Bahraini International Arbitration Act. As a result, it makes 
sense to argue that said reasons apply also as a matter of public policy, at least, when 
considering recognition and enforcement. This is also the hypothesis of this author and on 
this basis both this chapter and the next will assume that these common grounds suffice to 
refuse recognition and enforcement to foreign arbitral awards in the UAE and Bahrain.  
It should also be stated from the outset that although the relevant articles of the UAE 
Civil Procedure Code (i.e. those related to arbitration) have been effectively suspended 
following the promulgation of the 2009 Law, from the point of view of UAE jurisprudence 
they are still very much in force. Essentially, given that the principles underlying relevant 
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judgments rendered by UAE courts prior to the passage of the 2009 Law exist also in this 
Law, it is natural that the judgments in which they are contained continue to be in force and 
bind future courts and tribunals. Moreover, although the focus of the thesis and the ensuing 
chapters is on foreign arbitral awards and international arbitration in general, we shall be 
discussing and making extensive reference to jurisprudence that emanates from judgments 
considering domestic arbitral awards. Such references will be undertaken only where no other 
judgment on international awards exists and where the principles enunciated would apply 
mutatis mutantis in the case of foreign arbitral awards. This is an important point to 
remember because of its methodological value in the present context. Moreover, although this 
author aims to concentrate on the evolving law of the UAE and Bahrain, some references to 
international arbitral practice is inevitable, for no other reason but in order to ascertain 
whether the practice of these two nations lives up to their promise of establishing progressive 
and arbitration-friendly legal regimes, particularly in the sphere of enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. 
 
2.4.1 The Issue of Capacity 
 
Capacity is usually viewed as a simple matter that is resolved by reference to the personal law 
of the parties. Incapacity is also viewed as a rare phenomenon in international commercial 
contracts and subsequently in the field of arbitration. Yet, Article V(1)(a) of the New York 
Convention lists incapacity as one among possible reasons for denying recognition to a 
foreign arbitral award.
84
 In general, capacity to enter into an arbitration clause presupposes 
capacity to enter into a contract. Hence, arbitration is available to all those who enjoy the 
right to contract freely, which at first glance excludes minors and those lacking the requisite 
mental faculties. The list, however, is potentially broader, given that some nations forbid 
contractual autonomy to women or those deprived of their freedom by reason of a penal 
judgment. Moreover, it is unclear whether all legal persons throughout the world enjoy the 
right to enter into a contract and if so which entity within the company has the authority to 
bind the legal person. Finally, among others, in some jurisdictions such as England a 
bankrupt person cannot enter into an arbitration agreement by which to bind his estate,
85
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 See also Article 36(1)(a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
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 See Re Milnes and Robertson (1854) 15 CB 451, where it was held that although the bankrupt may not 
submit his estate to arbitration, he may nonetheless bind himself to arbitration. 
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although the trustee with the permission of the creditors or the court may refer to arbitration 
any debts, claims or liabilities between the bankrupt and any person that may have incurred 
liability to the bankrupt.
86
 
 One should also distinguish between substantive and procedural capacity. The former 
refers to the power of legal and physical persons to dispose of their entitlements by means of 
contract whereas the latter refers to the modalities by which this is to be achieved. By way of 
illustration, the Dubai Court of Cassation has held that arbitration agreements concluded by 
an agent of the principal without a special power of attorney are null; albeit only the principal 
may invoke said nullity, not the other party to the contract.
87
 
 The Bahraini Arbitration Act is silent on the capacity of both physical and legal 
persons. From the point of view of domestic arbitration, Article 233(4) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure stipulates that arbitration is only permissible to those competent to dispose of their 
rights.
88
 Moreover, the Code of Civil Procedure distinguishes between Muslims and non-
Muslims, thus subjecting all non-Bahraini Muslims, whether residents or aliens, to the law 
governing Bahraini Muslims. All other persons are governed by their own personal law, but 
principally the law of the country of which they are nationals.
89
 This is an unsatisfactory 
result from the point of view of foreign parties to an award that is sought to be enforced in 
Bahrain because it fails to consider the difference between nationality and residence (or 
domicile). Residence, particularly where it is effective, is considered superior to nationality 
for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction in private disputes as well as for the purposes of 
diplomatic protection.
90
 This is particularly the case where the party has effectively given up 
his initial nationality without having formally adopted a second one in his new country of 
residence. In such cases, it is suggested that Bahraini courts should look to effective 
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nationality or residence in order to determine the applicable law to the question of capacity.
91
 
Issues are no doubt likely to arise in cases where a party possesses either multiple 
nationalities or multiple domiciles. The latter is not merely a theoretical possibility and in 
such cases the courts of the UAE and Bahrain could follow the practice of their European 
counterparts and decide each jurisdictional issue on its distinct merits.
92
 Hence, for example, 
whether or not the person possessed capacity to enter into an arbitration agreement on behalf 
of his company may be decided on the basis of the law where the company is based, whereas 
in respect of torts the applicable law may be that of the country where the respondent 
habitually resides, which may be different from the seat of the company of which the 
respondent is the director. Significantly, given the assumed arbitration-friendly approach of 
UAE and Bahraini courts, they could give preference to the law of the country that gives 
significant capacity to the party under consideration to enter into contractual relations and 
arbitration agreements. 
 Bahraini courts are empowered to assess not only whether the person possessed 
capacity under his personal law, but also whether this foreign law “is contrary to Bahraini 
public policy and good morals”.93 A strict application of this assessment may create problems 
with respect to the practices of other Muslim nations. By way of illustration, would an award 
in which a woman was excluded under an alleged application of the Shari’a be enforceable? 
Whereas women may not enter into contracts in Saudi Arabia they are fully competent of 
doing so in Bahrain. In such a case Bahraini public policy is permissible, albeit the foreign 
interpretation of the Shari’a brings about opposite results. The choice for the Bahrain courts 
is a difficult one because it may bring them into conflict with other Muslim nations. The 
matter therefore, in theory at least, remains unsettled. 
 As far as legal persons are concerned, as well as State agencies, Bahraini law does not 
impose a capacity impediment upon them from the point of view of entering into contracts or 
indeed arbitration agreements. The law of course is silent in respect of joint venture 
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agreements (JVA) where one of the legal or physical persons does not enjoy contractual or 
arbitral capacity under his personal laws or the law of the seat or country of incorporation. It 
is suggested that in such cases, given Bahrain’s reliance on the UNCITRAL Model Law, that 
its courts would take an arbitration-friendly approach and simply dismiss the incapable party 
without frustrating the terms of the contract or the arbitration clause for the others. This 
would constitute an exemplary application of the separability principle in respect of capacity. 
The law is also silent as to who possess the capacity to bind the legal person. The Dubai 
Court of Cassation has held that under Articles 235 and 237 of the Commercial Companies 
Act representation to enter into contracts and arbitration clauses binding upon the company is 
vested on the company’s statutory representative, a position which ordinarily coincides with 
that of the company’s manager or director.94  
 It has also been suggested that under UAE law the so-called group of companies 
doctrine,
95
 or similar concepts, the purpose of which is to introduce into the arbitral 
proceedings otherwise third parties that are closely connected with the company that is a 
party to the dispute, does not exist. The corporate veil is unsusceptible to fracture under the 
current company law regime. However, legal experts opine that this regime does not prevent 
a tribunal from deciding that a corporate affiliate is bound by an arbitration agreement 
entered into by the parent company on a case-by-case basis, depending on the particular 
circumstances of each case.
96
 
 
2.4.2.1  The Meaning of Proper Notice in Commercial Arbitration 
 
Article 9 of the UAE Arbitration Law stipulates that: 
 
1. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, any letter or communication shall be delivered 
either to the addressee personally or at his place of business, his habitual residence or mailing 
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address known by both parties or designated in the arbitration agreement or in the document 
organising the relationship subject to arbitration. 
 
2. If none of these can be found after making a reasonable inquiry, a communication is 
deemed to have been received if it is sent to the addressee’s last-known place of business, 
habitual residence or mailing address by registered letter. 
 
The requirement to provide proper notice goes to the heart of arbitral proceedings and 
constitutes a fundamental principle of law; namely it encompasses the right to a fair trial
97
 
and that of equality of parties in judicial or arbitral proceedings
98
 which is roughly equivalent 
to due process rights.
99
 In one form or another it is a fundamental principle under Islamic law 
and a general principle of law applicable to arbitral proceedings. This may be established 
twofold. On the one hand, a variety of international instruments set out the parameters for 
proper notification. Chief among these is Article 36(1) (a) (ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
which clearly states that recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may be denied 
at the request of a party to the case as long as it can furnish evidence that it was not provided 
with proper notice of the arbitral proceedings or the appointment of the arbitrator, or where 
said party demonstrates that it was unable to present its case. This is a verbatim reproduction 
of Article V (1) (b) of the New York Convention.
100
 
 The foremost criterion in the determination of due process is the lack of due notice. 
Failure to meet this requirement may right result in non-enforcement. Due process has in 
practice been interpreted rather narrowly with national courts focusing on grave instances of 
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proper notice, such as the absence of notice altogether or its dispatch following the rendering 
of the award.
101
 As a result, despite the fact that lack of proper notice is commonly used to 
oppose the enforcement of an award, the courts are generally disinclined to dismiss an award 
unless the violation is severe.
102
 This does not of course mean that national courts are always 
disinclined from entertaining less severe due process violations.
103
 Some Arab commentators 
have attempted to find a nexus between due process violations and public policy.
104
  
 Lack of proper or adequate notice is a ground for terminating the proceedings in the 
relevant instruments of UAE and Bahrain. We have already made reference to the mandatory 
nature of compliance with the time limits set by the institutional rules of the tribunal or by the 
tribunal itself in Article 23(1) of the Bahraini International Arbitration Act. This basic rule is 
further elaborated in Article 24(2) and (3) of the Act as follows: 
 
The parties shall be given sufficient advance notice of any hearing and of any meeting of the 
arbitral tribunal for the purposes of inspection of goods, other property and documents. 
 
All statements, documents or other information supplied to the tribunal by one party shall be 
communicated to the other party. Also, any expert report or evidentiary document on which 
the arbitral tribunal may rely in making its decision shall be communicated to the parties. 
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Article 25(1) then puts forward the basic obligation of the claimant in arbitral proceedings 
with a view to avoiding surprise claims that would distort the parties’ right to a fair trial and 
equality of arms. The provision reads as follows: 
 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if, without showing sufficient cause, the claimant fails 
to communicate his statement of claim in accordance with Article 23(1), the arbitral tribunal 
shall terminate the proceedings. 
 
It clearly follows that if the tribunal may terminate proceedings on the basis that the claimant 
failed to respect his due process obligations, an award rendered in violation of such 
obligations will not be enforced in Bahrain and the UAE.
105
 Given the scarcity of material on 
due process rights in the jurisprudence of the courts of Bahrain and the UAE the following 
sections will necessary focus on legal developments adopted in the courts of other nations. 
 
 
2.4.2.2  The Standard of Proper Notice 
 
In order for inadequate notice to constitute a ground for due process violation the notice must 
fail to comply with the requirements set by the parties or the arbitral rules chosen by them. In 
case of a conflict between the relevant laws of the lex arbitri and the chosen institutional 
rules, the latter prevail.
106
 As a result, it is irrelevant whether said institutional rules provide 
for strict and narrow notice deadlines that would otherwise violate due process rights in the 
lex arbitri or the country of enforcement, given that party autonomy takes precedence in this 
case because the relevant rules are not of a compulsory nature.
107
  
 It is not improbable, however, for an arbitral tribunal to take the view that despite the 
choice of institutional rules in the circumstances of a particular case it would defeat the 
objectives of justice were the respondent to adhere to the institutional time frames. A 
poignant application may arise where the plaintiff attempts to surprise the respondent by 
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filing numerous claims and submitting thousands of pages of documents having prepared 
well in advance of making his claims. If the institutional deadline is very limited for the 
respondent to mount an effective defence and he subsequently approaches the arbitrators for 
an extension, it is submitted that the extension must be granted because it is in the interests of 
justice.
108
 
 Proper notice also encompasses the disclosure of the arbitrator’s name. In the case of 
Danish Buyer v German Seller,
109
 an award was refused enforcement on the basis of due 
process, namely because the name of the arbitrator was not disclosed in the notice issued to 
the respondent. 
 
 
2.4.2.3  Violation of Due Process due to Inability to Present One’s Case 
 
This ground is not explicitly mentioned in the UAE instrument,
110
 as opposed to the Bahraini 
Act.
111
 The limited data afforded by the travaux do not provide any concrete clues as to 
whether this ground was intentionally excluded. It is suggested by this author that the general 
conception of due process, party equality and procedural fairness constitute concepts that 
cannot easily be enumerated in an instrument of general nature, as is the case with 
arbitrational laws constructed on the basis of the UNCITRAL Model Law. This is especially 
the case if one considers that recent works identify a significant number of areas falling 
within due process in arbitration.
112
 Yet, Islamic law has been interpreted since classical 
times as encompassing a sufficient body of rules regulating sulh, such that allow kadis and 
arbitrators to enforce a broad code of due process that is largely based on the equality of the 
parties.
113
 This is certainly broad enough to cover the majority of conduct falling within due 
process, including no doubt inability to present one’s case. In the case of the UAE one should 
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not hesitate to look back to the arbitration provisions of the now superseded Code of Civil 
Procedure (CPC) with a view to ascertaining principles that could not have possibly been 
abolished with the passing of the 2009 Law. Specifically, Article 212 of the CPC explicitly 
denied the enforcement of arbitral awards where due process violations were demonstrated, 
including the denial of opportunity to present one’s case. This principle, along with all the 
others that make up the relevant group of challenges, was endorsed in 2009 by the Dubai 
Court of Cassation.
114
 It cannot possibly be claimed that the new law abolished this consistent 
and principled line of jurisprudence that finds expression in all developed legal systems. 
Therefore, in the context of this thesis it is assumed that all due process violations lato sensu 
are applicable in both Bahrain and the UAE, all of which give rise to a legitimate defence 
against enforcement of awards rendered in violation of these principles. 
 Inability to present one’s case encompasses situations where despite adequate notice 
afforded to the other party, said party is in some way unable to attend the proceedings or meet 
relevant deadlines on account of a reason that is beyond his reasonable control.
115
 This may 
include force majeure or situations where although the party is in fact able to appear he was 
not given the opportunity to present his case.
116
 It will not always be easy to assess the degree 
to which such inability is the result of personal fault.
117
 Moreover, if one is to set a 
benchmark or an ascertainable standard, it is obvious that this must take into account the 
harm to the other party to the case. Traditionally, in international arbitration fair hearing 
claims are assessed on the basis of their private nature, not in accordance with the laws of any 
particular nation or legal system.
118
 This is consistent with the principle of party autonomy 
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which grants the parties to arbitral proceedings significant latitude in deciding all procedural 
matters. Although this seems like a permissive rule, in fact it is not. The parties to an 
agreement leading to arbitration must not force each other into accepting terms and 
conditions that are clearly not in their interest. This is particularly true where one party is 
substantially stronger than the other, financially, politically or otherwise. In such cases the 
tribunal must either act proprio motu or entertain an examination of the relevant claims of the 
weaker party. In any event, the equality of parties to an agreement and before judicial 
authorities is an entrenched principle in Islamic law.  
It is instructive that recently the Hong Kong Court of Appeals in Pacific China 
Holdings Ltd v Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd decided a case where it was claimed that an 
arbitral tribunal had violated due process rights under Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law through poor case management. The Court indicated that it was concerned with the 
“structural integrity of the arbitration proceedings”. After reviewing several commentaries 
dealing with Article 34 the Court, without deciding on how serious or egregious the conduct 
must be before a violation could be established, emphasised that the conduct complained of 
“must be sufficiently serious or egregious so that one could say that a party has been denied 
due process”. It went on to say that a party that was afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present its case would “rarely be able to establish that he has been denied due process”.119 
This is a pretty sensible standard that UAE and Bahraini courts would be well advised to 
adopt in their own decisions because it does not arbitrarily and without good reason frustrate 
solid arbitral proceedings. 
 
2.4.3 Excess of Jurisdiction 
The relevant provisions of the UAE and Bahraini legislation stipulate that an award will be 
denied enforcement if the tribunal decided matters not falling within the submission 
agreement or arbitral clause, unless the excess part can be separated from the whole without 
injury to the remainder.
120
 There are numerous legal avenues by which to view excesses of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
arbitration shall do so promptly and shall not proceed with the arbitration as if there had been no compliance, 
keeping the point up his sleeve for later use”, and held that the failure to raise objections to the arbitral 
tribunal justified enforcement of the award.  It went on to say that the failure to raise the point before the 
Beijing Court would probably be an additional ground to enforce the award. 
119
 Pacific China Holdings Ltd v Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd, Case No 136/2011, judgment (9 May 2012). 
120
 This will certainly encompass situations where the arbitrator failed to consider conditions precedent 
appended by the parties to the arbitration clause. The Dubai Court of Cassation, case No 124/2008, judgment 
(16 September 2008) ruled that contracting parties can subordinate their arbitration to so-called conditions 
precedent, which have to be fulfilled prior to a referral to arbitration. Failure to fulfil the conditions precedent 
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jurisdiction by arbitral tribunals.
121
 On the one hand, it constitutes a violation of procedural 
rules, such as due process, procedural fairness and party equality that is incumbent upon the 
arbitrators by operation of institutional rules as well as by the lex arbitri.
122
 As a procedural 
rule, it is clearly mandatory, as opposed to voluntary, and thus the parties may not freely 
waive it. On the other hand, it is evidently also a substantive rule, emanating principally from 
the law of contract, whereby the wishes of a party to a contract bind those third parties that 
voluntarily assume rights and duties from said contract. Moreover, the arbitrators’ authority 
to pass judgment on the merits of a case is not unlimited. Although it is not the place of this 
thesis to distinguish between the two rival theories dealing with the legal status of arbitrators, 
either as judges (and therefore liable under public law) or as contract-appointed persons that 
do not enjoy the immunities of judges but are liable under the law of contract, it is clear that 
in both cases the arbitrator is bound by the terms of the parties’ contract. Excess of 
substantive jurisdiction is no doubt a wholly different matter from the authority of the 
arbitrator to decide certain matters that are undefined in the submission agreement and on 
which the parties have failed to reach any concrete agreement. Hence, if the parties have 
failed to clarify the governing law the tribunal may decide – although certainly not arbitrarily 
– the appropriate law in the circumstances of the case.123 
 There exists very little, if any, jurisprudence from the courts of Bahrain and the UAE 
on the proper meaning and scope of excess jurisdiction displayed by arbitral tribunals. A 
significant and growing body of case law is emerging in the industrialised world which seeks 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
is ruled to be a breach of the pacta sunt servanda principle and accordingly a submission for arbitration should 
be rejected where the relevant condition remains unperformed. 
121
 Many of these naturally fail. In Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] 1 All ER 315, Colman 
J. refused to sustain the respondent’s challenge who claimed that the tribunal had exceeded its mandate by 
quantifying the claimant’s loss according to findings made in separate arbitration proceedings (regarding a 
subsale contract between the claimant and a third party, which was decided by the same tribunal), which neither 
claimant nor respondent had raised or submitted as evidence in their arbitration. Colman J. dismissed this 
argument, reasoning that a tribunal acts within its mandate so long as it relies on evidence which is relevant to 
the resolution of the dispute submitted for determination by the parties, even if such evidence had not been 
raised by either party. Similarly, CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] 
SGCA 33, decided by the Singapore Court of Appeal. 
122
 In Ferrara v AG 1824 the Brussels Court of Appeal was asked to stay an arbitral award arguing that because 
the panel lacked impartiality the losing party was denied his fair trial guarantees under Article 6 of the ECHR. 
The Court of Appeals held that Article 6 does indeed apply to arbitral proceedings. However, it stressed that 
“the public policy character of the guarantees contained in Article 6(1) does not preclude parties to a dispute 
from waiving these guarantees by freely deciding not to submit the dispute to a court established by law, but 
rather to submit it to an arbitration tribunal, set up according to their agreement.” It went on to say that 
Article 6 was applicable in the instant case because the arbitrators had obtained their powers as a result of the 
parties’ will it is up to the arbitrators to “exhaust their own exclusive powers to judge and to ensure by 
themselves, under their own responsibility, the conditions of a fair trial, in accordance with the general and 
fundamental principles of our law and, as far as necessary, with the provisions of the ECHR”.  
123
 See, for example, Article 28(2) Bahraini International Arbitration Act to this effect. 
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on the one hand to limit excesses of power by arbitral tribunals while avoiding any claims of 
arbitration-hostility. This middle ground is certainly not easy as the recent UK Supreme 
Court ruling in Dallah Real Estate v the Government of Pakistan
124
 illustrates. There, the 
Supreme Court clarified the extent of the review to be undertaken by English courts when 
faced with a jurisdictional challenge to a foreign arbitral award. In Dallah, as well as in 
subsequent decisions, it was held that a mere limited review of the award by the court is not 
sufficient in cases where a party challenges the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Rather, a full 
investigation illuminating all the facts pertinent to jurisdiction is required.
125
 In fact, a full 
investigation by the court is necessary even when the award was issued by the tribunal in a 
foreign seat,
126
 in which case the award and the jurisdiction may be consonant with the lex 
arbitri. This is certainly a radical departure in terms of judicial intervention by the courts of 
the enforcement State and as such it has been queried whether the status of England as a 
jurisdiction for enforcing foreign awards may be harmed as a result of such decisions.
127
 Of 
course, the UK Supreme Court is not alone in such radical departures. We have already 
discussed exceptional judgments that are anything but enforcement-friendly adopted 
particularly by the courts of the UAE, with the Bechtel case being a lucid example. This 
reinforces the argument posited in chapter 1a that even the most efficient of legal systems 
may at times produce inconsistent, yet isolated, results. 
 In order to assess the scope of the subject matter of the dispute in the UAE and 
Bahrain, given the lack of case law or other guidance on the matter, it is important that we 
examine the arbitration agreement and the compromis itself. This will give us an idea as to 
how the law allows the parties to submit disputes to arbitral tribunals and what the power of 
said tribunals is in relation to the dispute before them. 
 
2.4.3.1 The Scope of the Arbitration Agreement in Assessing Jurisdictional 
Excess 
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 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of 
Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46. 
125
 Ibid, para 160, where it was held that “the starting point ... must be an independent investigation by the 
court of the question whether the person challenging the enforcement of the award can prove that he was not 
a party to the arbitration agreement under which the award was made”. 
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 Ibid, paras 27-29. 
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 C Caher, Early Impact of Dallah on the English Courts, Commercial Dispute Resolution (25 February 2011), 
available at: <http://www.cdr-news.com/arbitration-and-adr/112-articles/996-early-impact-of-dallah-on-the-
english-courts>. 
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Not long ago, it was widely known that Arab nations refused to recognise the validity of 
arbitration clauses in general contracts on the ground that they referred to a future event that 
was not susceptible to quantification and as such was considered speculative. It was this so-
called speculative character of arbitration clauses that was considered as being contrary to 
fundamental tenets of Islamic law and as a result said clauses were largely void in most 
Muslim jurisdictions.
128
 As a response, only submission agreements were allowed because 
they were deemed as satisfying existing needs, rather than catering for speculative events. 
This stance created numerous problems, not least that non-Muslim parties to contracts 
undertaken in Muslim nations were forced to submit future disputes to local courts. This state 
of affairs was quickly abandoned by the more progressive nations of the Gulf, particularly the 
UAE and Bahrain. Article 203(1) of the UAE Federal CCP explicitly allows arbitration 
clauses, stipulating that “the contracting parties may provide in a contract or in a later 
agreement, that all disputes which might arise between them from the performance of a 
contract will be referred to one or several arbitrators”. This is further reflected in Article 11 
of the 2009 Arbitration Law. In fact, the Dubai Court of Cassation has made it abundantly 
clear that the validity of the arbitration clause depends on the intention of the parties to 
incorporate it as part of their main contract.
129
 This is of course consistent with Article 11(2) 
of the 2009 Arbitration Law, which goes even further by suggesting that that arbitration 
clause may even exist in a document that is not of a contractual nature, as long as this 
document (and the arbitration clause) is clearly referred to in the main contract.
130
 It goes 
without saying, of course, that submission agreements are an equally valid contractual model 
for submitting disputes to commercial arbitration.
131
 
 The legal landscape is more or less similar in respect of Bahrain. Arbitration clauses 
are permissible both in the context of domestic arbitration,
132
 as well as in international 
arbitrations.
133
 Moreover, Bahraini law and jurisprudence accepts as valid those arbitration 
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 See G Sayen, Arbitration, Conciliation and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia (1987) 9 U Pa J Int’l Bus 
L 211, pp 218, 231ff. 
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 Dubai Court of Cassation, Civil Cassation, case No 100/2004, judgment (9 January 2005); Dubai Court of 
Cassation, Commercial Cassation, case No 174/2005, judgment (19 December 2005). 
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 Article 11(3) UAE 2009 Arbitration Law. The Dubai Court of Cassation in case No174/2005, Commercial 
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 Dubai Court of Cassation, Commercial Cassation, case No 39/2005, judgment (16 April 2005). 
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 Article 233 Bahraini Code of Commercial and Civil Procedure. 
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 Article 7(1) Bahraini 1994 International Arbitration Act. 
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clauses that do not set out the precise subject matter of the dispute, but refer generally to 
disputes arising out of the parties’ contract.134 This is no doubt consistent with the practice of 
industrialised nations and of the lex mercatoria, given that it is impossible for the parties to 
know in advance what disputes may arise in the course of an evolving commercial or other 
relationship. Of course, it is taken for granted that broad arbitration clauses which the parties 
later employ to refer to arbitration disputes that are not susceptible to arbitration will be 
found void by the courts and any awards rendered as a result will not be enforced.
135
 In fact, 
the Court of Cassation has held that even if the respondent to an award that was rendered on 
the basis of an arbitration clause which referred to arbitration a non-arbitrable dispute did not 
dispute the validity of the award, the courts are under a duty to set aside or refuse to enforce 
said award.
136
 
 It is evident from this analysis that both the UAE and Bahrain accept that the parties 
may refer all arbitrable disputes arising from their contracts to arbitration, whether 
domestically or abroad, their awards being subsequently enforceable before the courts of the 
two nations. If they choose to specify the subject matter of the dispute to the arbitral body, or 
if they fail to reach agreement as to said subject matter, it seems that the tribunal would not 
be in excess of its jurisdiction (as this arises from the arbitration clause) if it were to elucidate 
and complement the gaps left by the parties’ disagreement. Such “initiative” would clearly 
fall within the kompetenz-kompetenz power of the arbitral tribunal if it were looking ahead 
towards the parties’ enforcement of the award in the UAE and Bahrain. The tribunal would 
only be deemed as having exceeded its jurisdiction if it decided to invite third parties and 
expand the subject matter of the dispute in such a way as to clearly violate the explicit and 
implicit wishes of the parties to the original contract.
137
 Equally, the parties are free to 
withdraw from the effects of the arbitration clause and submit their dispute to the regular 
courts.
138
 What remains to be investigated is whether the arbitration clause survives a null or 
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 Bahrain Court of Cassation, case No 143/2009, judgment (5 March 2000). 
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 Bahrain Court of Cassation, case No 165/2005, judgment (3 October 2005). 
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 Bahrain Court of Cassation, case No 156/2004, judgment (4 July 2005). 
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 Crucially, the Bahraini Court of Cassation in case No 223/2002, judgment (12 May 2003) held that 
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void contract in both nations, which essentially gives rise to the question of separability and 
its recognition in Bahrain and the UAE. 
 Notwithstanding this discussion, the DIFC Court of First Instance (CFI) recently 
adopted a judgment that does not accord with the letter or spirit of the New York 
Convention.
139
 In this case, the respondent applied for a stay of judicial proceedings before 
the DIFC courts on the ground that the parties had already entered into an arbitration clause 
by which to settle their disputes. The CFI refused to entertain this claim, arguing that where 
the DIFC Courts had the jurisdiction to hear a case, they had no power to dismiss it, or to stay 
it for arbitration, unless the arbitration had its seat in the DIFC. This is a clear violation of 
Article II (3) of the New York Convention and it is evident that the CFI has misconceived the 
authority of DIFC legislation
140
 over and above the UAE’s treaty obligations, particularly the 
New York Convention. It is a principle of international law that a country cannot invoke its 
internal law in order to violate its international obligations
141
 and in any event not only do 
incorporated treaties possess the status of domestic law,
142
 but moreover it is a general 
principle of law that legislation is drafted in a manner consistent with treaty obligations.
143
 
 
2.4.3.2 The Relation of the Arbitration Clause to Contract Annulment 
 
In a recent case before the Bahrain Court of Cassation the parties had entered into an 
arbitration clause as part of their franchise contract which encompassed any dispute arising 
from the execution of the agreement. The petitioner initiated arbitral proceedings requesting 
the termination of the franchise agreement and the restitution of the amount paid. The 
respondent contested the award on the ground that the arbitrators had gone ahead to settle a 
dispute which did not result from the execution of the parties’ agreement. In essence, it was 
argued that a request for termination and restitution of the price for failure or impossibility to 
execute the contract is a dispute related to the execution and implementation of the contract. 
The Court of Cassation held that a dispute relating to the termination or nullity of a contract 
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 Injazat Capital Ltd and Injazat Technology Fund BSC v Denton Wilde Sapte & Co, Case No CFI 019/2010, 
judgment (6 March 2012). 
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 In this case, Article 13 of the DIFC Arbitration Law No 1/2008. 
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 Article 3 ICL Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. This is a principle 
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 Salomon v Commissioners of Custom and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116. 
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may not be referred to arbitration. It found that the arbitration agreement was restricted to 
disputes related to its execution and consequently did not extend to the termination and 
annulment of the agreement itself. This was justified because it was not the intention of the 
parties, particularly in light of the fact that the ruling did not exceed the explicit terms of that 
agreement and in any event the signature of the respondent on the submission to arbitration, 
the presentation of its defence and the filing of a cross-action before the arbitral tribunal were 
deemed insignificant and did not constitute conferral of jurisdiction on the arbitral tribunal to 
examine the dispute referred thereto by the petitioner.
144
 
 This is a significant judgment with no known equivalent in the UAE. Nonetheless, it 
is the contention of this author that it makes good legal sense and should certainly be 
followed in the region which does not generally have solid jurisprudence on standard 
contractual terms such as “arising from” with which the courts and the parties provide clear 
indications as to what types of disputes are included or excluded from arbitral consideration. 
 
2.4.3.3  Separability in the UAE and Bahrain 
 
The doctrine of separability is a fundamental tenet in the operation of international 
commercial arbitration. It posits that even if the main contract wherein the arbitration clause 
is contained is found to be null, void or inoperable, the arbitration clause continues to survive. 
This practically means that any of the parties may trigger the operation of the arbitration 
clause and refer a dispute arising from the contract to arbitration.
145
 That the tribunal may 
subsequently decide that no enforceable rights or duties arise from this null or void contract is 
a different matter, but it may also decide that one of the parties is responsible for the 
contract’s nullity and as a result it is liable to compensate the other party. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine the outcome of an arbitral process in which the main contract has 
been rendered null or void. 
 The autonomous nature of the arbitration clause vis-a-vis the main contract has long 
been recognised in the law of Bahrain and the UAE.
146
 Article 11(4) of the 2009 UAE 
Arbitration Law explicitly recognises the principle of separability. It reads in part that “the 
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 Bahrain Court of Cassation, case No 156/2004, judgment (4 July 2005). 
145 Established under English law in Heyman v Darwins [1942] 1 All ER 337. See SJ Ware, Arbitration Law’s 
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 The Dubai Court of Cassation in case No 254/2002, judgment (19 May 2005) explicitly endorses the 
principle of separability in domestic arbitration. The judgment should be seen as an endorsement also in 
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arbitral clause shall survive the nullity, rescission or termination of the contract, provided 
such clause is valid per se”.147 The Dubai Court of Cassation has ruled that although the 
autonomous nature of the arbitration clause is fundamental in the operation of the law of 
contract and that of arbitration, it survives only where said clause is not null itself.
148
 
 It remains to be seen whether a foreign award sought to be enforced in the UAE and 
Bahrain may be challenged by a party or the local courts on the ground that the arbitration 
clause was null or void and which the arbitrators failed to detect or rule upon. The UAE and 
Bahraini courts of enforcement would have to assess such a claim by reference to the 
governing law of the arbitration clause.
149
 There is some disagreement as to which law this 
actually is in the absence of agreement between the parties. The courts of certain jurisdictions 
assert that absent designation by the parties the governing law of the arbitration clause is the 
law of seat,
150
 whereas others contend that the proper law is the governing law of the main 
contract.
151
 In any event, it is clear that the Bahraini and UAE enforcement courts cannot 
decide such matters on the basis of their own law, if the parties did not designate this law 
either as the governing law of their contract or that of the arbitration clause.
152
 The principle 
of separability must be given the greatest possible effect and should not be frustrated by 
reference to the law of the country of enforcement when the parties did not have this law in 
mind when going about drafting their contract.
153
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2.4.4 Inappropriate Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal 
 
According to the majority of Islamic law scholars, the seal of approval for arbitration by the 
Prophet finds expression in the Quran itself. 
 
God doth command you to render back your trusts to those whom they are due; And when ye 
judge between people, that ye judge with justice; Verily how excellent is the teaching which 
He giveth you! For God is He who heareth and seeth all things.
154
 
 
Although there exists fierce disagreement between the various schools, particularly as to 
whether arbitration is merely a form of conciliation or whether an arbitrator possesses the 
attributes of a kadi (judge), this verse is generally taken to mean that awards rendered by 
those appointed by the parties to settle a dispute (arbitrators) are binding. It is also taken to 
mean that in order for an arbitration to be valid, an odd number must be appointed by the 
parties in accordance with their wishes. 
In the practice of international commercial arbitration the composition of an arbitral 
tribunal is determined by the parties, this being reflected in the arbitration clause or a 
subsequent submission agreement.
155
 The parties are responsible for appointing arbitrators of 
their choice and in case they cannot agree as to the person of the odd arbitrator – which is 
usually the norm – the party-appointed arbitrators ultimately choose that person.156 A 
challenge of inappropriate composition, therefore, goes to the very heart of the contractual 
wishes of the parties and concerns the appointment of those arbitrators whom one of the 
parties had not consented to. As will be seen in this section, however, inappropriate 
composition also involves challenges against the appointment of arbitrators in the absence of 
a clear statement by the parties in their contractual arrangements, in which and in order to 
salvage the arbitration clause the choice of arbitrators is predicated on the institutional rules 
of the chosen arbitral institution.
157
 In the Islamic context there are further theoretical – and to 
                                                          
154
 Qur’an 4:58. 
155
 In traditional Islamic law the submission agreement requires the names of the arbitrators, as well as the 
subject matter of the dispute, among others. See Sayen, supra note 68, p 211. 
156
 See A Redfern, M Hunter et al, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 4
th
 edition, 2004), pp 221-230. 
157
 See R Bishop, L Reed, Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-Appointed 
Arbitrators in International Arbitration, (1998) 14 Arb Int 395. 
 83 
 
a large degree also practical – issues that need to be addressed and which concern a tribunal’s 
legitimate composition.  
Primary among these is the requirement in certain Muslim nations, such as Saudi 
Arabia, that arbitrators in domestic arbitrations be Muslim men.
158
 Of course, where this 
mandatory rule exists it is forced upon the parties, especially foreign parties, and although in 
theory they could raise the defence of inappropriate composition at the enforcement phase 
before their own courts on the ground that they had no choice, in theory such a claim would 
fail. The reason is that although their choice was restricted, they did in fact possess a valid 
choice and in any event they chose to submit their dispute to the particular rules which 
provided for Muslim male arbitrators. I say in theory, because in practice this rather 
impossible defence has found application in the heart of the industrialised world. In Jivraj v 
Hashwani, reference to which was made in the beginning of this chapter, the English Court of 
Appeal held that a submission agreement by which the parties assented to the appointment of 
Ismaili arbitrators only was contrary to the country’s equality and anti-discrimination laws.159 
This is a rather odd judgment that runs against the logic of arbitration and party autonomy. It 
is taken for granted that arbitration involves a degree of discrimination, but this is a type of 
discrimination in the private sphere which does not offend public policy.
160
 Therefore, it is 
the opinion of this author that the particular judgment by the court of appeals is flawed and 
should not be followed in the future. 
The progressive arbitration legislation of the UAE and Bahrain does not restrict 
parties as to the choice of arbitrators. Indeed, even in the context of domestic arbitration, 
Article 206(1) of the UAE CCP does not require that arbitrators be Muslim or male. Neither 
the UAE 2009 Law nor the Bahraini International Arbitration Act requires any nationality, 
sex or religious credentials for the appointment of arbitrators. Where the parties fail to agree 
on a procedure for the appointment of arbitrators, Article 11(3)-(4) of the Bahraini Act states 
that: 
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3.1 In an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two 
arbitrators thus appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator; if a party fails to appoint the 
arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of a request to do so from the other party, or if the two 
arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within thirty days of their appointment, the 
appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the court or other authority specified 
in Article 6. 
3.2 In an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties are unable to agree on the arbitrator, 
he shall be appointed, upon request of a party, by the court or other authority specified in 
Article 6. 
 
4. Where under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties, 
4.1 a party fails to act as required under such procedure, or, 
4.2 the parties, or two arbitrators, are unable to reach an agreement expected of them under 
such procedure, 
4.3 a third party, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to it under 
such procedure, any party may request the court or other authority specified in Article 6 to 
take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides 
other means for securing the appointment. 
 
Article 18 of the UAE Law more or less provides for the same type of procedure. As a result, 
it is fair to say that the two laws are underlined by the same rationale. The Dubai Court of 
Cassation has held that the parties through their arbitration clause or subsequent compromis 
possess the authority to appoint arbitrators of their choice. However, if neither the clause or 
the compromis specify who the arbitrators are and how they are to be appointed, then it 
befalls on the institutional rules of the arbitral institution of their choice to make the selection 
for them. In the case at hand the parties had opted for ICC arbitration and hence it was the 
ICC institutional rules that would determine the method of choice of the arbitrators.
161
 In this 
manner the losing party is not allowed to raise a defence as to the tribunal’s inappropriate 
composition with a view to achieving non-enforcement of the award rendered. Again, this is a 
sensible ruling, albeit clearly everything depends on the wording of the arbitration clause and 
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the extent to which the parties are willing to contend the tribunal’s composition up until the 
stage of enforcement. 
 Exceptionally, where the arbitral clause refers a dispute to the Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Centre and the parties have failed to appoint their arbitrators, it 
befalls upon the Director-General of the Centre to appoint them following discussion and 
consultation with the parties.
162
 
 Where one or several arbitrators refrain from completing their mission, suspend their 
undertakings or are in any other manner precluded or challenged, and the parties have not 
come to any agreement as to their replacements, it is the court with original jurisdiction over 
the dispute that possesses the authority to appoint said replacements.
163
 This is also the case 
in Article 17 of the DIFC Rules, which like the legislation in UAE and Bahrain, is based on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law. When this situation arises the civil court assumes jurisdiction 
only upon request by one of the parties. This of course refers to domestic arbitrations but is 
worth mentioning in order to demonstrate the arbitration-friendly legislation and 
jurisprudence of the UAE in this regard. It remains somewhat unclear what avenues are 
available to the parties where the civil courts appoint arbitrators in the absence of an 
agreement by the parties. The Bahraini Court of Cassation has taken the view that where the 
civil courts undertake the task of appointment as a matter of urgency the parties do not have 
recourse to a challenge at a later stage if they accepted the appointment in the first place. In 
the event, however, that any one of the parties challenges the validity of the arbitration clause 
and the civil courts have appointed one or more arbitrators, this decision is subject to an 
appeal.
164
 Again, this is a sensible decision given that the parties may challenge at any time 
the validity of the arbitration clause and any judgments passed while the parties continue the 
challenge said clauses are certainly open to appeals. 
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 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Cassation, Civil Cassation, case No 206/2005, judgment (27 December 2005). 
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 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Cassation, Civil Cassation, case No 308/2005, judgment (21 March 2005). This is 
also the situation in Bahrain as decided by the Bahraini Court of Cassation in case No 95/97, judgment (21 
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Article 20 of the DIFC Rules on failure or impossibility to act on the part of the appointed arbitrator. 
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 Bahrain Court of Cassation, case No 277/2005, judgment (19 December 2005). 
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 The following subsection will look at a particular facet of inappropriate composition 
that does come up from time to time in the enforcement of arbitral awards in the Gulf region, 
namely that of bias on the part of a member of the arbitral panel. 
 
2.4.4.1  Challenges of Bias against Arbitrators 
 
Challenges of bias are common in commercial arbitration.
165
 Article 12(2) of the Bahraini 
International Arbitration Act stipulates that an arbitrator may be challenged “only if 
circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence, 
of if he does not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties”. This challenge is available 
even in respect of party-appointed arbitrators if the appointing party becomes aware of such a 
circumstance after the appointment has been made. In the practice of arbitration, those 
usually appointed as arbitrators act in this capacity a significant amount of times and if they 
are lawyers they may have clients or other affiliations that pose a conflict with the parties in a 
particular case. These direct and indirect links with the opposite parties usually give rise to 
sharp contentions. Article 12(2) gives no clear solution to such dilemmas. We are not aware 
of a case of this nature in the UAE or Bahrain, so reference will be made to an Omani case, 
which is closer to these two nations in legal culture. In Sultan Centre L.L.C. v Zaher ben 
Hamad al-Harethi, one of the parties to the arbitration challenged the appointment of both 
arbitrators on the ground that they worked for the same company. The tribunal rejected this 
challenge, firstly because the request was made more than fifteen days after the party became 
aware of this fact and secondly because the arbitrators themselves had informed the parties 
early in the proceedings.
166
 
 It follows therefore that if the parties had challenged the arbitrators within the proper 
time limits a case such as this would have been ripe for a judgment in favour of inappropriate 
composition and would have given rise to a refusal to recognise and enforce the relevant 
award. Anecdotally, it seems that the courts of the UAE and Bahrain may be prone to 
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 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp v Continental Casualty Co 393 US 145 (1968), at 150, where the US 
Supreme Court noted that “any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be 
unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias”. 
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 Sultan Centre LLC v Zaher ben Hamad al-Hareth, Muscat Court of First Instance, case No 147/99, judgment (25 
September 1999). General jurisprudence suggests however that the bias must be severe and should of itself be able 
to prejudice the outcome of the case. In Andros Compania Maritima SA v Marc Rich and Co AG, 579 F 2d 691 (2nd Cir, 
1978), the Second Circuit refused to overturn an award for which the claimant alleged a “close personal and 
professional relationship” between the arbitrator and the other party on the sole ground that said arbitrator 
had served together with the other party on nineteen arbitration panels. 
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accepting broad claims of arbitrator bias if these originate from a party that is a national of 
these two nations. One should not, however, assume that said courts are themselves biased. 
This is the result of the residual effect of the poor arbitral awards rendered against Arab 
nations in the 1950s and 1960s. No doubt, local courts should resist from showing sympathy 
to local parties, even if such expressions of sympathy are rare it should be said. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
LACK OF ARBITRABILITY AS A GROUND FOR NON-ENFORCEMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we analysed several grounds under which the courts of Bahrain and 
the UAE have refused to recognise and enforce foreign arbitral awards. These grounds were 
closely modelled around the terms of the New York Convention as well as the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. Although the implementing State may well dictate what lack of proper notice 
means, it is difficult to envisage situations where the lex arbitri or the country of enforcement 
will impose significantly different standards from those applicable in international 
instruments or from the lex mercatoria of arbitration, particularly as developed by the courts 
and legislatures of developed nations. Arbitrability, on the other hand, is not defined and its 
particular terms have never ben elaborated in international instruments. Much like the 
concept of public policy, which will be discussed in chapter 5, it is not susceptible to 
generalisations in international instruments for the reason that its content can only be derived 
from the dictates of local laws and exigencies. This is exactly why certain subject matters are 
susceptible to arbitral resolution in some countries and not in others.  
It is beyond the purview of this chapter to explain the range of local sensitivities and 
policies that underlie the politics of arbitrability. What we intend to do in this chapter is to 
analyse the general conception of arbitrability before we go on to explain this notion in the 
specific framework of Islamic law. This particular analysis will shed some light as to whether 
Bahrain and the UAE are following the dictates of Sharia on the settlement of business 
disputes. Of course, this would necessitate that a single rule exists under Islamic law, such 
that encompasses within its ambit all types of commercial and other disputes. Whether or not 
the legislatures and the courts of the two nations under consideration follow Islamic 
arbitrability rules is a matter of contention. The fundamental argument in this chapter is that 
although Bahrain and the UAE follow Islamic law as the principal source of their legislation 
they have tacitly distinguished rules and injunctions therein that prohibit particular conduct 
and have attempted to reinstate said conduct after eliminating its attendant vices. Thus, while 
adhering to the spirit of Islamic law, the legislatures of the two nations have consciously 
abstained from prohibiting the conduct per se. This has been undertaken in a manner that 
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recognises the value of the prohibition while at the same time reflecting on the realities of 
contemporary business life. By way of illustration, the rationale for the prohibition of usury 
(riba) is that, among others, it exacerbates the human passion of greed and culminates in the 
strong taking perpetual advantage of the weak. The aim is therefore the elimination of the 
passion’s inducement. The introduction of a regulated and generally low-interest imposition 
under UAE law, coupled with the choice of opting for Islamic financing, has to a 
considerable degree eliminated the vices of usury while at the same time responding to the 
need to compete with foreign banks and financial institutions. 
 The chapter also discusses the statutory arbitrability landscape of the two 
nations and comments on the power of arbitral tribunals to decide on matters of arbitrability 
as opposed to referring this matter to the jurisdiction of regular courts. The chapter concludes 
by examining the arbitrability framework of the DIFC, despite the fact that very little 
concrete practice exists in this field. Nonetheless, this author has undertaken a thorough and 
comprehensive survey in order to discern arbitrability rules in DIFC legislation. 
 
3.2 The General Conception of Arbitrability 
 
Arbitrability refers to the appropriateness of arbitration as a method of resolving particular 
disputes. Whether or not a particular dispute is susceptible to arbitral resolution is determined 
by reference to the lex arbitri and the law of the country of enforcement.
167
 As a result, the 
ambit and content of arbitrability is based on the dictates of national law. There is no 
transnational or international rule on arbitrability and this is perfectly natural because even if 
such a rule existed it would be extinguished in practical terms on account of the fact that it 
would have to be validated by the dictates of the jurisdiction where the award is rendered or 
sought to be enforced. This of course does not mean that there do not exist international 
trends on arbitrability and that States do not make mutual concessions at the bilateral or 
multilateral level in order to limit the range of disputes that can only be brought before 
national courts, as opposed to private dispute settlement. A prime example concerns disputes 
related to the private dimension of anti-trust disputes. Despite some logical hesitation by the 
courts of industrialised nations because of the public character of anti-trust conduct, the US 
Supreme did not hesitate to proclaim that the private aspects of anti-trust disputes between 
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 See I Bantekas, The Foundations of Arbitrability in International Commercial Arbitration (2008) 27 
Australian Yearbook of International Law 193. 
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rival companies may be lawfully subjected to arbitral proceedings, assuming of course that a 
valid arbitration clause or submission agreement exists between the parties concerned.
168
 This 
line of thinking soon became entrenched in European legal thinking and is now considered 
good law and has spread to other areas that have otherwise been perceived as falling 
exclusively within a broader public regulatory framework, such as patent
169
 and labour 
disputes,
170
 among others. 
 Arbitrabilty relates to subject-matter. Its rationale lies in the traditional and exclusive 
regulatory function of the State, which imposed upon it and its courts the obligation to deal 
with disputes encompassing a public interest or a public element. This is no doubt a wise 
policy for if private parties were to resolve such disputes among themselves the function of 
the State would be redundant. In the case of anti-trust or insolvency for example, it would be 
absurd for the relevant parties to settle outstanding matters among themselves because they 
have every incentive of abusing the process and absolving themselves from any wrongdoing 
in breach of the legitimate expectations of their creditors. This is especially the case given the 
confidential nature of arbitration, in which event no one would ever know how the parties 
settled the dispute which caused damage to the public interest (e.g. soaring prices in the case 
of an abuse of dominant position or monopolistic practices). As a result, it is evidently in the 
public interest to retain certain disputes within the public domain and resolve them through 
the regular jurisdiction of ordinary courts. 
 Nonetheless, there are obvious drawbacks to this approach. On the one hand, disputes 
are multifaceted and encompass dimensions that have a limited public interest and which can 
be settled among the rival parties without jeopardising the rights of others. This relates to the 
private dimension of disputes otherwise encompassing a public interest, which the courts and 
the legislator have opted to subject to arbitration as long as their results do not interfere or in 
any way disrupt the parallel proceedings brought by the legitimate organs of the State. On the 
other hand, the State retains an interest in allowing the parties concerned to settle said 
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 See especially the celebrated case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc, 473 US 614, 
which did not come about in isolation. Its ground had adequately been prepared by the US Supreme Court in 
Scherk v Alberto-Culver 417 US 506 (1974). 
169
 DW Plant, Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Issues in the United States (1994) 5 American Review of 
International Arbitration 11; MA Smith et al, Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity Issues Worldwide 
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 TE Carbonneau, Liberal Rules of Arbitrability and the Autonomy of Labor Arbitration in the United States, in 
LA Mistelis, SL Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer, 2009), p 
143. See particularly Alliance Bernstein Investment Research and Management v Schaffran 445 F 3d 121 (2nd 
Cir 2006). 
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disputes privately because it decreases the costs of justice and thus allows it to divert its own 
scarce resources to the criminal or administrative aspect of the investigation in the case at 
hand. 
 To put things in a more practical perspective, the following should be noted as general 
principles: a) disputes related to investments – based on the definition of investment in a BIT- 
are always arbitrable, even if they concern matters, such as taxation;
171
 b) even if an award is 
rubber-stamped according to the laws of the lex arbitri, it does not necessarily follow that 
said award will pass the arbitrability test of the country of enforcement; c) arbitrability 
generally extends to all subject matters that are susceptible to conciliation;
172
 d) although 
there is a trend to remove arbitrability barriers in order to make arbitration consistent 
throughout the world,
173
 less developed nations will always seek to protect their weaker 
trading and commercial classes against perceived threats or power imbalances emanating 
from their richer – and usually foreign – counterparts and trading partners; e) the legal 
sources of arbitrability are invariably found in local statutes, decrees and other types of 
domestic legislation. However, because arbitrability relates to a large degree with public 
policy,
174
 which is not immutable and is subject to constant changes, a significant source for 
the determination of arbitrability is the local judiciary.   
Of course, the courts cannot render a particular subject matter non-arbitrable without 
the existence of a statute; at least in industrialised nations. Nonetheless, and this is crucial to 
the focus of this thesis, nations in which Islam is the primary source of legislation cannot 
claim that a statute supersedes an injunction in the Qur’an or the hadith or other secondary 
sources of Islamic law. Given the various schools and the vastness of their secondary sources 
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 See especially Ecuador v Occidental Exploration & Production Co. (OEPC), [2006] EWHC 345 (Comm), where 
it was held that discriminatory tax against a foreign investor gives rise to claims of creeping expropriation, 
which is a matter of public international law and does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of States. If 
therefore the investor and the host State have entered into a contract with an arbitration clause or are 
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ILM 895. WW Park, Arbitrability and Tax, in Mistelis and Brekoulakis, supra note 4, pp179-205 
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 In accordance with s 1 of the 1999 Swedish Arbitration Act, “disputes concerning matters in respect of 
which the parties may reach a settlement” may be submitted to arbitration. Equally, under Article 1 of the 
Saudi Implementing Rules to the country’s Arbitration Act [Royal Decree No. M/7/2021, of 08/09/1405 H 
(1985), reprinted in Umm Alqura Gazette, No 3069 of 10/1405 H (1985), recourse to arbitration is prohibited in 
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 Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, where pre-dispute arbitration clauses were 
found to be permissible by the US Supreme Court in relation to consumer contracts. 
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 See, however, SL Brekoulakis, On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and New Areas of Concern, in 
Mistelis and Brekoulakis, supra note 4, p 19, 21ff, who while acknowledging the prescriptions of national laws 
whereby there exists a clear link between arbitrability and public policy, he finds this nexus as constantly 
diminishing. 
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it becomes evident that the courts may be swayed in certain cases to accept that a particular 
matter that has otherwise been settled by statute is in fact non-arbitrable by operation of a 
religious ruling. This renders arbitrability a very indeterminate business that defeats the 
concept of legitimate expectations. The following sections seek to illuminate the standard 
position in Islamic law, if one actually exists, and then to provide the particular situation in 
the UAE and Bahrain.    
 
3.3 Islamic Arbitrability 
 
From a purely methodological perspective, Islamic arbitrability rules would be derived from 
the sources of Islam, namely the Qur’an, hadith and secondary sources of reasoning and 
interpretation, including ijtihad, where relevant. If any rules were found to exist under this 
scheme, they would have to be validated against the practice of Muslim nations. If said 
practice was found to contradict the primary and secondary sources of Islam then the 
conclusion drawn would be that Islamic arbitrability rules have become defunct or obsolete, 
having been taken over either by secular rules or by a process of re-interpretation of the 
original religious rules. In any event, we could no longer talk of Islamic arbitrability as such – 
unless of course one does so through a legal history lens – but of national arbitrability rules 
where one could trace remnants or influences from religious rules. The view of this author, as 
will become evident in the course of this chapter, is that although Islamic law continues to 
play a significant role in the shaping of commercial dispute resolution in the Muslim world 
certain ancient prescriptions have given way to modern business trends that have been 
incorporated in the laws and regulations of most Muslim nations. These have sidelined some 
of the ancient rules in favour of more flexible and business-oriented ones, without necessarily 
injuring the spirit of the ancient injunctions. As a result, arbitrability has become needs-based 
rather than religious-based, which in turn has necessarily given rise to heated debates as to 
whether the substantive dimension of such rules (e.g. banking interest) applies at all. 
 The general rule on arbitrability in Islamic law is that arbitration is permitted in cases 
where a dispute may be resolved by conciliation. This is a rather problematic formulation 
because in the Arabic language the terms “conciliation” and “mediation” are more or less 
tautosimous and translated as “sulh”. Moreover, this injunction was traditionally meant to 
apply to personal disputes (including those arising from criminal conduct) and the few known 
commercial disputes of the Prophet’s time. The complexity of contemporary business 
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transactions and the pace of technological development are insusceptible to this broad and 
indeterminate rule. The second point of departure concerns the various prohibitions found in 
Islamic law, which naturally are not susceptible to private dispute resolution because they are 
prohibited in the first place. These are far too many to enumerate, so we shall limit ourselves 
to those that are of particular interest to this thesis. Chief among these are the prohibition of 
fraudulent agreements,
175
 the imposition of usury or interest,
176
 speculative contracts and 
generally all business transactions the aim of which are to cause unlawful injury to one of the 
parties or a third person, or which concern other prohibited conduct such as alcohol
177
 or 
gaming-related.
178
 Of course, the overriding consideration is that all agreements must be 
honoured,
179
 as long of course as these are muamalat agreements in the first place. The 
rationale behind these prohibitions is evident. Prophet Mohamed as a messenger of the 
Almighty Allah wanted to create an ideal society out of the social ruins of the Arab society he 
inherited, which was based on profit-making and human indulgence. It is clear that the four 
aforementioned prohibitions concern conduct which if left to human nature has the tendency 
to culminate and nurture the vice of greed. By removing this element from contractual and 
business relationships he was in fact humanising commerce, implanting therein a social and 
ethical dimension, which was crucially absent before his advent. 
 So clearly, the jurisprudential question is whether the principal consideration of 
Prophet Mohamed specifically, and of Islamic law more generally, is to divest commerce of 
the greed factor or to impose these prohibitions irrespectively. The question is crucial because 
if the object of attack is greed, it follows that if this can be eliminated by other means, the 
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 There is some discussion of this in Westland Helicopters Ltd v Arab Organisation for Industrialisation [1995] 
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substantive conduct need not be prohibited or eliminated.
180
 Thus, if the introduction of 
banking interest is controlled in such a way as to not give rise to greed, it will be permitted. 
Equally, if the uncertainty (gharar) is of minor importance (gharar yasir), as opposed to 
severe (gharar fahish) it may be acceptable and thus be lawfully subjected to arbitration. 
 Unfortunately, there is no clear line of jurisprudence which supports this contention, 
not because such currents are lacking in Islamic legal thought, but because it is unwise to 
express such ideas in the form of jurisprudential or theological writings. They would open up 
heated debates with no determinate outcome and would be rejected outright by hardliners. 
The chosen method is tacit defiance reflected in legislative work, court judgments and a 
general supportive attitude and policy. This has been the case for example throughout the 
Gulf nations, Arab North Africa and the rising economies of south East Asia, particularly 
Indonesia and Malaysia. There, governments have a two-tier track system whereby merchants 
and consumers are free to choose what best suits their religious views and have introduced 
parallel banking and insurance systems
181
 on the basis of either Islamic finance (and takaful 
in the case of insurance)
182
 and regular conventional banking premised on the charging of 
interest in respect of lending transactions.
183
 Even where interest has been allowed, it is not 
unregulated but is otherwise susceptible to several limitations. By way of illustration, Articles 
76 and 77 of the UAE Federal Commercial Transactions Law No 18 of 1993 allows lenders 
to charge their clients simple interest, the ceiling of which must not exceed a rate of 12 per 
cent. The Federal Supreme Court of Abu Dhabi has had a chance to review and assess the 
compatibility of this law with the UAE federal constitution and has come to the conclusion 
that economic necessity in a contemporary complex and largely internationalised business 
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 See MA El-Gamal,  An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of Riba in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence (Rice 
University Press, 2001); MSA Khan, The Mohammedan Laws against Usury and How They Are Evaded, (1929) 
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 The opinion has been expressed that convention insurance constitutes a prohibited transaction under 
Islamic law, and disputes arising therefrom are not arbitrable, because said insurance is essentially a gambling 
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environment necessitates the charging of interest by financial institutions.
184
 The same result 
was reached also by the same Federal Supreme Court in the form of a judgment,
185
 which 
demonstrates a clear trend towards legitimising the charging of interest and confirming its 
compatibility with fundamental tenets of Islamic law – or at least reconciling it with the latter 
– which in turn gives rise to the arbitrability of disputes involving interest-based commercial 
and financial activities.
186
 Even Saudi practice seems to be going down this path – not so 
much the riba prohibitions but in liberalising their arbitrability policy - as is suggested by 
recent scholarship.
187
 
 Islamic finance differs from conventional banking in that the lender assumes the risk 
of the project as much as the debtor, whereas in conventional banking the lender does not 
partake in the risk – unless of course the debtor becomes insolvent – but instead makes a 
profit by charging interest for the loan.
188
 In practice, the Islamic financing model may yield 
much higher dividends for the lender because of his greater participation in the project’s 
profits.
189
 Thus, although this type of financing eliminates a narrow dimension of greed 
derived from usury, it fails to eliminate its broader dimension. No doubt, however, because 
Islamic banking requires the taking of serious business decisions by the bank its assessment 
of projects is by necessity very thorough and transparent. It is therefore the contention of this 
author that the two systems meet at various points of their operations and this largely explains 
why the UAE and Bahrain, as well as other Muslim nations, have decided to allow riba-based 
lending and therefore subject relevant transactions to private dispute settlement. 
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Press, 2004), who discuss several Muslim legal systems and generally suggest that existing Islamic finance 
systems are beginning to adopt policies of economic liberalism on the basis, however, of Islamic values and 
beliefs. 
 96 
 
 It would seem that prohibited conduct is not susceptible to arbitration and I am talking 
particularly of alcohol and gaming (maysir) activities. These cannot be reconciled with the 
spirit of Islamic law and the human vice inherent therein cannot be removed from these 
activities.
190
 Of course, the parties could well conceal the principal activity and portray a 
different subject in respect of their dispute. However, there is no guarantee that said award 
will be enforced in the UAE and Bahrain, especially if one of the parties – usually the losing 
one – were to object at the enforcement stage. 
 
3.4 Statutory Arbitrability in the UAE and Bahrain 
 
Statutory arbitrability in the UAE is structured around pragmatic grounds. Both the CCP 
(Article 203(4)) and the 2009 Arbitration Act (Article 14) allows parties to subject to 
arbitration matters which are ordinarily susceptible to conciliation.
191
 Again, this is a broad 
formulation the deciphering of which is achieved through a thorough examination of statutes. 
Much like throughout the Arab world, disputes arising from commercial agency and 
distributorship agreements are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of UAE courts.
192
 
European jurisprudence has recently started to accept the permissibility of arbitration in order 
to resolve disputes arising from such agreements
193
 and this is a trend that should be followed 
closely by the UAE, especially where it is demonstrated that the parties to said agreements 
are at a relative parity.
194
 In Bahrain the situation is different. The Bahraini Commercial 
Agency Act No 23 of 1975 grants jurisdiction to local courts in respect of any dispute 
between the commercial agent and the principal, as well as over disputes arising between the 
agent and the relevant Ministry. However, this jurisdictional ambit seems to concern only 
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 Some of course have cited verses from the Qur’an whereby alcohol is not perceived as inherently evil and 
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domestic agency agreements and one should not read into this a requirement of exclusive 
local court jurisdiction over commercial agency disputes where the principal is non-Bahraini. 
A 1998 amendment to the kingdom’s Commercial Agency Law abolished the requirement 
that local agents are subject to the jurisdiction of local courts. 
 Labour disputes are equally barred from being resolved by means of arbitration.
195
 
The same is true in respect of collective labour disputes, which are to be referred to the 
Supreme Arbitration Board as appointed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 
Indeed, the Labour Relationship Organisation Act No 8 (1980) established a Higher 
Commission of Arbitration with jurisdiction over collective labour disputes. The Committee 
is empowered to offer a binding judgment after all other ADR means have been exhausted, 
including mediation and conciliation. The situation is more or less similar in Bahrain where 
the Court of Cassation has ruled that all rights and entitlements of an employee arising from 
his termination of employment are subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, even if the 
parties have entered into an arbitration agreement. This is because this relationship is 
considered as being governed by mandatory rules.
196
 
 The parties are not entitled to subject to arbitration attachment and enforcement 
procedures, unless they have decided otherwise.
197
 Crucially, disputes arising from the 
Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA) must be arbitrated at the first 
instance if the parties have entered into a valid arbitration clause or submission agreement.
198
 
Unlike other industrial nations,
199
 the UAE allows for corporate disputes to be resolved by 
means of arbitration without limitation as to subject matter. 
 Landlord and tenant disputes in Dubai must be referred to a rent committee. The 
courts enforce the decisions of the rent committee. The Dubai Property Court is an arm of the 
Dubai Court of First Instance, which now has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with property 
disputes in the Emirate of Dubai where the parties have agreed to the jurisdiction of the 
Dubai courts to settle disputes. The Dubai Real Estate Regulatory Agency (RERA), a 
specialist arm of the Dubai government’s Land Department, regulates the real estate market 
in Dubai and can mediate disputes referred to it between developers and purchasers. 
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 It is presumed that all other disputes are arbitrable, unless they touch upon a matter of 
public policy. It is the contention of this author that both in the UAE and Bahrain there exists 
a presumption of arbitrabillity as long as the relevant subject matter is not susceptible to 
arbitral resolution by reference to a statute, a prior judgment by the local courts, public 
policy,
200
 or is otherwise contrary to an international obligation validly assumed by the two 
nations.
201
 It should also be admitted that some of these grounds are sufficiently 
indeterminate to warrant caution on the part of those who seek to enforce arbitral awards in 
Bahrain and the UAE. By way of illustration, although we have demonstrated that the 
charging of banking interest is legitimate, some foreign law firms warn their clients that it is 
not improbable that the local courts may at some point find this practice problematic and 
decide not to enforce a foreign award that concerns the payment of interest. 
 The following section will focus on an issue that is not directly connected to 
arbitrability per se but in the thinking of this author it is a crucial dimension in the 
arbitrabiltiy of all disputes. The issue at hand is third party funding that is filtered into arbitral 
proceedings. 
 
3.5 Third Party Funding and Arbitrability 
 
Third party arbitration funding agreements have become widely available to parties intending 
to bring or defend a case before an arbitral tribunal. Indeed, the cost of arbitration can at 
times be prohibitive for claimants and defendants and so financial institutions found a 
lucrative avenue for making money.
202
 Third party arrangements involve the payment of all 
arbitration-related expenses by a person or entity that is not in any way connected to the 
proceedings. The arrangements themselves vary considerably but the underlying rationale is 
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that the third party funder shares in the risk of the entity he is funding and expects to make a 
profit from the latter’s award or otherwise take a loss in the eventuality that this entity loses 
the case. Third party funding seems like an ingenious proposition that realises the right of 
access to justice for those who would otherwise not be able to afford it
203
 and at the same 
time provides employment to the legal and other professions. Yet, it is not without its own 
share of problems, particularly of an ethical nature. More specifically, it is suggested that the 
person funding ones litigation through which he expects to make a profit has every incentive 
to see his protégé win. This means that he will not seek the best result for his client, but the 
one that provides him with a larger profit.
204
 By way of illustration, if the parties reached a 
settlement from which the funder would only receive a small percentage, he will be induced 
to protract the litigation even though it is clearly not in the best financial and other interests 
of his client. English and other courts have overcome these ethical barriers under condition 
that the funder remains impartial and independent from the proceedings and the manner 
through which his client prepares his case.
205
 
 On the basis of the preceding discussion in other sections of this chapter it is evident 
that third party arbitration funding may cause particular problems for those wishing to 
enforce arbitral awards in Bahrain and the UAE. Two main issues arise. The first concerns 
the validity of the award itself, whereas the second concerns the validity of arbitral awards 
based on disputes arising from third party agreements. The complication is no doubt the fact 
that the uncertainty in such agreements is significant, as opposed to minor, and as a result 
they may be construed as being contrary to local public policy. This possibility is particularly 
acute given that litigation or arbitration funding arrangements are unknown in Islamic legal 
theory and even zakat (almsgiving) was not envisaged to cover such circumstances. The 
problem is compounded even further by the absence of any express prohibitions or 
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restrictions on disinterested third party litigation funding in Bahrain and the UAE. This of 
course is no guarantee that the courts may necessarily consider third party funding to be 
compatible with public policy or local law more specifically. No doubt, usury legislation will 
be central in any assessment of the contractual arrangements of third party funding.
206
 We 
have already explained that the charging of interest is legitimate but strictly regulated in 
Bahrain and the UAE and as a result high returns and interest charged by the funder may 
culminate in public policy objections. Of course, many funding arrangements are confidential 
and are not even disclosed to the other party to the dispute, albeit a number of entities have 
decided to make their dealing with funders transparent.
207
 In the opinion of this author 
funding agreements will not give rise to questions of indeterminacy and speculation and 
hence will not be problematic from a contractual point of view. The only serious cause for 
concern relates to the usury dimensions of the agreement and whether or not they meet the 
standards set by the governments of the two Gulf nations. It may also be presumed that if the 
opposing party was aware of the other’s funding arrangements, particularly in cases of public 
declarations, and yet continued with the case without taking any legal or other action, that 
party has waived its right to make subsequent claims. Of course, there is always the danger 
that the courts will not look at the wishes of the parties but only at the public policy 
dimension of the agreement. 
 
3.6 Who Decides Issues of Arbitrability 
 
The kompetenz-kompetenz principle which permeates the relevant statutes of Bahrain
208
 and 
the UAE
209
 clearly suggest that in case of dispute as to whether an international arbitration 
taking place on their territory is in fact arbitrable is to be decided by the tribunal itself. This is 
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a logical rule that is based on the express terms of the UNCITRAL Model Law
210
 and arbitral 
practice more generally.
211
 There is no jurisprudence emanating from the courts of the two 
nations that might provide exceptions to this general rule. It is assumed that the arbitrator is 
either aware of local statutory arbitrability or in any event that an award dealing with a 
subject that is not susceptible to arbitration will fail to be enforced therein – although it may 
well be enforced in third nations that are willing to defy the terms of the lex arbitri. Based on 
the express provisions of the two arbitration statutes, even in the eventuality that the 
arbitrators defy the lex arbitri of the two nations and go ahead although the dispute is clearly 
non-arbitrable, the challenging party will have to wait until the proceedings are over in order 
to challenge the award before the courts.
212
 
 Recent practice in the USA suggests that the parties to an ongoing arbitration may 
approach a local court, outside the seat of the arbitration, in order to seek a preliminary 
injunction pending the results of an arbitral decision. Although the arbitrator is empowered to 
make the injunction himself and enforce it through the regular channels of the lex arbitri, it is 
accepted that in exceptional circumstances and in order to secure the assets of a party to the 
proceedings, going directly to the courts of the country where the assets are located may be 
more expedient, especially where the pending arbitration is in no way prejudiced.
213
 Although 
this is largely unrelated to the power of the tribunal to decide on matters pertinent to 
arbitrability, it demonstrates that even when a statutory provision is explicit in favour of 
arbitral authority, ordinary courts may decide to circumvent such provisions. 
 
3.7 Arbitrability under the DIFC Rules 
 
The DIFC Arbitration law is rather cryptic when it comes to determining questions of 
arbitrability. Article 44(1)(b)(vi) simply states that an award will not be enforced or 
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recognised if “the subject matter of the dispute would not have been capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the laws of the DIFC”. Given that the DIFC is a relatively new entity that 
has not promulgated a significant amount of laws and given also that it will apply Bahraini 
law in the absence of its own – although under no compulsion to do so - one assumes that 
Bahraini arbitrability laws apply. In practical terms, this will probably be the same, but since 
the aforementioned provision in the DIFC Arbitration Law does not associate arbitrability 
with Bahraini laws but only with DIFC laws this might well connote a desire to liberate the 
DIFC from some of the constraints under the laws of Bahrain. This is especially true given 
the purpose behind the establishment of DIFC and so it is the contention of this author that 
Bahraini legislators consciously bypassed Bahraini legislation relating to arbitrability, thus 
allowing significant latitude to the parties.
214
 
 Evidence of this may be gleaned indirectly through an examination of relevant DIFC 
legislation. For one thing DIFC is not bound to apply Bahraini law. On the other hand, its 
own legislation is predicated on party autonomy and does not impose any limitations thereto. 
By way of illustration, DIFC Contract Law No 6/2004 makes no mention to the ability of 
parties to refer particular matters to arbitration, thus avoiding any references to arbitrability. 
Article 12 of the Contract law goes on to say, however, that: 
 
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices which 
they have established between themselves.  
(2) The parties are bound by a usage that is widely known to and regularly observed in 
international trade by parties in the particular trade concerned except where the application of 
such usage would be unreasonable. 
 
What this means is that there is always a presumption in favour of arbitrability, especially if a 
particular trade usage or lex mercatoria demonstrates a pattern of arbitral resolution in that 
industry. Given that all traders, manufacturers and others now routinely enter into arbitration 
clauses in their contracts it is unlikely that the DIFC courts
215
 will find a trade usage to which 
arbitration is alien. The DIFC Companies Law No 2/2009, on the other hand, while making 
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no reference to arbitration, leaves two possibilities open. Firstly, it seems to allow the 
shareholders to decide the particularities for the drafting of the company’s articles of 
association without much limitation.
216
 Nonetheless, Article 29(1), which concerns 
shareholders’ and members’ right to object to variation, suggests that any dispute arising 
therefrom “may apply to the Court to have the variation cancelled and, if such an application 
is made, the variation has no effect unless and until it is confirmed by the Court”. It is clear 
thus that in variation disputes the parties do not have the choice of taking their dispute to 
arbitration but must instead apply to the DIFC Court.
217
 It is unclear however whether the 
general entitlement of the shareholders to draft their articles of association in any manner 
they wish also encompasses the right to bypass DIFC courts in favour of arbitration. This is a 
serious omission by the legislator and one which may create some problems in the future. It is 
suggested by this author that the general presumption in favour of arbitrability should prevail 
unless the clear and unambiguous consent of one or more shareholders or other actors that 
have not ratified the articles is in doubt.
218
 It seems that provisions in DIFC legislation that 
refer explicitly to the courts are not meant to divest the parties of their right to arbitrate 
disputes falling within the ambit of particular laws. Rather, the aim is to subject certain 
actions with a public character to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts. This, for example, is 
evident in Article 43 of the DIFC General Partnership Law No 11/2004, which subjects all 
matters relating to the dissolution of partnerships to the jurisdiction of regular courts. It is 
considered that although the dissolution of general partnerships may be agreed between the 
parties the actual dissolution must be ratified by the attendant public authority because such 
act is in the public interest. As a result, one must distinguish in DIFC laws the general 
freedom of parties to subject all disputes to arbitration from the specific express exceptions to 
this freedom.  
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In a survey of all DIFC laws and regulations conducted by this author the term 
arbitration comes up only in Schedule 2 of the DIFC Insolvency Law and none of these 
instruments explicitly states that DIFC courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over disputes 
falling within their ambit. Thus, it is opined that arbitrability is indeed of a general and broad 
nature, subject to very few express limitations in the statutes and then again only in respect of 
functions and purposes that serve a clear public interest and which need to be transparent and 
in the public domain. At the same time it should be acknowledged that there is some 
uncertainty as to the correct interpretation of DIFC laws and the precise relationship of 
arbitration to these laws. Indeed, the notions of arbitrability and public policy are always 
among the most indeterminate legal terms in the lexicon of lawyers. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
GROUNDS FOR NON-ENFORCEMENT: NULLITY OF AWARD AND 
APPLICATION OF IMPROPER LAW 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Previous chapters have focused on other circumstances that render foreign arbitral awards 
non-enforceable in the UAE and Bahrain, notably incapacity, lack of proper notice, excess of 
jurisdiction, inappropriate composition and lack of arbitrability. This chapter, as suggested by 
its very title, intends to concentrate on two areas that generally go unnoticed on their own 
because they are either typically subsumed within other categories (e.g. award nullity is 
usually viewed from the lens of other defects pertinent to the award)
219
 or as something 
which is necessarily faulty but at the same time it would be wrong to consider it as a defect 
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that negates the entire arbitration process. The latter comment refers to a refusal to recognise 
a foreign award because the tribunal applied a substantive law that was different to that 
designated by the parties in the arbitration clause or the submission agreement, or where the 
tribunal is deemed to have gotten the governing law of the contract wrong.
220
 
 Once again, we have decided not to embroil ourselves with the international 
jurisprudence available on these two issues, but rather concentrate on the law of the UAE and 
Bahrain, chiefly because this matter has received some attention. The only limitation is that 
the courts of the two nations have not had the chance to assess relevant claims and as a result 
we are forced to employ judgments that may provide some clarity through indirect means. As 
will become evident, even the statutes of the two nations under consideration fail to provide 
much guidance in respect of these two grounds for non-enforcement and in the case of 
Bahrain in particular whose relevant statute makes no reference to the application of 
improper law this author is forced to enter his personal assessment of the matter by reason of 
analogy and the dictates of justice and reason. 
 The other important dimension of this chapter is our extensive discussion of the 
concept of ijtihad in the context of arbitration. In particular, we consider the possibility of an 
arbitral award made by a highly reputable Muslim scholar in which he is unable to discern the 
governing law of the contract and hence engages in an original construction of the available 
Islamic law. We assess whether such an interpretation may constitute ijtihad and if so 
whether this award may be set aside or refused recognition and enforcement in the courts of 
the UAE and Bahrain. In the knowledge of this author this is the first time that ijtihad is 
linked to arbitration and particularly as regards non-enforcement of foreign awards on the 
basis that the arbitrator failed to apply the law chosen by the parties. 
 
4.2 Nullity in Bahrain and the UAE 
 
The concept of award nullity is a broad term encompassing a number of issues, both 
substantive and procedural in nature. Award nullity generally refers to the validity of the 
award in the lex arbitri, which is distinct from the nullity of the award in the country of 
enforcement by reason of any of the grounds set out in the New York Convention. The 
former type of nullity is not regulated in the New York Convention because quite obviously it 
is not an integral aspect of the enforcement procedure which is the raison d’etre of the 
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Convention. For all intents and purposes, however, courts and commentators assimilate the 
grounds for non-enforcement to the grounds for nullity, although there is no express 
transnational rule that prohibits countries from adding more grounds to this list.   
It should be stated from the outset that the concept has never really been clarified in the 
jurisprudence of the UAE and Bahrain and although it is sparsely stipulated in the laws of the 
two nations it is not exactly clear what it refers to. The Bahraini International Arbitration Act 
does not even mention award nullity as a ground upon which to refuse foreign arbitral awards 
or even as a consideration for setting aside.
221
 On the other hand, Article 53(a)(2) of the UAE 
Federal Arbitration Law states that an arbitral award may be set aside: 
 
- If the award settled matters not subject to, or falling beyond the scope of the 
arbitration agreement. However, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration 
can be separated from those not submitted, only that part of the award which contains 
decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be annulled; 
- If the award is null or the arbitral proceedings’ nullity affected the award. 
 
The UAE thus seems to distinguish between separable null awards and awards considered 
null as a result of a particular defect in the award itself or a defect in the proceedings, thus 
recognising both substantive and procedural nullity. The fact that these distinctions are not 
made in the Bahraini Act should not lead one to believe that they are not present in the law of 
this nation. Rather, because its respective law was drafted as far back as 1994 they either 
skipped the attention of the drafters or in any event the drafters believed these to be an 
inherent part of award nullity. By way of illustration, Article 31 of the Bahraini law discusses 
the form and content of arbitration awards, clearly suggesting that if for whatever reason one 
of the stipulated grounds is missing then the award shall be considered null and void and as a 
result the award will fail to be recognised and enforced therein. 
 It should be immediately recognised that award nullity is not removed from the realm 
of contract law for the obvious reason that the award itself is premised on the contractual 
desire of the parties to have an arbitrator decide their dispute in a binding manner. The award 
therefore is the product of contract and is naturally subject to the rules of contract law, both 
permissive and obligatory. This is also the case within the context of Islamic law generally 
and Islamic contact law specifically. Of course, one has to be careful in making assumptions 
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about, and imputing, interpretations to classical Islamic contract law notions as they were not 
meant to deal directly with the situations at hand. This is particularly the case because the 
doctrine of separability was unknown prior to the advent of contemporary arbitration and this 
is true of classical Islam. Hence, in classical Islamic contract law the fact that a contract was 
null because of procedural or other defects would have automatically rendered the 
appointment of arbitrators or their award null. Quite obviously this is not the situation today 
because the doctrine of separability has resolved these matters in favour of arbitration.
222
 So, 
the fact that the main contract may be void under Islamic law by reason of public policy 
(such as gharar) does not necessarily mean that a submission to arbitration via an arbitration 
clause is equally null and void.
223
 It is thereafter up to the arbitrators to ensure that the award 
rendered, particularly if the parties wish to enforce in the UAE or Bahrain, is compatible with 
any provisions that would render it unenforceable, particularly in terms of nullity 
requirements. In practice, the doctrine of separability is so well entrenched in both the legal 
systems of the UAE and Bahrain that litigants find hosting arbitral tribunals on their territory 
will not prejudice or in any way harm their ultimate award because the lex arbitri of the two 
nations will generally be resilient to petty claims of nullity.
224
 
 If as already mentioned nullity refers to the quality of the contract, as a starting basis 
in assessing the quality of the award, it follows that an otherwise valid award from a 
procedural perspective may be rendered null by reason of the fact that the contract which 
triggered arbitral jurisdiction is in some measure defective, such as to render it null or void. 
This type of nullity is well recognised in international arbitration law and practice and is duly 
given credence in the respective laws of Bahrain and the UAE. Given that we have already 
examined the formal validity of the contract wherein the arbitration clause exists, we shall not 
endeavour a replication of this extensive discussion. Instead, we shall confine ourselves to a 
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brief overview of those instances where a defective contract has an impact on the validity of 
an arbitral award. Examples include a prohibited contract, such as those dealing with illicit 
activities under the laws of one or more nation, as would be the case with illicit arms sales or 
narcotics and equally the purchase of an insurance package whose terms could be described 
as highly speculative in a country where such practice is forbidden. Questions of arbitrability 
are also encompassed within the concept of null contracts, as would be the case with a 
contract settling a particular dispute through arbitration, despite the fact that the subject 
matter of said dispute was not in fact susceptible to resolution by arbitral means.  
No doubt, questions of arbitrability concern a particular aspect of the contract, namely 
the arbitration clause, for which we have already made an extensive discussion.
225
 It is here 
where central issues of contract nullity affect the award, even though these may have been 
known to the parties in advance and to their respective legal teams. As has already been 
explained, the courts of Bahrain and the UAE are rather sensitive when it comes to such 
procedural defects in the arbitration clause and are keen to remedy them by considering the 
award null. An illustrative example typically includes the incapacity of one of the parties to 
partake in the drafting and signing of the arbitration clause on account of his personal law, or 
on account of statutory restrictions in law where the award was made.
226
 Of course, when the 
arbitration clause is fundamentally faulty which renders it null it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to make space for the application of separability, as would otherwise be the case in respect of 
a null or void contract.
227
 
In the majority of cases the defect will concern the award itself, in conjunction with 
the main contract or the arbitration clause. In all these cases the award must be viewed as part 
of a much larger process which starts from the moment the arbitration clause is triggered by 
one of the parties until such time as the award is rendered and certified. Under this light the 
parties must be careful in adhering to particular procedural formalities. The laws of the UAE 
and Bahrain pay particular attention to these formalities and as has already been explained 
their higher courts are rather alert and sensitive to particular violations. By way of 
illustration, the lack of proper or adequate notification of the proceedings by one party to 
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another will lead in the nullity of the award.
228
 Equally, if the award deals with a dispute or 
parts of a dispute that were not contemplated by, or not falling within the terms of the 
submission to arbitration, or contain decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission 
to arbitration, will ultimately render the award void, unless of course separability kicks in.
229
 
Moreover, if the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place, the award will be 
rendered null in both the UAE and Bahrain.
230
  
In some cases it is unclear whether the mandatory provisions found in arbitral 
legislation necessarily lead to the annulment of the award where they are violated. A point at 
hand is Article 42 of the UAE Federal Arbitration Law, which recounts the formalities of the 
award once rendered. In the opinion of this author, if the parties intend to enforce a foreign 
award in the UAE it is imperative that they make known to the arbitrators this provision and 
ensure that they comply with its prescriptions, lest they risk possible annulment proceedings 
by the losing party. As a result, it is submitted that the requirements stipulated in Article 42 
are mandatory and any failure to comply entails the nullity of the award, unless of course the 
court of enforcement determines by reason of an expansive construction that the defect is not 
of such nature as to render the award null, or that the defect may be rectified.
231
 The 
conditions are as follows: 
 
a) The award shall be made in writing and in arbitral proceedings with more than one 
arbitrator, the award should be rendered by the majority of all members. If the 
opinions of the arbitrators were different so as the majority is not met, the president of 
the arbitral tribunal shall record the award and dissenting opinions. 
b) The award shall be signed by the arbitrators and any omitted signature by one or more 
arbitrators shall be stated. The award is deemed to be valid if signed by the majority 
of the arbitrators. 
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c) The award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless the parties have 
agreed that no reasons are to be given or if the rule of law applicable on the arbitral 
proceedings does not require that reasons be stated. 
d) The award shall state the names of the parties in dispute, their addresses, the name of 
the arbitrators and their nationality, the place and date of issuance of the arbitral 
award, a copy of the arbitration agreement, a summary of the parties’ claims, 
statements and documents, the finding of the award and its reasons when required. 
 
It is evident that these are formal, mandatory, requirements, which can however be remedied 
by permission of the court of enforcement, as would be the case for example, by submitting 
the parties’ claims where this document was originally omitted by mistake. It should be noted 
that UAE courts have set out a number of reasons as to the practical significance of these 
requirements and why they are warranted in the law. By way of illustration, the Dubai Court 
of Cassation has explained that it is important for the enforcement court to be aware of the 
award’s supporting reasons232, its findings, as well as the date and place of issuance because 
it provides it with the necessary information to discern the formal validity of the award and 
hence dispel any claims to the contrary.
233
 Equally, the requirement that the arbitrators place 
their signature on the award is not a mere formality, but it serves as proof not only that the 
award was actually rendered, but that it was made by those who signed it. Hence, in case of 
doubt as to the existence of the award, particularly where it is not of an institutional nature, 
the court of enforcement may have recourse to the arbitrators in order to ensure that it was 
actually made by them.
234
 
Other procedural defects cannot however subsequently be rectified by corrective 
action, not even by an expansive judicial construction because the law does not allow for any 
such remedial action. This would certainly be the case with the requirement in Article 44(1) 
of the UAE Federal Law which requires that the arbitral tribunal issue the final award settling 
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the dispute within the period of time agreed upon by the parties. It stipulates that failing such 
agreement, the award shall be issued within six months from the date of the first hearing. In 
all cases, the arbitral tribunal may extend this period of time, provided said extension does 
not exceed six months, unless the parties agree on a longer time period. Failure to adhere to 
the time limits give rise to an entitlement to ask the court for an extension,
235
 but there is the 
danger that the award may ultimately be rendered null and void by the court of enforcement. 
No doubt, such rules are rather more flexible in advanced arbitral jurisdictions such as 
London, New York and Hong Kong because most of these formalities are susceptible to 
remedial action without prejudice to any of the parties and hence the courts therein do not see 
these defects as posing serious impediments, such that would necessitate the annulment of the 
award as a whole.  
This is certainly the correct attitude because any claims made on the grounds listed in 
Article 42 of the UAE Federal Law by which the losing party seeks the annulment of the 
award are mere delay tactics and a means of frustrating an otherwise impeccable award. The 
courts in the UAE and Bahrain should be very hesitant to annul an award on such formal 
grounds and should always apply of test of remedial action as follows: if the defect can be 
remedied without prejudice to any of the parties in such a way that satisfies their original 
intention to settle their dispute by resource to arbitration, then the court should allow the 
winning party to remedy the particular defect.
236
 There is certainly some significant evidence 
that such practice is followed by the higher courts of Bahrain. In a case concerning a 
challenge against a domestic arbitral award, the losing party challenged the award on the 
basis that one of the arbitrators had failed to sign it. This was a formal requirement in Article 
239 of the Bahraini Code of Civil Procedure and if the court followed the letter of the law it 
would have to rule that said defect was sufficient in and of itself to render the award null and 
void. Nonetheless, the Bahraini Court of Cassation took the much applauded position that 
because the award was quite clearly rendered by the majority of the arbitrators and was 
moreover signed by other arbitrators and the chairman it could not possibly be claimed that it 
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was null simply because one of the arbitrators had failed to sign it. This was, after all, 
something which could be remedied.
237
 
 
4.3.1 Failure to Apply the Law Stipulated in the Arbitration Clause 
 
Failure by the arbitral tribunal to apply the law stipulated by the parties in the arbitration 
clause or the submission document serves to nullify the award, quite simply because it has 
acted ultra vires and has not respected party autonomy. The parties are not restricted to the 
law which they can request the arbitrators to apply. This may be the law of one or several 
nations, general international law, customary international law, lex mercatoria, recourse to 
justice and fairness and others.
238
 The tribunal is required to uphold the wishes of the parties 
and apply only that substantive law that they have designated. This is not only a cardinal rule 
of international commercial arbitration, but also a fundamental premise of the law of contract 
and party autonomy thereto. 
 The UAE Federal Arbitration Act specifies in Article 53(4) that a foreign arbitral 
award may be refused recognition where “it failed to apply the law agreed upon by the parties 
to govern the subject matter of the dispute”. This clearly echoes international development 
and provides some legal certainty to litigants, even to the winning party who will be weary of 
an award that is defective in this manner because of the potential challenges posited by the 
losing party. It is therefore in the interests of both parties to ensure that the arbitrators apply 
the substantive law stipulated in the arbitration clause and submission agreement. The 
Bahraini International Arbitration Law is less clear in its articulation of a similar rule. In fact, 
failure to apply the parties’ chosen substantive law is not an explicit ground for the refusal of 
recognition. The closest one can come to such a conclusion is through the operation of Article 
36(1)(c) which as already mentioned states that an award will not be enforced if it deals with 
a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration. 
Although this provision does not specifically stipulate that failure to apply the parties’ chosen 
law leads to the award’s automatic annulment in Bahrain, a purposive construction supports 
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the conclusion that the determination of a dispute without taking into consideration the law 
chosen by the parties is contrary to the arbitration clause and the submission agreement. 
 No doubt, there are exceptions to the general rule, which in the opinion of this author 
the courts in Bahrain and the UAE will not object to, despite the fact that there does not exist 
any supporting case law at the present time. We are referring of course to situations where an 
arbitration clause is defective in and of itself or otherwise inoperable, or not wholly clear as 
to the law to be applied. For example, an arbitration clause may dictate that the governing law 
of the contract is lex mercatoria in the field of Islamic insurance. Yet, when the arbitral 
tribunal requests the parties to furnish evidence of such practice the parties’ legal teams are 
unable to discover any lex mercatoria in this field. It would be unwise of the tribunal to 
declare that there is no law applicable to the dispute at hand as it is in a position to satisfy the 
wishes of the parties to resolve their dispute through arbitration with reference to takaful and 
related concepts. As a result, the tribunal may decide that justice is better served by reference 
to the takaful laws and regulations of their respective nations, even though these laws were 
never listed by the parties to the dispute. This “alternative” law is no doubt a matter of 
interpretation by the tribunal, but it would defy reason for it to be sustained in cases where 
both parties are opposed to the discovery of new law by the tribunal. The general practice of 
courts and arbitral tribunals is to apply several tests or criteria in circumstances where the 
parties have not designated a governing law or where this is not clear at all. By way of 
illustration, English courts have accepted that if there is an English arbitration clause this is 
sufficient weight in favour of the governing law being that of England.
239
 
 This is of course much different to the nationalisation arbitration cases of the 1950s – 
1970s where the arbitrators held that even though the governing law of the contracts between 
the Arab nations and their foreign investors stipulated the application of international law to 
the extent of its compatibility with Islamic law, the proper law to be applied was in fact 
international law and not Islamic law.
240
 If these awards were submitted for enforcement 
before the courts of Bahrain and the UAE today it is beyond doubt that they would be 
rejected on the ground that the arbitrators refused to respect the governing law of the contract 
as this was set out in the appropriate clause. These days are now far and gone. Nonetheless, 
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the Beximco judgment is a stark reminder as to how Islamic law is viewed by the courts in the 
western world, which brings into doubt whether it is truly advisable for parties to a contract 
to stipulate any part of Islamic law as the governing law of their contract.
241
 It will be recalled 
that the English Court of Appeal in the Beximco case held that under the 1980 Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations only national legal systems 
can be designated as laws governing a contract, a requirement which the Sharia does not 
satisfy. The parties in that case had designated the Sharia as the governing law of their 
mutual contract. Although there is a lack of empirical evidence as to whether in 
contemporary practice Muslim parties to large commercial contracts stipulate Islamic law as 
the governing law of their contract despite being aware of the Beximco judgment, which is 
not merely an isolated decision. Anecdotal evidence that is available to this author suggests 
that this is not in fact the case. Rather, although Islamic law plays a significant part in 
contract negotiations, contract development and construction among Muslims and non-
Muslims, the governing law of the contract is usually a combination of a Muslim legal system 
and other foreign laws. This is consistent with typical lex mercatoria in most fields of 
business and commerce and no doubt the legal profession will have advised clients to keep 
some separation between their religious convictions and contract formation. 
 
4.3.2 Ijtihad as New Law? 
 
Ijtihad is relatively unknown to the western legal audience. In brief, it is a recognised source 
of interpretation of Islamic law, but it does not resemble the other secondary sources which 
rely on analogy (qiyas) and communal consensus (ijma). The common characteristic of qiyas 
and ijma is their adoption and corroboration by the community of Muslim scholars, whether 
at local or ecumenical level. Hence, they are community – albeit the most educated parts 
thereof – sources of law. Ijtihad, on the other hand, is also a secondary source of Islamic law, 
but lacks the fundamental ingredient inherent in qiyas and ijma; that of broad community 
consensus. In fact, ijtihad represents legal reasoning adopted by a single scholar in order to 
give answers to recurring problems for which no other source can deliver a direct solution. 
The problem, however, with ijtihad is that it can lead to legal anarchy because each scholar – 
there is of course the primary question as to who qualifies as an ijtihad scholar – may have a 
different interpretation to a particular problem, thus leading to a process of fragmentation. 
                                                          
241
 Beximco Pharmaceuticals v Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC, [2004] 1 W L R 1784. 
 115 
 
The elaboration of the virtues and pitfalls of ijtihad is beyond the focus of this thesis,
242
 but it 
suffices to say that the very process of ijtihad is reminiscent of arbitration, in the sense that a 
particular dispute arises and the scholar is asked to offer his legal/theological opinion on the 
matter. In fact, although he is given an implicit and immutable framework to work with (i.e. 
the Quran and the sunnah), if the ijtihadist is to provide a contemporary and durable solution 
to the problem at hand, he is necessarily obliged to circumvent the primary sources, not in the 
sense of violating them, but by advocating new avenues and ideas that are either absent or by 
modernising otherwise antiquated notions. A modern-day ijtihadist could very well be a 
Muslim arbitrator who is called by the parties to provide a solution to their dispute (assuming 
they are both Muslim and have designated Islamic law and/or Muslim legal systems as the 
contract’s governing law). Were this arbitrator to claim that existing interpretations of Islamic 
law on the particular subject matter are antiquated and have no relevance to the exigencies of 
the modern Muslim, he would be forced to offer an ijtihad if his intention were to offer a just 
and durable solution to the dispute posed. If his award was innovative and circumvented the 
typical notions iterated by classic scholarship, then the award may lay claim to an ijtihad, 
which the court of enforcement in the UAE and Bahrain would have to assess whether it 
constitutes a breach of the substantive law stipulated by the parties in their arbitration clause 
or submission agreement. 
 `The personal opinion of this author is that since ijtihad is a valid convention under 
Islamic law – no doubt subject to a significant amount of limitations  - it does not in any way 
resemble the arbitrary rejection of the parties’ chosen substantive law by some arbitrators. As 
a result, ijtihad is an acceptable form of arbitral intervention among Muslims, designed not 
only to avoid non-resolution of a dispute but also to provide the most appropriate solution 
pertinent to the needs of contemporary Muslims. Viewed in this light, ijtihadi awards do not 
violate party autonomy. This is very much a theoretical issue at this point because it has not 
been contemplated by any court in the Muslim world, let alone the much progressive courts 
of Bahrain and the UAE. Nonetheless, it should be emphasised that not everyone can lay 
claim to the production of ijtihad and not every innovative decision constitutes ijtihad. 
Rather, two conditions must be satisfied: a) the arbitration in question must be a Muslim 
scholar of high repute in matters of the Quran and the sunnah, and; b) the award rendered 
must not be in violation of the Quran and the sunnah. In this manner the opinion expressed by 
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the ijtihad will become acceptable to the community as a whole and will in time, if not 
straight away, assume normative status. This is also a species of hybrid Islamic precedent that 
could be used by the courts of Muslim nations, or at least Gulf nations with similar socio-
legal backgrounds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
ARBITRAL AWARDS IN BAHRAIN AND UAE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Public policy or public order is an elusive concept, despite the fact that this author makes an 
attempt to define it from the point of view of Islamic law and from the perspective of the law 
of the UAE and Bahrain in the course of this chapter. It not only fluctuates from time to time 
but it is possible that what is reprehensible in one place to be revered in another. A recent 
judgment will help illustrate the point. In 2012 the District Court of Cologne held that the 
circumcision of a 4-year old Muslim boy constituted an unlawful offence of causing actual 
bodily harm and could not be justified by the consent of the boy’s parents.243 For good reason 
the decision created an outrage among Jewish and Muslim communities in Germany who 
practice circumcision as a matter of religious duty. One would have expected that public 
policy in the Muslim world would have encompassed all those religious elements that are 
usually associated with Qur’anic prohibitions, such as usury and the charging of commercial 
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interest, but this is not the case in general terms. No doubt, many of the prohibitions 
contained in the primary sources of Islam are considered public policy violations, but the 
laws of the UAE and Bahrain have gone a long way and are no longer opposed to commercial 
practices that are routinely encountered in the industrialised nations of the West. What is 
striking about the public policy considerations of the courts in the UAE, and particularly 
Dubai, is their adherence to procedural irregularities that would otherwise make no difference 
to the quality of the award in the West. This author attempts to understand the political and 
legal considerations behind such decisions and assess whether these are the norm or whether 
they are in fact aberrations to an otherwise well-oiled legal system. 
 There are various definitions of public policy but the core of the concept encompasses 
the core of local laws, fundamental notions of justice and morality.
244
 To be sure, there is 
general agreement that internationally condemned acts, particularly if they constitute criminal 
acts, would certainly violate public policy. Within this definition one may also include 
mandatory rules, although as will become evident not all mandatory rules give rise to public 
policy claims and most States are disinclined to seek public policy exceptions to each and 
every mandatory rule. Moreover, it is not clear that a difference exists between public policy 
and public order, at least as this is understood in Islamic jurisprudence generally and in the 
law of the UAE and Bahrain more specifically. Public order is referred to as al-nizam al-
amm, which seems to be more limited as compared to the notion of public policy. Article 
235(e) of the UAE Code of Civil Procedure refers specifically to “public order”, whereas 
other pieces of legislation employ public policy, without there being a clear distinction 
between the two. For the purposes of this thesis they are viewed as possessing the same 
meaning. Certain Muslim nations, and even some in the Gulf, employ rather extensive 
statutory legislation in order to specify what mandatory conduct falls within the rubric of 
public policy.
245
 Bahrain does not have any such legislation, whereas UAE statutes are far 
more elaborate, yet many issues are still largely indeterminate. 
 The aim of this chapter is to shed some light on the notion of an Islamic public policy 
and from there to construct a thread that ties together the jurisprudence of the UAE and 
Bahrain. Along this trail it is important to be critical about the approach of the courts of these 
nations in their use of public policy and their interpretation of the notion. It is hoped that 
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some of the decisions discussed here will be re-examined by the relevant courts again with a 
view to making them more compatible with the spirit of the New York Convention without at 
the same time compromising local standards of morality or public order. Once again, 
although some Western judgments are cited throughout, it has been the aim of this author to 
present the relevant issues through the lens of judgments and laws adopted in the Gulf region, 
with particular emphasis on those of the UAE and Bahrain. 
 
5.2 The Concept of Public Policy under the New York Convention and its 
Application to the Muslim World 
 
The starting point for this discussion must only be Article V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention, which provides that recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused 
where the competent authority in the country where recognition is sought finds that such 
recognition and enforcement “would be contrary to the public policy of that country”.246 This 
definition dispels certain fictitious misconceptions that are fundamental to the discussion of 
the subject matter of this thesis. The first concerns the classical question as to who’s public 
policy. There has been a definite attempt in the relevant literature to formulate an argument 
whereby the notion of public policy in Article V(2)(b) of the Convention refers to 
“transnational” or “international” public policy, as opposed to local public policy.247 This 
transnational public policy is certainly narrower than local public policy, albeit it is a lot more 
precise, as per its supporters. It has been defined by the International Law Association (ILA) 
as a notion that must be understood in its private international law context, namely:  
 
... That part of the public policy of a State which, if violated, would prevent a party from 
invoking a foreign law or foreign judgment or foreign award. ... It is not to be understood in 
these Recommendations as referring to a public policy which is common to many States 
(which is better referred to as “transnational public policy”) or to public policy which is part 
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of public international law. International public policy is generally considered to be narrower 
in scope than domestic public policy.
248
 
Those who take the view that public policy in the context of the New York Convention is 
limited to the public policy of the country of enforcement refer principally to the wording of 
Article V(2)(b), which explicitly mentions “that country”.249 Moreover, the application of this 
argument by scholars to the particular situation of Muslim nations serves to highlight that it is 
“their” public policy that is crucial and not the public policy that is prevalent in the conflict of 
laws that is culturally and socially odourless.
250
 Of course, this does not mean that Muslim 
nations cannot change their particular notion of public policy in both time and space and 
render it in conformity with prevailing international standards. This observation is all the 
more pertinent given the fact that the New York Convention is tending towards some degree 
of uniformity and a tendency to place as few obstacles as possible in the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, at least on the basis of the practice of national courts.
251
 In previous 
chapters we have already seen the significant efforts of both the UAE and Bahrain in 
attracting foreign investors through the lure of arbitration and enforcement-friendly 
jurisdictions. However, it is not at all clear whether public policy is in fact susceptible to 
broad international harmonisation, despite the advent of globalisation, given the 
fragmentation of societies along social, cultural, religious, ethnic and other characteristics.
252
 
 The 1983 Riyadh Convention on Judicial Cooperation between States of the Arab 
League reinforces the argument that Muslim public policy is distinguished by said nations 
from the public policy of non-Muslim States. Article 37(e) of the Convention stipulates that 
arbitral awards are not to be recognised and enforced among signatory nations where any part 
of the award contradicts “the provisions of the Islamic Sharia, the public order or the rules of 
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conduct of the requested party”. It is thus clear that even among Muslim nations the various 
rules of public policy are respected. 
 Without specifically mentioning any of them, it is evident that national courts 
invoking public policy as a ground for refusing recognition of foreign awards, even of liberal 
industrialised nations, do not make a meal of transnational public policy and at best adopt 
enforcement-friendly judgments or rely on conduct that is internationally and unequivocally 
reprehensible, particularly criminal conduct.
253
 What this necessarily means is that one 
should approach the issue of public policy in the New York Convention from a local 
perspective. Whether a nation wishes to move beyond the national to a transnational or 
harmonious co-existence is a matter of choice alone. The fact that the particular provision in 
the New York Convention must be interpreted in good faith and according to the ordinary 
meaning of the words therein does not negate this argument.
254
 Rather, it is contended that 
only when a State party, through its courts, abuses or distorts the meaning of local public 
policy against the legitimate expectations of a national of another State party that a violation 
of the Convention exists. 
 
5.3 An Islamic Public Policy? 
 
Having established the local nature of public policy, it is crucial to examine if an Islamic 
public policy in fact exists. Some recent scholarship takes a rather superficial view of the 
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civilised countries”. For an opposing view, see Fougerolle v Procofrance, judgment by the Paris Court of Appeal 
(25 May 1990), (1990) Rev Arb 892. The Paris Court of Appeal was quite adamant in European Gas Turbines SA 
v Westman International Ltd in its  judgment of 30 September 1993), (1994 Rev Arb 359, that bribery was not 
only contrary to French public policy but moreover contravened the ethics of international commerce. It 
should be noted that at the time it was not a criminal offence for a French company to bribe a foreign official 
abroad in order to acquire favourable treatment! 
254
 The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal stated in Hebei Import and Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd 
[1999] 2 HKC 205, that “when a number of States enter into a treaty to enforce each other’s arbitral awards, it 
stands to reason that they would do so in the realisation that they, or some of them, will very likely have very 
different outlooks in regard to internal matters. And they would hardly intend, when entering into the treaty 
or later when incorporating it into their domestic law, that these differences should be allowed to operate so 
as to undermine the broad uniformity which must be the obvious aim of such a treaty and the domestic laws 
incorporating it”. Given my aforementioned observation, I disagree that the public policy provision in the New 
York Convention can be read in such a broad manner. 
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matter and so will not be mentioned in any detail,
255
 despite the lack of solid or ample 
international literature on public policy in the Muslim world. Earlier works by Muslim 
scholars, although much more focused because of the authors’ capacity to read the primary 
sources, are equally of little relevance today because many of the cultural and religious 
barriers identified ten and twenty years ago are no longer considered part of public policy, at 
least in practice.
256
 El-Ahdab has stated that in Islam “the concept of public policy is based 
on the respect of the general spirit of the Sharia and its sources and on the principle that 
individuals must respect their clauses, unless they forbid what is authorised and authorise 
what is forbidden”.257 Saleh has argued that Islamic public policy may be inferred from the 
surah al-nahl.
258
 
Hence, from a methodological point of view, we are left with limited options in order 
to come to a meaningful conclusion as to the existence or not – never mind the relevance – of 
an Islamic public policy.
259
 The first is to discern it from an analysis of the laws of Muslim 
nations belonging to the same school. The second requires an assessment of all that which 
may be deemed prohibited under the primary sources of Islam, namely the Qur’an and the 
sunnah, followed by a close reading of these sources by scholarly interpretative works. The 
third is to consider that public policy in the Muslim world is equal to, and certainly 
tantamount, to the notion of arbitrability; hence, that which is arbitrable would also be 
consistent with public policy.
260
 
 All of these approaches contain both concrete advantages and unequivocal pitfalls. An 
examination of formal laws would require a significant amount of labour on a narrow issue 
that is beyond the purview of this thesis. Although it would no doubt illuminate our 
understanding of Muslim public policy, such a research would be limited by the fact that few 
                                                          
255
 See particularly, E Levi-Tawil, East Meets West: Introducing Sharia into the Rules Governing International 
Arbitrations at the BCDR-AAA, (2011) 12 Cardozo J Conflict Resolution 609, who relies on existing literature and 
does not delve into the sources of Islamic public policy. 
256
 See AH El-Ahdab, Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New York Convention (1994) 11 Journal of International 
Arbitration 87, p 91, who noted that foreign awards dealing with profit and those decided by non-Muslim 
arbitrators are un-enforceable. Neither of these observations is true in the present day. 
257
 AH El-Ahdab, General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries, in International Handbook on 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 1998), Annex I, p 12; see equally AH El-Ahdab, Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards in Arab Countries (1995) 11 Arbitration International 169. 
258
 S Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: A Study in Shariah and Statute Law (Graham and 
Trottman, 1984), p 473. 
259
 Among the rare gems one should include the aforementioned works of Wakim, supra note 8 and Kutty, 
supra note 5. 
260
 This certainly seems to be the conclusion of the Dubai Court of Cassation in Case No 180/2011, judgment 
(12 February 2012), analysed below. 
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nations, let alone Muslim nations, describe the contours of negative civil conduct; i.e. 
whether particular conduct is or is not contrary to public policy. As a result, at the end of such 
an assessment we would only have a partial picture of public policy. Looking at the primary 
sources of Islam would equally require significant labour but would also produce significant 
results. The downside is that, despite the obvious examples, it is not obvious that Qur’anic 
injunctions are wholly consistent with the practice of Muslim nations on the ground and once 
again the keen researcher would have to distinguish among a plethora of case studies in 
relation to the degree of strict adherence to the Qur’an and the sunnah. Interpretative works 
would further complicate things because in their majority relevant commentators have little 
familiarity with business trends and practices and tend to focus on the religious nature of the 
texts. A consideration of arbitrability as a foundation for public policy is an excellent 
methodological approach and this author cannot perceive of examples where a subject matter 
that is not arbitrable may nonetheless escape the public policy hurdle. However, arbitrability 
statutes and practices are limited in the same manner as statutes related to public policy, in 
that they are sparse.  
 Despite the aforementioned limitations, all three of these methodological approaches 
encompass elements that are useful in our quest for public policy constraints. The remainder 
of this chapter will make use of all three in varying degrees with a view to clarifying the 
picture in respect of the public policy of Bahrain and the UAE. 
 
5.3.1 Unlawful Contracts in Islamic Law as a Public Policy Barrier 
 
In chapter 3, which related to arbitrability, it was emphasised that fraudulent agreements, the 
imposition of usury or interest,
261
 speculative contracts and generally all business transactions 
the aim of which are to cause unlawful injury to one of the parties or a third person, or which 
concern other prohibited conduct such as alcohol
262
 or gaming-related
263
 are in conflict with 
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 Qur’an 2:275, stating that “those who devour usury will not stand excepts as stands one whom the Evil one 
with his touch hath driven to madness”. 
262
 Qur’an 4:43, 5:90. 
263
 Non-Muslim courts have expressed their opinion on Islamic public policy, even if not in very precise terms. 
In Lemenda Trading Co Ltd v African Middle East Petroleum Co Ltd [1988] QB 448, the parties had gone to 
arbitration over a contract that envisaged illicit payments to a Qatari official in exchange for business favours. 
An award was rendered in that case but its enforcement in England was refused on several grounds, among 
which was that it violated the public policy of Qatar. A different conclusion was reached in Westacre 
Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd and Others [1999] 3 WLR 811, whose facts were not very 
different from Lemenda. In this case, however, the court effectively held that fraud and bribery in a contract to 
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the express dictates of the Qur’an. The same is true of contracts that introduce a significant 
degree of uncertainty or speculation (gharar fahish) in the relations between parties. This 
means that the typical Sharia-based contracts, such as profit-sharing (mudharabah), leasing 
(ijarah) and safekeeping (wadiah), as well as well joint venture (musharakah) are permissible 
and consistent with Islamic public policy. 
 No doubt, whether a contract meets the gharar criteria is subject to determinations 
that differ from country to country. In Saudi Arabia, futures trading agreements
264
 and 
Western-type insurance contracts would certainly fall under the public policy umbrella.
265
 In 
the UAE and Bahrain, however, this does not seem to be the case. This is reinforced by the 
fact that no explicit legislation bans such contractual arrangements and in any event said 
practices have been undertaken for a while now in both jurisdictions without the courts or the 
authorities having declared them unlawful. It stands to reason therefore that unless a 
particular contract, or its content, contravenes the statutory laws of Bahrain and the UAE, the 
fact that said contract allegedly violates the Qur’an or the sunnah will be of no legal 
relevance. This, of course, has not deterred foreign law firms from advising existing and 
prospective clients that the legal landscape in the two nations is rather foggy with respect to 
matters that would otherwise fall within the public policy exception, this being particularly 
highlighted in the case of interest. 
 
5.3.2 The Complexity of Usury as Islamic Public Policy 
 
It has already been explained that usury is prohibited under classical Islamic law. Yet, it is 
also notable that besides its explicit approval in the UAE and Bahrain,
266
 it is also tolerated in 
Saudi Arabia, at least in the sense that the authorities there are aware of the phenomenon and 
are willing to turn a blind eye. The answer to the question of enforcement of international 
arbitral awards bearing interest in countries that have some explicit or rather implicit ban on 
usury (which is the ban contained in Islamic law on "excessive" interest) depends on a 
number of factors.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
be executed in Kuwait, did not offend that country’s public policy and could therefore be considered arbitrable 
under the laws of England. 
264
 See generally, Freshfields, Islamic Finance: Basic Principles and Structures (2006), available at: 
<http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/13205.pdf 
265
 K Roy, The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy to Refuse 
Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitration Awards? (1995) 18 Fordham Int’l L J 920, at p 954. 
266
 See Federal Supreme Court of Abu Dhabi, case No 245/2000, judgment (7 May 2000). 
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The first consideration is whether the ban encompasses all types of interest or such 
interest that exceeds a certain threshold. Moreover, one must also respond to the question 
whether the ban extends to interest accruing on a contractual or rather consensual debt or 
whether in fact it extends also to interest awarded by courts and tribunals to account for 
delays in paying the awarded sums. The second fundamental issue is whether the ban is 
explicitly formulated in a discernible source of law, namely a decree, canon, precedent or 
other. The third crucial factor concerns the actual practice within the commercial dealings in 
the country of enforcement. This may come down to a very simple query. Does this country 
have a regulated banking system which operates on interest-based transactions? Finally, and 
depending on the nature of the dispute as commercial or investment-related, is the ensuing 
award rendered under the law of investment arbitration (e.g. ICSID) or is it subject to 
enforcement under the terms of the New York Convention and thus open to non-recognition 
on the basis of public policy against usury (or interest as the case maybe)? 
The first three questions relate to the “scope” of the Islamic law ban on usury, in order 
for it to function as a rule of law applicable in the country of enforcement. And to that extent, 
this author is unaware of any awards being denied enforcement in a country that supposedly 
lists Sharia as a source (or even the main source) of legal authority.
267
 Even in Iran, where 
payment of interest is explicitly prohibited by the Iranian Constitution, arbitral awards 
rendered against Iran under the Iran-US Claims Tribunal have been reported to bear 
interest.
268
 This author is moreover aware of two cases in Saudi Arabia where enforcement of 
international arbitral awards was refused because purportedly they violated Saudi public 
order, namely the Islamic law ban on interest.
269
  
With regard to investment arbitration and whether Islamic public policy exceptions 
may in fact apply, there has been very little jurisprudence from ICSID on this matter. 
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 Under Article 2-1.09(q) of the Sultani Decree7/1974 on Omani Banking Law, the Central Bank of Oman 
enjoys the prerogative to set interest rates. This currently stands at 10% and hence the Omani Court of Appeal 
has held that parties and entities operating in Oman – and by extension those who wish to enforce arbitral 
awards in Oman – must respect the ceiling rates of interest. Anything above the statutory limit shall be 
declared void and unenforceable. See Case 43/1984 BSCD judgment (1984), Case 51/86 Omani Court of Appeal 
judgment (1986) and Case 7/87, Omani Court of Appeal judgment (1987). See Al-Siyabi, supra note 3. 
268
 See J A Westberg, International Transactions and Claims Involving Government Parties: Case Law of the 
Iran-USA Claims Tribunal (International Law Institute, 1991), p 253. Of course, it may be posited that in the 
case of Iran it was forced to accept the imposition of interest because it entered into the relevant treaty (or 
otherwise this would have been imposed by the UN Security Council) and in any event this did not constitute 
gharar because it was not in respect of a future event the aim of which was to make profit, but instead related 
to a past event with detailed losses. 
269
 For further details of these cases, see http://www.alsindilaw.com/wp-
content/themes/AlSindi/pdf/enforcement.pdf p 174. 
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However, one case does stand out with relevance to this discussion, namely the judgment in 
Wena Hotels Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt.
270
 Although the annulment request did 
not raise the “Islamic law purported Ban on Usury” it did deal with the provisions of the 
Egyptian Civil Code setting a maximum on interest to be paid on any outstanding financial 
obligation (at 4% in civil matters and 5 % on commercial matters), as the applicable rule of 
law that should have been applied by the Tribunal when deciding the matter of damages and 
interest. The Tribunal, nevertheless, awarded 9% compound interest. The Tribunal applied a 
criterion compatible with international business practices as “an alternative that is most 
appropriate in this case” in an effort to satisfy the requirements of prompt, just and equitable 
compensation that does not diminish the “market value of the investment immediately before 
the expropriation” (as per Articles 2 and 5 of the 1976 Agreement on the Protection and 
Promotion of Investments Between Egypt and the UK). The Egyptian Government paid the 
award in full with compound interest upon rejection of its application for annulment.
271
 
It seems appropriate to conclude that the UAE and Bahrain permit interest-based 
activities in accordance with the statutory and judicial limitations already identified. 
Therefore, said activities cannot be deemed as contravening the public policy of the two 
nations because such an outcome would frustrate the parties’ legitimate expectations. 
 
5.4 The Bechtel case as a Precedent 
 
One of the aberrations of public policy invocation in the UAE is no doubt the outcome in the 
Bechtel case. There, the Dubai Court of Cassation refused to enforce a foreign arbitral award 
rendered in favour of the claimant on the ground that the arbitrator had failed to swear 
witnesses in the proceedings in the manner prescribed by UAE law for court hearings.
272
 This 
procedural “defect”273 relates, among others, to UAE public policy but is not listed, even 
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 Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Annulment Decision January 8, 2002. 
Available at http://italaw.com/documents/Wena-annulment.pdf 
271
 The Cairo Court of Appeal has ruled that an arbitral tribunal was allowed to apply interest above the 
maximum rate set by statute because the parties had come to a mutual agreement and thus the award did not 
contravene Egyptian public policy. Case No 41/114, judgment (2 October 1997). 
272
 International Bechtel Co Ltd v Department of Civil Aviation of the Government of Dubai, Dubai Court of 
Cassation, case No 503/2003, judgment (15 May 2004). This same result was later reaffirmed by the Court in 
case No 322/2004, judgment (11 April 2005). 
273
 In fact, following the issuance of the award, the losing party, the Dubai government, filed a claim with the 
Court of First Instance (CFI) arguing that the arbitrator’s warning to the witnesses that they were “bound to tell 
the truth” and could “face severe consequences” for failing to do so was contrary to Dubai law [specifically 
Article 211 of the Civil Procedure Code) which requires witnesses to swear “by the Almighty to tell the truth 
 126 
 
indirectly, among the reasons for non-enforcement in the New York Convention. In any 
event, given that none of the parties during the arbitral proceedings protested against the 
particular manner of swearing witnesses and given also that the procedure in arbitral 
proceedings is not limited by reference to any domestic civil procedure law, but is rather 
delineated by the wishes of the parties – which usually reflects the procedure of the 
institutional arbitration of their choice – it is inconceivable that the Dubai Court of Cassation 
could have assumed that awards sought to be enforced in the UAE ought to comply with its 
civil procedure law. Such an outcome defeats the fundamental principle of party autonomy 
and reduces the credibility of that particular legal system.
274
 Some commentators have noted 
that UAE courts routinely require that foreign awards satisfy its rules and procedures and 
may as a result refuse to enforce awards that violate its local laws.
275
  
Although this author has not undertaken an extensive review of all judgments at the 
lower courts and hence is not in a position to know with any degree of certainty whether 
other foreign arbitral awards have been stricken down on petty procedural grounds, the fact 
that no other similar judgments have come out of the senior courts of Dubai or of other 
Emirati courts since Bechtel indicates that Bechtel must be viewed as an aberration and not as 
the norm, particularly since the losing party was a government entity. This is especially so 
given the adoption of the new UAE Arbitration Law which supersedes Bechtel and moreover 
the government has ratified the New York Convention since the adoption of that judgment. 
Equally, it is inconceivable that following the creation of DIFC that the Dubai authorities 
would allow similar judgments to take place, especially since the judges sitting at the DIFC 
courts are internationally respected jurists who would not strike down awards on the basis of 
petty public policy considerations of this nature. Of course, one has to wait and see the legal 
climate more carefully in order to make sound judgments about the future but it is the 
contention of this author that although Bechtel was a shock case that tested the system, the 
Dubai Court of Cassation remains adamant that certain irregularities that contravene 
procedural aspects of UAE law are sufficient to refuse recognition on public policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and nothing but the truth”. Not surprisingly, both the CFI [Case No 288/2002] and the Court of Cassation 
agreed with this claim and vacated the award. 
274
 See AS Rau, Fear of Freedom (2006) 17 Am Rev of Int’l Arb 469. 
275
 See C Fadel, N Sader, Arbitration in the United Arab Emirates: The CMS Guide to Arbitration (3
rd
 edition), 
available at: 
http://cmsarbitration.com/wiki/index.php?title=United_Arab_Emirates#ARBITRATION_IN_THE_UNITED_ARAB
_EMIRATES. 
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grounds.
276
 The next section will provide an analysis of case 180/211, decided in 2012 by the 
Dubai Cass 
 
5.5 Particular Manifestations of Public Policy in the Judicial Systems of the UAE 
and Bahrain 
 
Whereas Bahraini legislation does not specifically articulate the meaning of public policy, 
Article 3 of the UAE Civil Code
277
 defines public policy in the following manner: 
 
Rules relating to personal status such as marriage, inheritance, descent, and rules concerning 
governance, freedom of commerce, trading in wealth, rules of personal property and 
provisions and foundations on which the society is based in a way that do not violate final 
decisions and major principles of Islamic Sharia.
278
 
This is an unfortunate definition that is so broad and hence susceptible to arbitrary 
interpretations by the courts and government authorities. It is no doubt at odds with the 
UAE’s ambition to be a global commercial centre. Moreover, Article 235(e) of the UAE 
Code of Civil Procedure (CCP)
279
 stipulates that a foreign judgment may not be executed so 
long as it “does not conflict or contradict with a judgment or order previously passed by 
another Court in the State and does not include any violation of moral code or public order”. 
Given the immutability of public order in the UAE legal system it is unlikely that a contrary 
conclusion may be read in the country’s recent Arbitration Law which applies, as has already 
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 It should be mentioned that Bechtel applied to US federal district courts while the case was pending with 
the Dubai Cassation Court. It was noted there that the nullification of the award on the basis of the oath alone 
“registers at the hypertechnical fringe of what Americans would call justice”. In re Arbitration between 
International Bechtel Co Ltd v Department of Civil Aviation of the Government of Dubai [Bechtel I] 300 F Supp, 
2d 112, at 118 (DDC, 2004). Funnily enough, once the Cassation judgment was issued, the US federal courts in 
a rather calculated move proceeded to dismiss Bechtel’s petition on the ground that the UAE was not at the 
time a signatory to the New York Convention and therefore was not entitled to relief under the Convention 
nor the US Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) because the parties had failed to agree that a judgment on the award 
could be entered in a US court, as is otherwise required by section 9 of the FAA. See Bechtel II, 360 F Supp, 2d 
136, at 137 (DDC, 2005). 
277
 Federal Law No 5/1985. 
278
 Article 27 of the Civil Code stipulates that “the provisions of all the laws which would be against the Islamic 
Sharia, public policy or good morals of the State of the United Arab Emirates shall not be applied”. This test 
supplements that which is found in Article 3 of the Civil Code. 
279
 Federal Law No 10/1992. 
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been considered, to international arbitration. This outcome is reinforced by the fact that the 
UAE views public order and public policy from a local lens.
280
 
 In a recent judgment rendered by the Dubai Court of Cassation one sees the same 
maladies that plagued it in the Bechtel case. In case 180/2011 the respondent had filed a 
claim before the Dubai Court of First Instance (CFI), requesting the recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award rendered by a sole arbitrator under the DIAC Rules. The 
matter seemed simple enough, encompassing a sale agreement of a unit entered into with the 
appellant, a local real estate developer. The respondent claim before the arbitrator was that 
the agreement was null and void because the purchase had not been registered with the 
Interim Real Estate Register of Dubai within the determined period, as is otherwise required 
under Article 3 of Law No 13/2008 regulating the Interim Real Estate Register. As a result, 
the arbitrator determined that the purchase agreement was invalid and ordered the real estate 
developer to return the sale amount and pay interest as well as the other party’s arbitration 
costs. The CFI upheld the dictum of the arbitral awards and rejected the arguments of the real 
estate developed that the arbitrator had exceeded the limits of his jurisdiction and in doing so 
violated his right to defend himself. When the case ultimately reached the Dubai Court of 
Cassation, it decided to justify the developer principally on grounds of public policy and 
arbitrability. It referred to Article 203(4) of the CCP and argued that the matter at hand was 
not susceptible to conciliation and was therefore beyond the lawful ambit of arbitral 
disposition by the parties. It went on to emphasize that:  
 
… The selling of units without compliance with the registration requirement as provided for 
in Article 3 of Law No. 13/2008 may not be the subject matter of arbitration simply because 
this sale without registration contravenes public policy. Therefore, where a dispute subject to 
Article 3 of Law No 13/2008 is brought before an arbitral tribunal, and that tribunal rendered 
an award settling that dispute, such award is null as only the Court shall decide on the same 
dispute, at its own discretion, as it is a matter which relates to public policy.
281
 
Although this is not an international arbitral award, the case is emblematic of the approach of 
the Dubai Court of Cassation. No doubt, the Emirate should have its laws implemented 
                                                          
280
 One should also consider Article 203)4) of the CCP which stipulates the well-known arbitrability test in 
Islamic jurisprudence, according to which matters not susceptible to conciliation are equally not susceptible to 
arbitration. Again, this principle applies to international awards sought to be enforced in the UAE. Matters that 
are not subject to conciliation are referred to in Article 733 of the Civil Code. 
281
 Dubai Court of Cassation, Case No 180/2011, judgment (12 February 2012). 
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without failure by all persons, especially where this relates to a sensitive financial field such 
as real estate. It is within the interests of the State to know and regulate in detail the purchase 
of real estate and the registration of sales is an integral aspect of the laws of all nations, 
industrialized and non-industrialized. However, the Court in the present case could have 
taken a much different route and could have avoided giving the impression that public policy 
may extinguish legitimate expectations and legal certainty.
282
 
 For one thing, if every violation of the substantive or procedural law of a nation 
amounted to a public policy concern that sufficed to render an arbitral award unenforceable, 
then arbitration would not exist. Therefore, one is in the dark as to the methodological criteria 
of the Court in respect of the public policy violation in the present case. The objective of the 
parties was to determine whether the agreement was valid, not to substitute the State in its 
land registration function. In fact, the award itself recognized that the purchase was invalid 
precisely because it had not been registered. The arbitrator had complied with the local legal 
requirements and the award was both lawful and legitimate. Of course, the effects of the 
Bechtel judgment were much more significant that the present case because the irregularity 
complained of was of little value, whereas in the present case the violation was indeed 
significant. The Dubai Cassation Court could have just as well proclaimed that the matter was 
not arbitrable and avoided any references to public policy, which was unfortunate because it 
created unnecessary confusion. 
 A ray of hope in the cloudy world of UAE public policy, and particularly that of the 
jurisprudence of the Dubai Court of Cassation, has been offered by the Court itself. It has 
ruled that not all procedural faults fall within the sphere of public policy. In the case at hand 
it held that the expiration of an arbitration agreement does not relate to public policy. Rather, 
the concerned party has the burden of invoking the nullity of the agreement before the 
arbitrators or the courts. If he, or she, fails to do so, that person cannot later invoke said 
expiration as a public policy ground in order to refuse enforcement of the ensuing award.
283
 
This line of judgments reinforces my previously held view that the Bechtel decision was 
exceptional in that the winning party was unfortunate that its opponent was a government 
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 See K Mechantaf, H Al-Mullah, Public Policy in the UAE as a Ground for Refusing Recognition and 
Enforcement of Awards (6 July 2012), available at: 
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/07/06/public-policy-in-the-uae-as-a-ground-for-refusing-
recognition-and-enforcement-of-awards/>. 
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 Dubai Court of Cassation, case No 322/2004, judgment (11 April 2005); Dubai Court of Cassation, case No 
141/2006, judgment (10 October 2006). 
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entity. It does not of course mean that we can predict with any degree of certainly the 
mentality and direction of the Dubai Court of Cassation in similar circumstances. 
 Although as we have already indicated Bahraini law is silent as to what constitutes 
public policy, it is safe to assume that any fundamental violations of the Sharia as well as 
mandatory provisions of statutory law will be found to contravene public policy. The 
Bahraini Court of Cassation seems to have taken a more liberal attitude towards public policy 
without restraining itself with minor technicalities and thus frustrating without much reason 
party autonomy. By way of illustration, the Court has ruled that although the parties cannot 
waive mandatory rules that direct them to litigation by submitting their dispute to arbitration. 
However, in a case concerning a labor dispute where mandatory rules applied, the Court ruled 
that the parties may validly refer to arbitration pecuniary rights and interests generated by 
public policy matters, as was the case at hand.
284
 This is reminiscent of the breakthrough 
decisions of the US Supreme Court whereby it distinguished between the public character of 
anti-trust conduct from its contractual and pecuniary dimension in respect of which there was 
no reason why the parties could not validly refer to arbitration.
285
  
 An exception to this principle was introduced by the Bahraini Court of Cassation in a 
case where one of the parties to an arbitral award challenged the award on the basis that it 
was issued by the arbitrator after the 3-month mandatory period stipulated under Bahraini 
law. Although the Court did not specifically invoke public policy, it held that the parties do 
not have the capacity to waive this requirement through a mutual agreement and therefore an 
award that is rendered at an expired date is null and void.
286
 Although this judgment is 
consistent with the principle enunciated by the Court in case No 79/2005
287
 (i.e. that the 
parties are not free to waive the substantive dimension of mandatory rules) it seems rather 
harsh to nullify an award in respect of which neither party protested at the time of issuance. 
In order to mitigate the harshness of this line of thinking the Court has emphasized that rules 
of evidence, as opposed to substantive rules, do not relate to public policy.
288
 This judgment 
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 Bahraini Court of Cassation, case No 79/2005, judgment (24 October 2005). 
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 The leading Arab jurisprudence on the issue comes from Egypt. There, the Egyptian Court of Cassation – 
and it should be remembered that both the UAE and Bahrain have been significantly influenced by Egyptian 
law-making- has ruled that not all mandatory rules are relevant to public policy. See case No 1259/49, 
judgment (13 May 1983) and Egyptian Court of Cassation, case No 326/51, judgment (31 January 1986). 
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 Bahraini Court of Cassation, case No 305/2004, judgment (9 May 2005). 
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 It is also very much consistent with the Dubai Court of First Instance, case No 268/2010, judgment (12 
January 2011), where it was held that two arbitral awards were void because they were issued more than six 
months after the first arbitration hearing. 
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 Bahraini Court of Cassation, case No 165/2005, judgment (3 October 2005). 
 131 
 
is certainly at odds with its Bechtel counterpart decided by the Dubai Court of Cassation, 
because it clearly suggests that the swearing of witnesses and oath-taking, both of which are 
procedural rules, are not related to public policy and therefore an arbitral award whereby 
these had not been complied with would survive and be enforced. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It was stated in the Introduction to this thesis that having reached the end of the research and 
after having examined in detail all matters pertinent to the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in Bahrain and the UAE that the conclusion would not necessarily focus on 
summarising what has already been said, but on what needs to be done in order to render the 
two legal systems all that more effective. This is no easy task because according to the data 
available, a significant number of foreign arbitral awards are brought before the courts of 
Bahrain and the UAE for recognition and enforcement because the parties have assets therein. 
Despite some isolated incidents, most of which were remedied in one form of another by 
judgments offered in other courts, the perception of foreign lawyers is certainly not that the 
UAE and Bahrain are hostile to the enforcement of foreign awards. This is consistent with the 
conclusion reached by this author, i.e., that the two nations are generally arbitration-friendly, 
generating significant amounts of revenues for foreign law firms to continue expanding their 
presence there. Hence, if one were to offer any concrete recommendations in terms of 
improvement these would have to offer something new to an already successful system. 
 
 
6.1 Impediments to Enforcement from the Practitioner’s Perspective and 
Appropriate Solutions to the Problems Raised 
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One does not expect his or her clients, or clients involved in litigation more generally, to 
possess an understanding of the relevant procedures or to be aware of arbitration-friendly 
jurisdictions, such that would render any prospective award enforceable there. The clients’ 
perspective is necessarily coloured by their legal teams’ experience and is fleshed out by 
means of their conversations with their legal teams. Clients, whether commercial entities or 
investors, choose to enter into contractual relationships with a view to making profit, with 
legal considerations playing a part, but not a determinative one. Given that arbitration is a 
process typically associated with the legal profession it is prudent to determine under what 
light this profession views the enforcement practices of the UAE and Bahrain from the point 
of view of advising their clients that they should invest and trade there. The key terms are 
legitimate expectations and legal certainty, especially since the enforcement of an arbitral 
award coincides with the raison d’etre of the parties’ contract and their obligations therein. 
Hence, it is not merely a part of the contract, it is the contract. Given, as was stated in the 
Introduction, that there is no empirical dimension to this thesis, including interviews, the 
perceptions of the legal profession will be assessed from the point of view of an independent 
observer who will proceed to step into their shoes, although this is done sparingly and some 
use is made, especially in chapter 1a, of existing studies to this effect. 
 From the outset it should be pointed out that there is nothing inherently controversial 
in the arbitration laws of the two nations. If nothing, given their extensive reliance on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law they can be viewed as manifestations of this Law. However, it is 
with the interpretation of the local statutes that the problem really lies. It should be 
emphasised that throughout the thesis the reader will have observed that there was nothing 
particularly controversial about the judgments that have come out from the senior courts of 
Bahrain – although this of course may be attributable to the fact that no complex cases have 
come before them. Rather, it is the Cassation Court of Dubai that has given rise to much 
criticism with isolated decisions such as Bechtel.
289
 This is worth signalling out because it 
stands out for the concern and retreat it has caused, as well as for its rather biased reasoning. 
 It will be remembered that in this case the Cassation Court of Dubai ruled that 
because an arbitral tribunal had not administered an oath to the witnesses in accordance with 
the requirements of the UAE Federal Code of Civil Procedure – and more specifically the 
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 International Bechtel Co Ltd v Department of Civil Aviation of the Government of Dubai, Dubai Court of 
Cassation, case No 503/2003, judgment (15 May 2004). This same result was later reaffirmed by the Court in 
case No 322/2004, judgment (11 April 2005). 
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wording of the oath – the entire award was deemed to be null and void. It will also be 
remembered that the losing party in the arbitration was a Dubai government entity engaged in 
a commercial activity. That this judgment is fundamentally problematic is without doubt and 
this opinion has been expressed by all professional commentators. However, what is of 
interest in the present analysis is whether this decision and its follow-up will be detrimental 
to the views of the legal profession working or bringing legal business to Dubai and the UAE 
more generally. 
 In the aftermath of the Bechtel judgment there was significant confusion among the 
international legal community. On the one hand there was uncertainty as to whether the 
Dubai Cassation Court had retracted back to an anachronistic public policy defence with 
general application, or whether this was simply a one-off decision with a view to protecting 
the particular government entity from civil liability. On the other hand, the fear was 
expressed that even if this was a one-off, it was not certain that the Court would fail to 
honour its ruling in subsequent cases, particularly since a losing party could find this 
precedent attractive. In the latter scenario, the fear is that if the Court were to “save face” and 
honour the precedent it set, many cases would fail to be enforced on very narrow technical 
grounds. More worrying is the fact that future claimants may not simply rely on the narrow 
set of facts as those relied on in the Bechtel case (the inappropriateness of the administered 
oath), but may in fact go a step further and apply this ruling in analogy to all situations where 
a narrow technical rule with no significance to the merits of the case has been breached by 
the arbitrator, even if the parties failed to protest at the time. 
 Legal professionals want to be able to advise their clients that the very expensive and 
time-consuming arbitral award they have been successfully pursuing is not simply an empty 
promise, but is in fact susceptible to fast and effective recognition and enforcement in the 
country or countries where the losing party has assets. Given the assets held by individuals 
and companies in the UAE and Bahrain, it is natural that lawyers suggest that enforcement be 
sought there. When enforcement is sought in a country, it is presumed that a loss accrues to 
the losing entity and to the country at large. This presumption is based on the fact that the 
winning entity will repatriate all its earnings from the enforcing nation. No doubt, this 
assumption is true, but it paints only a minor part of a much larger picture. A country that is 
deemed to be investor-friendly, but particularly arbitration and enforcement-friendly, has a 
number of enticing advantages. For one thing, it attracts a higher concentration of lawyers 
who in turn will advise their clients that enforcement in that country is expedient and to their 
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interest. This raises legal fees and associated court fees and augments the profit accruing to 
the “legal industry”. This in turn feeds not only the local legal profession but also associated 
professions, such as clerks, accountants, secretaries, surveyors, engineers, bailiffs, not to 
mention the secondary economy, which is concerned with the feeding, clothing and housing 
of those professionally engaged in this industry. As we shall see in the next section, the 
arbitration business, including its enforcement strand, are incorporeal commodities that have 
just as much value as produce derived from the land. Thus, even if the winning party 
repatriates its winning assets from the territory of the enforcing State, this is only a temporary 
setback, given that by opening up one’s jurisdiction to such claims one is necessarily 
investing in one’s legal system and its capacity in attracting those who wish to make good use 
of the legal system. 
 The second major advantage of having an efficient enforcement regime relates to the 
capacity of this legal system to be the recipient of legal claims, including enforcement claims, 
and judicial cooperation requests against other legal systems. In this manner, along with the 
trust that comes with having a liberal and trustworthy legal system, the legal profession will 
also use that legal system to bring claims it cannot easily bring elsewhere, in the knowledge 
that the courts of said legal system can assist in transferring such claims abroad effectively 
and diligently. It is no wonder, therefore, that the courts of New York and London have seen 
a significant degree of international and transnational litigation, even in respect of cases that 
had little relevance with the two jurisdictions, simply because the legal profession behind 
these cases was not only familiar with the two legal systems, but also because they were 
keenly aware that their courts would issue sensible enforcement judgments, as well as 
international injunctions against recalcitrant parties. Thus, it is fair to say that the courts of 
London and New York have in essence become international courts that decide matters 
beyond their immediate jurisdiction simply because of their perception in the eyes of the legal 
profession. 
 This is exactly the kind of perception that the courts of the UAE and Bahrain should 
be looking for. Nonetheless, this does not mean, and in no way am I suggesting otherwise, 
that the two nations should in the process give up their religious, cultural and social identity 
in order to render themselves global legal systems, in the manner of London and New York. 
On the contrary, a solid legal system must depend on strong social – or religious and ethical 
as the case may be – values in order to yield legitimacy from within and also to garner respect 
from outside. It would be absurd to divest the Bahraini and UAE legal system from those 
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distinct characteristics that make it Arabic and adherent to a post-classical Islam, as it would 
also be absurd to return to a system of Islamic interpretation similar to that of Saudi Arabia, 
as this is no longer consistent with the social and cultural climate of the UAE and Bahrain. At 
the same time,  however, what is needed in order to entrench and fortify internal legitimacy 
and attract external approval is to render certain elements of commercial laws far more 
precise and subject to legitimate expectations. The legal profession does not expect Bahraini 
and UAE courts to adhere to Western laws or to adopt judgments in the same socio-cultural 
light as the courts in New York and London. They know very well that the courts of the Gulf 
have to respect their cultural and religious heritage and expect nothing less. What they are 
demanding is that the laws and the judgments of the courts be made predictable and subject to 
the highest degree of legal certainty, even though in their vast majority judgments are 
predictable. So, here I am referring to the isolated aberrations, which although isolated, 
provide bad publicity to the system as a whole 
 Arbitrability and the various vague strands of public policy are areas where concerted 
effort is required in order to render them more predictable and in order to avoid situations 
such as that of Bechtel. Because even a Bechtel-type impediment, if it is well advertised in a 
law, will not be ignored by the lawyers of the parties, even if one deems it unreasonable to 
observe such technical criteria in the course of an arbitral hearing. The law-makers of both 
notions ought to collect in a single legislative instrument all those issues that they deem 
contrary to Islamic or Gulf public policy and public order and render this law a supplement to 
the existing arbitration legislation. Although it would be prudent for such a law to be as 
extensive and detailed as possible, this may make it rather rigid and inflexible. Whatever 
choice of drafting is ultimately adopted it should be supplemented with a solid commentary 
based on the travaux of the drafting process on the basis of which the judges may draw 
appropriate analogies or references in order to dispel any disputes that come before them by 
the parties. As things currently stand the legal profession can only guess as to what issues 
may come under the umbrella of public policy. The introduction of a legislative instrument 
will take away much of the uncertainty, the arbitrariness and the element of surprise currently 
felt by the legal community. Such a development will also begin the process for the 
harmonisation of the public policy debate in the Gulf and among Arab nations more 
generally. 
 It is also crucial that a similar statute be adopted on the issue of arbitrability. Although 
it is common in all Western nations to treat arbitrability through dispersed laws and rules, the 
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situation in the Gulf is rather different. In the West, arbitrability is not necessarily 
synonymous with public policy, the latter being perceived in narrow terms. On the contrary, 
in the Muslim world public policy and arbitrability are more or less the same and therefore 
there is an urgent need to delineate its precise boundaries. A statute that would deal with both 
public policy and arbitrability would constitute the ideal solution to this problem and would 
clear up much of the indeterminacy. It is crucial that if the governments of the two nations 
were to take up this idea and conjure a relevant law encompassing and clarifying arbitrability 
and public policy that they do not do so in isolation of their stakeholders. There has to be a 
strong and open public consultation process with the local and international legal profession 
practicing therein, the local chambers of commerce and foreign businesses operating there, as 
well as religious leaders. The final outcome should garner the widest possible public support 
and should reflect the opinion of the countries’ direct stakeholders otherwise it will be 
doomed to failure. 
 It is equally important that once a new code or law is promulgated under the widest 
possible public consultation that the judiciary be given directions to apply the new law 
objectively and without opposition. A new precise law will make it far easier for the ultimate 
judicial institutions such as the courts of cassation to give rulings that do not require 
interpretative thinking or other means of imaginative construction. Such a development will 
allow a more fruitful discussion about the compatibility of arbitration and its various strands 
with Islamic law more generally, something which has not really occurred in the UAE and 
Bahrain.   
It is also prudent, in order to fizzle out Bechtel-type situations from the list of 
precedent of higher courts that the authorities set up standing committees, such as the Law 
Commission of England and Wales, to review the law every ten years or so with a view to 
eliminating all those judgments and institutions that are aberrations or which have not worked 
as originally expected. It would be ideal if local and international experts were appointed to 
such standing committees because their work would facilitate and enhance the role of law-
makers in the two jurisdictions. The ultimate decision about adopting the recommendations 
of these standing committees will naturally lie with the legislative bodies of the UAE and 
Bahrain and apart from political considerations it would be unwise to reject proposals that 
have received wide stakeholder support and which are moreover in tune with international 
developments and which in no way breach social and other mores. 
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6.2 Arbitral Forums as Places of Contention and Competition 
 
This section will kick off with a very simple question. Why do Bahrain and the UAE desire to 
be perceived as arbitration-friendly and enforcement-friendly jurisdictions? This question 
was partially addressed in the previous section when dealing with the incentives of being 
enforcement-friendly. Yet, this would work well with countries that have relied excessively 
on the provision of services as their primary income source, which is to a large degree the 
case with Dubai, but not the remainder of the UAE or Bahrain. The establishment of 
arbitration free zones or the DIFC are manifestations of a desire to capture part of the global 
dispute resolution market, which as has already been explained is rather lucrative and brings 
with it a vibrant secondary economy. For Bahrain and the UAE, in the opinion of this author, 
the attraction of the arbitration world in their respective jurisdictions is a reaffirmation of 
their place in the global economy, not simply as mere oil-pumping nations but as equal 
partners in a world where the real money-makers are those who provide expensive services, 
whose cost is far smaller than manufacturing and engineering. 
 Are States competing among themselves for the share of the global dispute resolution 
market? The simple answer is a flat, yes! Not only are they competing, but they are vying for 
clients. In fact, there is significant competition within the UAE itself, not to mention between 
the various Gulf nations. This is evident principally from the varieties of institutional 
mechanisms that have sprung up throughout the Arab world, with or without the intervention 
of well-established institutional arbitral mechanisms in the UK and USA. There is certainly 
enough work to go around for everyone, albeit there is no denying that like-minded States 
compete among themselves for the coveted prize. More significantly, research suggests that 
whereas the European arbitration market is saturated the Asian market continues to provide 
significant opportunities for growth. 
 The outcome of this competition can be both negative and positive. The negative 
dimension forces States to commit financial resources that would best be deployed to offset 
other social needs. On the positive side, a healthy competition is great for legal professionals 
because it makes their product cheaper, easier to sell to clients and more effective. 
Competition among nations is a catalyst for such changes, the effect of which is then 
immediately felt by the clients. We have not yet seen the fruits of this competition in the Gulf 
States, or at least this has not yet become evident to this author, although the growth of the  
legal industry there may be the first important sign. Ultimately, however, many restrictions 
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and impediments will be lifted and new and precise laws will be enacted so as to convey a 
greater feeling of legal certainty. This outcome should not be divorced from the practice of 
Bahrain and the UAE in respect of the recognition and enforcement of foreign court 
judgments as the two constitute an integral part of a much larger process. It is only hoped that 
this competition will not simply be a drive to the top but a means of providing a better service 
and as enhancing the existing legal system. By conclusion, the competition between London, 
New York and Paris has not stopped other jurisdictions from claiming a stake in the 
burgeoning market, particularly Hong Kong, Singapore and Stockholm, among others. It is 
hoped that this healthy competitions drives the relevant actors in Bahrain and the UAE. 
6.3 The Need for Judicial Clarity and the Role of Transnational Precedent 
 
What makes London and New York significant players in the global dispute resolution 
industry is the fact that their local courts not only produce independent judgments that are 
respected worldwide and assist the parties in enforcing their awards, but also because said 
courts produce judgments that are clear, concise and leave no future room for arbitrary 
manoeuvres. According to this author, the quality of judgments differs significantly from one 
court to another and from one jurisdiction to another. In theory, when a case goes before a 
higher court, such as a supreme court or a court of cassation, the expectation is that the 
judgment delivered by this court will set a precedent for future cases in that country. Hence, 
its deliberation is doubly important, both for the parties at hand as well as for future litigants. 
It goes without saying therefore that judgments delivered by higher courts in precedent-
setting cases should allow future litigants and their lawyers to form a precise view of their 
arguments so that they can rely on them and that other persons in the jurisdiction can rely in 
addition in order to reform their conduct accordingly. This can only be achieved if said 
judgments are detailed enough both in their factual and legal analysis. The latter is no doubt 
of the utmost important. The judgments delivered thus far by the higher courts of Bahrain and 
the UAE are of excellent quality, albeit the training of the judges and the practice of their 
predecessors has necessarily limited the way in which they view what should be 
encompassed within a judicial order. This is very much down to the distinct legal culture of 
the Gulf, which differs from the culture of courts and tribunals in common law jurisdictions – 
much like the courts in the Gulf their counterparts in civil law nations provide rather brief 
judgments. The DIFC judgments handed down to date are very similar to those delivered in 
common law jurisdictions, the reason of course being that the judges appointed to the DIFC 
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courts have their origin in the legal profession in the common law, whether from England, 
Singapore, or elsewhere.  
 With regard to decisions in the field of international arbitration, a further condition is 
pertinent in the relevant judgments. Given that the international arbitration laws in both the 
UAE and Bahrain have been based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, the intention of their 
drafters must have been to elicit international best practices, harmonise their rules and 
regulations to the benefit of the legal profession and in the interest of greater volumes of 
litigation. This necessarily entails paying some attention to the legal developments in other 
nations. It would be inconceivable therefore for a court in the UAE, for example, to decide an 
issue of separability and make no mention at all to the abundant case law on the matter based 
on judgments from respected courts all over the world, when there is no similar judgment in 
the UAE and taking into consideration that the relevant provision in the UAE statute is based 
on the UNCITRAL Model Law. The courts of London, New York, Hong Kong and many 
others routinely cite the judgments of other courts and tribunals when considering cases with 
an international element and this certainly the case when considering international arbitration 
disputes. These courts do so not only because there is now an established lex mercatoria in 
the field of international commercial arbitration which is undeniable, but also because foreign 
judgments serve as authorities for the precise interpretation of particular concepts for which 
there is no other precedent or authority in the particular nation. The courts of the UAE and 
Bahrain have been disinclined to employ respected foreign judgments and again this is down 
to their judges’ legal culture, which has generally been apprehensive in the use of foreign 
precedent. Judges in these two nations focus only on domestic law, disregarding international 
development. 
 According to this author, said approach of the judges in the UAE and Bahrain is 
problematic. International arbitration involves foreign parties and perhaps also some local 
parties. When all these actors signed a contract setting forth an arbitration clause they had a 
clear vision of the relevant process and their legal advisors were well aware of the 
transnational jurisprudence which provides a distinct degree of authority. It is therefore rather 
retrogressive when these same lawyers have to apply for enforcement in the UAE and 
Bahrain and the courts refuse to recognise their award on the basis of a legal analysis that is 
completely divorced from international practice and the foundations which were all too 
familiar to them. While it is understandable that certain mandatory rules are not susceptible to 
conformity with international practice, particularly arbitrability and public policy – in general 
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terms all other matters have some basis in transnational precedent. If the judges are not 
familiar with such precedent – assuming that they were allowed to make use of it – then 
without going into a process of training them, it may be a good idea if said judges were given 
suitable clerks with experience in the relevant fields who could act as their advisors on the 
law, in the same manner as the clerkship systems works in the USA. Following the approval 
of the judges as to the relevance of the transnational precedent or practice, the clerks could 
then be authorised – in the case of the UAE and Bahrain – expand on and write the relevant 
part of the judgments as is common practice in many overburdened courts that employ clerks. 
 There does not seem to be any explicit rule in the law of the UAE and Bahrain that 
forbids the judges from employing foreign law to the merits of a dispute. In fact, this author 
would add that as long as the foreign law does not clash fundamentally with domestic law 
and the countries’ constitutional sources, it may legally be employed by the courts. From a 
practical point of view, once a Gulf court issues a decision involving foreign precedent it will 
possess the authority to render its own judgment a matter of domestic as well as international 
precedent. This will give a significant amount of authority to the courts of the UAE and 
Bahrain and advertise the two countries as progressive and as adhering to the rule of law. 
 
6.4 The Role of Amicus Briefs 
 
It is common practice for courts in the common law world, as well as international courts and 
tribunals, to accept amicus briefs from non-interested third parties with the object of 
illuminating the court as to the law in the particular case. Amicus briefs have proven 
extremely useful in areas which the court has little or no expertise and is also a good way of 
demonstrating that the courts are not closed institutions but rather that they are open to the 
public and are as a result transparent. Even the ICSID Tribunal, and its various emanations, 
has gone ahead to accept amicus briefs. This is significant given that ICSID is an arbitral 
tribunal and it is well known that arbitral proceedings are covered by a cloak of 
confidentiality to which third parties have no entry rights. The higher courts in Bahrain and 
the UAE could also be the recipients of amicus briefs, especially from counsel, both foreign 
and local, working in the region who have an interest in specifying to the courts where the 
law is and where it is heading. In this manner the courts will get an idea of the views of the 
legal profession on a particular matter. Moreover, amicus briefs may equally give rise to a 
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healthier civil society not only in the narrower field of arbitration, but also more generally in 
other fields of commerce, economic and social life. 
 Very importantly, amici briefs from recognised think tanks could render the courts an 
instrument of commercial policy in the following manner. Where the stated aim of Bahrain 
and the UAE is to become international arbitral centres, the courts of the two nations stand 
out as beacons regarding their claim to a modern, efficient and international-leaning legal 
system. Therefore, the courts need to be appraised of international developments constantly 
and pay heed to legal initiatives elsewhere. The judges cannot afford to be trained 
continuously on such matters as this would defeat the interests of justice. Rather, in addition 
to the appointment of law clerks, it is imperative that one or several think tanks apprise the 
courts of international developments so that the courts can decide whether they wish to go 
down that same route or deviate from said route in order to attract a greater volume of 
litigation and arbitration, without necessarily violating the forum’s laws.  
 As things stand, the judges are unable to fathom international developments in the 
fields under their docket because they lack the requisite knowledge and expertise, have no 
one to advise them and do not perceive that they have an additional role – albeit indirect one 
– to promote the commercial and economic interests of their nation without compromising 
justice. I am not of course suggesting that the courts should become direct organs of the State 
and execute State policies, but the courts should sensitive to the situation on the ground and 
conform in their judgments as much as possible – without in any way compromising justice – 
to the confirmed policies of the country they are serving. 
 That justice needs modernisation in the UAE and Bahrain is without question. In this 
thesis, including its conclusion, this author has merely dealt with the practice of enforcing 
foreign arbitral awards and the obstacles that impede such enforcement. It was not the aim of 
this thesis to set out a general discussion about the judicial system in the two nations, 
particularly since the subject matter of the thesis was rather limited from the outset. That is 
why the recommendations in the Conclusion are not meant to exhaustive, albeit the majority 
of these recommendations could find concrete applications in all areas of arbitration and 
could enhance the work and efficiency of the respective judicial systems. There is no doubt 
that in the coming years the two nations under consideration will attract a significant portion 
not only of international trade and commerce but also of the burgeoning dispute resolution 
industry that has hit the shores of Bahrain and the UAE since the early 1980s. There has been 
much improvement by the passage of specialist laws, especially in the field of arbitration, 
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supplemented by more general laws that are relevant to all the actors involved in arbitral 
proceedings. Moreover, the courts have provided a tremendous degree of legal certainty and 
have cemented the reputation of the two nations as countries strongly adhering to the rule of 
law and the rules and practices of international commerce. The next phase of modernisation 
should be grounded on two axes: the first should culminate in the introduction of court 
judgments that are precise enough to create solid precedents; this should be supplemented by 
the passage of legislation that clarifies all existing gaps in the law, such as in the field of 
arbitrability and public policy; the second should comprise of a mechanism that takes into 
consideration developments in the progressive and successful arbitration nations with a view 
to taking measures that makes them competitive and more attractive to the international legal 
profession and their clients. This is still a rather long road but it is hoped that the present 
thesis has made even a minor contribution towards this end. 
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